1971-10-09
By A. Hariharan
Page: 0
New Delhi: Reading between the lines and drawing conclusions from some gestures, Indian journalists who accompanied Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to Moscow last week are convinced the Soviet stand on Bangla Desh is now closer to India's.
First, the gestures. The talks were postponed to enable Party First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev to return home for them: it is rare for all three dignitaries, the first secretary, the president and the prime minister to hold simultaneous talks with a visiting prime minister; Mrs. Gandhi was put up in the Kremlin, a practice followed only when heads of state visited the Soviet Union, not heads of governments. And finally a "joint statement" appears to be more significant than a "joint communique".
Reading between the lines, correspondents say the Soviet Union has tacitly accepted that India must leave its options open to enable the nine million refugees to return to East Bengal. Some consolation is derived from the fact that the statement refers to East Bengal and not to East Pakistan; the treaty signed earlier in September spoke of East Pakistan and this was very much resented by some in India.
The Kremlin statement said the troubles in East Bengal began with the events of March 25. This, it is pointed, clearly showed that the Soviet Union believes the West Pakistan military action was solely responsible for the tragedy.
But different conclusions could be drawn from the statement. It expresses its sympathy to the democratic forces in Pakistan (not East Bengal only); the Soviet Union feels that basically the Bangla Desh issue is one between West Pakistan and East Bengal (an internal matter) and India got involved only because of the spillover of refugees. That a solution must be found through peaceful means (a veto on armed intervention by India).
Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin himself was plain spoken when he said it was a complex problem and the Soviet Union had no ready solution for it. And the only concrete thing said about this matter in the statement is that Pakistan should take urgent measures to create conditions in East Bengal "for the safe return of the refugees to their homeland in conditions safeguarding their honour and dignity".
On her return to New Delhi Mrs. Gandhi did not draw any exaggerated picture of the achievements made in Moscow. All that she was prepared to say was that India and the Soviet Union had identical views on Bangla Desh and positive steps have been taken to further improve economic and technical collaboration.
Newspaper comments on Mrs. Gandhi's mission to Moscow have been varied. Some said the outcome was very disappointing. The Statesman, for instance, said: "The burden of Soviet comment is that the vital issue is not independence but the preservation of peace in the sub-continent; Kosygin spoke of influencing the Pakistani authorities into a more reasonable frame of mind and firmly rejected a military solution. In its essentials this is identical to the Nixon point of view and is as good an illustration as any of the common ground which the major powers share on the Bangla Desh issue."
The Hindustan Times said that while the Soviet Union took note of the Mukti Bahini's activities within Pakistan territory, "it would not like India to augment its support to this movement beyond a critical level which may give Pakistan a pretext for a military conflict with India".
Indians have been generally critical of the joint statement because it does not bring the Bangla Desh issue any nearer a solution and has further tied India's hands. The Times of India commented: "It is true that India has not yet decided to take military action to end this menacing situation. But it has also not closed that option as a last resort. The Soviet Union is apparently trying to do so in the name of peace and anti-imperialism."
But most observers say when top leaders of two friendly countries meet for long talks, everything will not get into joint statements or communiques.
Meanwhile India fears that many more millions will walk across the Indian border as Pakistan starts mopping up operations against the Mukti Bahini at the end of the rainy season. The freedom fighters have been claiming a series of local successes and some 100,000 have been given about three months' training. What they want is firepower.
It is now conceivable that more arms will flow into their hands to keep the resistance going. In other words, India, the Soviet Union and Bangla Desh seem convinced that a war of attrition is inevitable and that by wearing down the Pakistan army they expect the Bengalis will finally emerge victorious.