New Delhi

THE developments in Bangla Desh and the consequent worsening of Indo-Pakistan relations have once more highlighted the unavoidable side-issue of Sino-Indian differences. As the situation stands, it appears India and China are poised along two extreme lines of thinking.

Stopping short of recognising Bangla Desh as a sovereign independent state, India has extended support to the people of Bangla Desh and given asylum to the destitute millions fleeing East Bengal out of sheer desperation and terror. China on the other hand has endorsed Pakistan's assertion that the situation in its eastern province is its own affair and that it has been aggravated by India's interference. Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai has assured President Yahya Khan that "should the Indian expansionists dare to launch aggression against Pakistan, the Chinese government and people will as always firmly support the Pakistan government. . ."

This pronouncement naturally gave rise to apprehension in India that in case of an open confrontation between India and Pakistan China would offer its military help to Pakistan. How far this fear has inhibited India's initiative to take bolder postures in regard to Bangla Desh is open to speculation, but there is no doubt that possibilities of Sino-Pakistani collusion worry New Delhi - particularly after Yahya's recent hints of open conflict.

Some people have thus advocated that India start negotiating with China. In their view any progress in this direction would help India take a more resolute stand regarding Pakistan. Others, however, have opposed any such move on the ground that circumstances still do not warrant reconciliation with China. The arguments marshalled in favour of these two conflicting lines of thinking provide an index of current Indian opinion on Sino-indian relations.

Those who advocate reopening talks with China heavily underscore the signs of relaxation in Sino-US relations - the American table tennis team's visit to China, the gradual lifting of travel and trade bans and finally Nixon's announcement of two weeks ago that he would visit Peking sometime within the next 10 months. All these developments, in their view, have an immediate relevance for India also. In such abruptly changed circumstances, when China may not only be recognised by the US and its allies but may also be requested to play an increasingly important role in international affairs, doubts that India can remain indifferent to these changes have arisen. During the 1962 border war with China, India received prompt military assistance from the US government as well as sympathy from the American people. Until very recently India could expect American support on its differences with China.

However, as China and the US move closer, can India continue to receive the same attention? If American warmth towards China results in coolness towards India it is possible New Delhi's dependence on the Soviet Union will increase, damaging India's present posture of equidistance from and equidependence on both the super powers. Erosion of a posture of nonalignment might make it impossible for India to move towards normalisation of relations with China - so long as the Soviet Union opposes such a move.

Another important factor favouring new initiatives in Sino-indian relations is the domestic situation in India. Since the thumping victory of Mrs Indira Gandhi's Congress Party in the last general election a strong and stable government has been formed at the centre. The very fact that the right-wing opposition has been considerably reduced in strength following its defeat at the polls allows for bolder thinking on China by the government, which is currently trying to project a radical image in its domestic policies.

A third stimulant exists favouring normalisation in Sino-Indian relations. Paradoxically enough it comes from the current phase of China's relationship with Pakistan. It is true that since its differences with India started China has moved closer to Pakistan and that every time a crisis has developed in Indo-Pakistani relations it has been unequivocally partisan to the Pakistani t viewpoint. The x readiness with which Q India accepts the idea of collusion between China and Pakistan does indeed, derive from India's past and present experiences.

However, it is questionable that Sino-Pakistani collusion is an incontrovertible feature of the politics of the Indian subcontinent. A distinction must be made between active and formal collusion.

Until now India has very often confused the two and has failed too ask why China would want to convert a profitable formal collusion into an active one. China does not act in support of other powers unless its own national interests are involved. And China's military strength, though far from that of either the Soviet Union or the United States, surpasses India's. China is also enjoying a series of diplomatic successes, first with the shift in the US attitude and secondly with the race among other countries to recognise and open trade relations. In fact, China can now afford to look at India as a small power, not a rival. It need not necessarily support Pakistan on every occasion.

Thus Indian supporters of an "open door policy" with China point out that Peking's various pronouncements on Bangla Desh do not wholly endorse the West Pakistan government's military action against the people of East Bengal. In recent years Peking has made subtle moves to dissociate itself at least partly from Pakistan's overall anti-India posture. During the visit of Pakistan Air Marshal Abdul Rahim Khan to Peking in June 1970, for instance, the New China News Agency deleted his critical references to India's internal policies. Again, during Yahya Khan's visit to Peking in November 1970, Chinese Vice President Tung Pi-wu assured him that "although some people are displeased with the continuous development of the Sino-Pakistani friendly relations and are sowing dissension, we firmly believe that with the joint efforts of our two governments and two peoples they will not succeed". Though outwardly this statement was made as a pledge of support to the Yahya Khan administration, the question arises of why the Chinese felt it necessary to make this pledge at all. In sum, the argument that Sino-Pakistani collusion is more formal than real may indeed have some basis.

