Dacca: The present crisis in East Pakistan, unlike the natural catastrophe of last November's cyclone, had not left too many marks, said President Yahya Khan in his first press conference two months after military intervention in his nation's east wing. He added that he would soon visit East Pakistan to see the situation for himself.

Such a move indeed is desirable since the president's judgement to date seems to have been based exclusively on reports from his own military chiefs in the east. These reports have reflected exaggerated optimism rather than cool realism. In fact, there are many far worse scars left by the recent man-made calamity than last year's tidal wave. There's no doubt that the Pakistani army won the first round against secessionist forces and succeeded in gaining almost complete control of the province. But a much more difficult problem-which may prove insurmountable at least in the short term - lies ahead. This is to regain the confidence of the defeated Bengalis.

The national flag flying in all villages and towns today is more of a signal of fear than loyalty, depression than hope. East Pakistan's body may still be intact but no blood runs through its veins.

Possibly the most depressing experience for the visitor is to find a ghostly emptiness pervading settlements which once bubbled with life. Millions have fled the towns straddling the main traffic routes running parallel to the Indian border. They may return only when the army has further consolidated its control and proved that it is sincere in its promise that amnesty will be granted. Though Dacca, the capital, and other cities such as Chittagong and Comilla are hesitatingly returning to life, the province as a whole is far from normal.

"What else can you expect after a civil war?" said a West Pakistani civil servant just posted to Dacca. Indeed, what else? But was it really civil war?

It seemed more a battle between Bengalis and non- Bengalis, a bloody collision between totally different ethnic groups regardless of their views on Islam, considered by Pakistan's founders as the binding factor in national unity.

The events of March and April until recently remained a mystery to the outside world. Today they speak for themselves. The headquarters of outlawed Awami League leader Sheik Mujibur Rahman at Chittagong are still caked with blood, a grim memorial to a slaughter of Urdu-speaking Biharis by Bengalis.

Hundreds were killed at the Awami League offices and at a jute mill just outside Chittagong where a kindergarten became the execution centre for women who were first raped and then, along with their children, beheaded.

In Thakurgaon, a town in northern East Pakistan which has a large nonBengali population, the killing may have been even worse. There I saw hundreds of women crying in the streets - widows of some of the 7,000 Biharis reported to have been massacred.

What happened when the army finally moved can only be imagined. But the story was clearly written in the fearful faces of the town's Bengalis: Whenever a soldier appeared they quickly ducked from view or saluted anxiously.

Even clearer proof of how the rebels acted and the troops retaliated can be seen in the ruins at Khulna, Jessore, Chittagong and many other places. There streets have been almost totally razed. The few buildings left standing are deserted. Most shops remain closed.

After touring the province, talking with army officers, Biharis and Bengalis, it was not difficult to piece together a chronology of events which led to the carnage. President Yahya obviously decided finally on March 23 or 24 to call for army intervention after the failure of his negotiations with Sheik Mujib on the degree of autonomy East Pakistan should have.

Yahya believed he had evidence that the Awami League high command was going to arrest him and capture Dacca airport and Chittagong harbour. The army, according to Major General Rao Farman Ali, responsible for civil administration in the province, also had reason to fear rebellion by the East Pakistan Rifles, the East Bengal Regiment and the police in collaboration with Dacca University students.

When the army finally struck at the East Pakistan capital on March 25 it had three objectives: control of the barracks, the police headquarters and the university. In the night which followed the army apparently made a terrifying example of Mujib's followers. The immediate result was that Bengali forces across the province turned on their West Pakistani officers, killed them and then launched into an orgy of bloodletting, the Awami League action against Biharis at Chittagong being their example.

Major General Rahim Khan, martial law administrator of East Pakistan's Sector I who has his headquarters at Dacca, admitted that five battalions of the East Bengal Regiment (about 4,000 men), about 14,000 members of the East Pakistan Rifles and almost 30,000 police had deserted government ranks. "We are very much ashamed of it," said the general. "That was the first mutiny in the Pakistani army."

Rahim Khan claimed that at the time of intervention only 8,000 West Pakistani soldiers were in the east wing, "but within five weeks we got every inch of East Pakistan under our control".

This seemed a slight exaggeration when other reports were considered. However, in a week of touring the province I did not see a single incident and all army officers insisted that "the war is over". They even scoffed when asked if there was a likelihood of increased guerilla activity during the monsoon season or of Indian intervention.

Said Rao Farman Ali: "Our only major task left now is to remobilise the economy in general and the communications system in particular." The vital rail link between Dacca and Chittagong, broken by the blowing up of three bridges by the rebels, would be restored by this week, he said. When this was achieved rice and wheat distribution to the northern parts of the province would no longer be a problem.

Asked about the refugee problem, Rao Farman Ali said: "If India would stop its malicious propaganda concerning conditions in East Pakistan and refrain from deliberately creating a refugee problem it would be much easier for us to finally normalise the situation. Nevertheless we are hopeful because the people already have started coming back."

However, the present collaboration between Biharis and the army, held up as an example of the "return to normal" in East Pakistan, must in itself be open to question. The Bengali majority obviously see it as a move directed against them.

For President Yahya, the crucial question is whether to find a political solution which would create confidence, or to sue for confidence and thus pave the way for a political solution. As things stand, his only chance seems to be to offer the Bengalis a political scheme which will provide them with greater autonomy. If the plan he has promised to announce does not include such an assurance, it will be virtually impossible to fill the giant political vacuum created by the outlawing of the Awami League.