WASHINGTON—One hour after leaving a White House session with President Nixon, who had asked his entire Cabinet to sit in, India's Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, was telling a packed National Press Club lunch Friday about a “reign of terror” in East Pakistan.

“What is taking place is not a civil war,” said the slender, sari‐clad head of the world's largest democracy. “It is punishment of civilians . . . it is a cynical way of getting rid of one's opponents.”

Mrs. Gandhi conspicuoulsy avoided referring to “East Pakistan.” Instead, in her slightly accented meticulous English, she used the term “East Bengal.” To many, she seemed to be implying that the eastern wing of Pakistan, with its 70 million people of Bengali stock — minus nearly 10 million refugees now in India—never again would willingly accept the rule of the West Pakistan military junta headed by President Yahya Khan.

This also is the opinion increasingly discernible here among junior and middle‐grade officials in close touch with the continuing campaign of repression that the Pakistan Army has been waging for seven months against all in East Pakistan—Moslems and Hindus alike—who are suspected of favoring Bangla Desh, or East Bengali independence.

If senior policymakers — President Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, his National Security assistant; Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs—share this appreciation, however, it is not evident.

“Our policy,” Mr. Sisco insisted to a senior Indian diplomat not long ago, “is to preserve the territorial integrity of Pakistan.”

The reasons, as United States officials explain them, are both complex—and slightly reminiscent of cold war ideology.

Basically, Washington fears that break‐up of Pakistan might spark an Indo‐Pakistani war or at least throw President Yahya into the arms of Peking, which, they say, has long been supplying Pakistan with arms to offset Russian arms supplies to India.

The United States itself began arming and subsidizing Pakistan in 1954—at the height of the cold war—to bolster the subcontinent Against Soviet aggression. It embargoed most arms after the Indo‐Pakistan war of 1965. Now, after 17 years and the expenditure of $4‐billion in arms, food and other aid, the bureaucratic momentum is still rolling inexorably forward. Pakistan is a favorite aid target.

Mr. Nixon and his officials, others say, “like” the Pakistanis—especially the tall, English‐speaking martial Punjabis such as President Yahya and other military leaders. The Americans find them, uncomplicated, reliable, grateful for United States help and easy to deal with.

By contrast, many American officials privately describe the Indians as uncooperative and given more to talking about “democracy” than to standing up to the Russians.

In fact, the recent Indo‐Soviet 20‐year agreement — after successive United States, governments had furnished $9‐billion in aid to India since World War II—irritated and puzzled the Nixon Administration. It also compounded the pro‐Pakistani and anti‐Indian trend visible throughout the Administration here.

President Yahya's bloodletting in East Pakistan has been viewed, here more in sorrow than in anger. There is virtually no moral indignation evident among policymakers. Rather, they tend to agree that President Yahya has been clumsy, that he should have defused the Awami League's drive for autonomy (and subsequently for independence) with less adverse publicity. They complain that United States plans for economic development in Pakistan have been set back.

Administration policymakers deny Indian assertions that American diplomatic, and military backing for the Yahya regime is bolstering its repressive campaign. The United States, they say, has stopped issuing new arms licenses since March 25, though they concede there is still more than $2‐million in spare parts and ammunition in the “pipeline.”

The United States has also, they say, ceased economic development aid to Pakistan until the situation clears up, and has repeatedly warned President Yahya “privately” about the bad image his actions are creating around the world and the need for a “political” settlement.

“We don't have much leverage with Yahya,” said a State Department source. “But we'd have none at all if we were to come out openly and blast him.”

So far, officials note, the United States has prevailed on him to accept a United Nations presence in East Pakistan, to which Washington has so far contributed $154‐million for relief and rehabilitation. (It has given $80‐million for refugees in India). Bangla Desh sympathizers charge that the Pakistan Army is commandeering chartered United Nations river boats and trucks to move and help supply its own forces.

United States officials also claim; that President Yahya's gestures toward restoring civilian rule in East Pakistan—gestures that the Bangla Desh adherents term “cosmetic”—are belated, but better than nothing.

In two days of talks here with Mr. Nixon, Prime Minister Gandhi probably has not changed the Administration's predilection for Pakistan. However, she appears not to have minced her words.

In his welcoming remarks Thursday, the President cited India's recent disastrous “typhoons and floods.” Quietly, but with deep conviction, Mrs. Gandhi reminded the President—and the Government—that the “worst tragedy is a man‐made tragedy of vast proportions,” namely the flight of nearly 10 million refugees into India, with more streaming in each day.

“I came here,” she said, in search of some wise impulse that has sometimes worked to save humanity from despair.”

As she prepared to return to. India and as Mr. Nixon flew to his weekend retreat at Key Biscayne, Fla., it was unclear whether Mrs. Gandhi's warning would evoke a “wise impulse” in time to avert further tragedy.