The most important constraint against waving the olive branch to Peking at this stage is India's association with the Soviet Union. India has always found the Soviet Union to be a useful ally, especially in view of its support for India's stand on Kashmir. Even at the height of Sino- Indian friendship Peking had scrupulously avoided a similar stance - even though Pakistan was considered to be a satellite of the United States and by implication anti-China as well. In recent years, the Soviet Union has established closer contact with Pakistan and has given it arms and technical assistance, but its support to India on the Kashmir issue remains unchanged. In the context of the Indian subcontinent therefore it is futile to imagine that India can afford to lose Soviet help for as yet undetermined benefits of closer relations with China.

Nor can Soviet help be simply measured statistically. During the critical period of Sino- Indian hostility Soviet support saved India from becoming totally dependent on Western powers. India could also morally justify its position against China because even the Soviet Union - formerly China's closest ally-found itself unable to co-exist with China.

Territorial disputes with China constitute another bond between India and the Soviet Union. Both stress that they have been victims of Chinese aggression and adventurism. The fact that the frontiers between China and India and those between China and Russia continue to be the outstanding issues in the relationships of all three countries automatically provides a concrete basis for closer Indo-Soviet cooperation. So long as China occupies a large chunk of disputed territory and shows no sign of resolving the problem, many think it is not in the interest of India to start negotiating with Peking. There are also strong domestic pressures restricting New Delhi's diplomatic options vis-a-vis China. Hence, although Mrs Gandhi's government enjoys an absolute majority, it cannot ignore the various shades of opposition to any step taken to normalise relations with China.

Finally, China's stand on Bangla Desh demonstrates in effect that its hostility towards India has not relaxed. Whether the Sino-Pakistani collusion is formal or not, the feeling remains that Chinese policies in South Asia are mainly directed against India. To expect that any initiative on India's part to befriend China would be welcome in Peking is unrealistic.

These arguments - both for and against normalising Sino-Indian relations-have certain concrete bases. Frontiers are undoubtedly a difficult matter to resolve, especially when they become central issues involving nationalist sentiment and prestige. India's friendly relations with Russia are also a matter to be considered while making any move towards a detente with Peking. However, the Soviet attitude towards China is not completely rigid and it is quite possible, in view of Sino-American diplomatic moves, that Soviet leaders may try to repair their relations with Peking. In that case it would not be premature for India to explore possibilities for better relations with China without making the Soviet Union unduly suspicious. In light of the Sino-US thaw and Chinese willingness to accept and be acceptable to the international system, there is no reason for China to isolate India. On the contrary, Peking has already shown it is interested in reestablishing diplomatic ties with India.

If India is keen on patching up differences with China there are more positive factors available than before. The image of China over the years has undergone a subtle change in the minds of Indians. By any count China is regarded as a

big power capable of exerting its influence in the world in general and in Asia in particular. In view of this, a policy of accommodation will prove more beneficial to the country than continued hostility. In addition it is now recognised that Chinese diplomatic successes have sometimes resulted in a reduction of India's active role in international affairs.

On the other hand, pre-occupation with supposed Pakistani-Chinese collusion against India has impaired Indian capabilities even in matters having a direct bearing on national interests. This incapacity has been most forcefully demonstrated in the case of Bangla Desh. The fear that any direct action in support of Bangla Desh would bring India into a joint confrontation with Pakistan and China has inhibited New Delhi to the extent that a situation has developed in which millions of refugees have crossed over the borders and have become an internal problem of India. Yet New Delhi's attempt to internationalise the issue and to seek help for the refugees has not succeeded in any large measure, further accentuating India's growing isolation in the world. Some commentators believe such isolation can be reduced somehow by coming to terms with China.

Foreign Minister Swaran Singh seemed to reflect that view when he told parliament last week that the government was willing to normalise relations with Peking. But he also seemed to be speaking for the majority when he added that normalization would have to be on the basis of mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and non-interference in each other's affairs. These are terms China understands well, having applied them many times in recent months as it has established relations with a succession of countries. It appears the time may be at hand for India to seize the initiative and take preliminary steps for moving closer to China.