NEW DELHI, Sept. 5—Relations between New Delhi and Washington have deteriorated seriously, in the last few months and although misunderstandings between the Indians and Americans have, always been more the rule than the exeption, this time the rupture seems basic, bitter and deep, and unlikely to be smoothed over easily. The reasons for the Indian bitterness are obvious—the refusal of the Nixon Administration to publicly denounce the five‐month‐old Pakistani military repression aimed at crushing the independence movement in East Pakistan, and the Administration's decision to continue some arms shipments to Pakistan under old licensing agreements despite, an implied embargo after fighting erupted in East Pakistan.

Diplomatic observers here believe that Washington either did not realize the anger these shipments would arouse in India or did not care. Even if the arms had consisted of only a few crates of bullets or spare parts, an anti‐American furor would have developed. The State Department says the total is $6.2‐million in arms; some Senators have put the figure as high as $35‐million.

The estimated eight million Bengali refugees who have fled into India from East Pakistan have placed crushing burdens on her fragile economy and on the already strained social fabric of her volatile eastern region.

Tense Military Confrontation

The crisis has resulted in a tense military confrontation between predominantly Hindu India and Moslem Pakistan, reviving all the bitter memories of the Hindu‐Moslem bloodshed at the time of partition and of the two brief Indian‐Pakistani wars that followed in 1947 and 1965.

In this context, the emotionalism that has blossomed here would seem to have been predictable. If there is one particular reason why United States policy has foundered here, most analysts feel, it is because it has disregarded the Indian mood and psychology.

“The United States has overlooked completely that there is a moral issue involved here,” said one Foreign Ministry official. “Millions are deeply affected. It's a case of genocide. It's a case of absolute inhumanity. And it's a case of absolute coldness on the part of the United States.”

This attitude is not confined to the Government, but has pervaded all levels of Indian life. The average Indian feels that the United States has lined up with evil and with genocide and with India's enemy, Pakistan. Washington's sizable relief aid for the Bengali refugees has made little impression.

Pro‐Americans Critical

Even traditionally pro‐American voices have turned hostile. The Indian Express, in a recent editorial, said: “So far, the Nixon Administration has chosen to pursue a policy of deliberate cynicism in the face of a massive human tragedy. It is a policy wholly alienated from American public opinion as reflected by the American press and other mass media,”

That last sentence reflects the distinction Indians have by and large made between a sympathetic American people and the “cold” Administration. There has been nothing personal about the anti‐American sentiment, and no hint of physical danger to Americans living here has crept into the atmosphere.

Washington's policy as described by American diplomats here is designed to be pragmatic, unemotional, quiet, constructive and sophisticated. It is aimed at keeping a foot in both camps, restraining India and Pakistan from going to war again, and producing stability on the subcontinent.

The Administration, these diplomats say, hopes to retain some leverage over the military regime of President Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan by avoiding any sharp public statements or acts against Pakistan. Reliable sources suggest that the United States is hoping for some short‐term political solution to East Pakistan's civil war and that it sees a united Pakistan under the present Yahya regime as the best means to accomplish this.

These sources also say that the Administration is irritated at India for what it considers aggravation of the crisis—presumably because of the sanctuary and military aid that New Delhi is giving the Bengali guerrillas.

President Nixon himself has discussed his policy in public only once—in an opening statement at a Washington news conference on Aug. 4, the day after the House of Representatives voted a foreign aid bill that would suspend all aid to Pakistan until that country restored “reasonable stability” in East Pakistan.

Nixon Explains Stand

Mr. Nixon criticized the House move as having “seriously jeopardized” Pakistan's ability “to create some stability” and added: “We feel that the most constructive role we can play is to continue our economic assistance to West Pakistan and, thereby, to be able to influence the course of events. We are not going to engage in public pressure on the Government of West Pakistan. That would be totally counterproductive.”

New Delhi officials feel that Mr. Nixon's recent global moves —particularly his overtures for a rapprochement with Communist China—will make India even less important in Washington's designs.

And regardless of whether the new Soviet‐Indian friendship treaty proves of any substantive benefit or not, the Indians, as one foreign observer put it, will remember only that the Russians came to their side in their time of need, while the Americans deserted them.”

There are no current visible major moves by either side to repair the schism in United States‐Indian relations.

The consensus here is that no matter what patchwork is done in the immediate future, the relationship will be a different one from now on. A dramatic shift in United States policy, or a Democratic Administration, might change matters, but the emotional Indian memory of the recent events will probably never fade completely.

An attempt at surface repairs will probably be made when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visits Washington in November as part of a tour of major world capitals to explain the Indo-Soviet treaty and discuss the East Pakistan situation and other matters.