WASHINGTON, Nov. 24 —President Nixon was reported today to be contemplating a personal appeal to President Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan of Pakistan to release Sheik Mujibur Rahman from prison and to seek by personal negotiations a peaceful solution to the crisis in East Pakistan.

Sheik Mujib is the leader of the Awami League, which swept last December's elections in East Pakistan.

On March. 25, when Pakistani troops began to suppress a Bengali separatist movement, Sheik Mujib was arrested and flown to West Pakistan. He has been reported “on trial” on charges of treason.

Appeal by Rogers

Meanwhile, Secretary of State William P. Rogers called on both India and Pakistan today to disengage their forces in East Pakistan and for mutual withdrawal to prevent expansion of the fighting. Mr. Rogers noted that President Yahya Khan had publicly agreed that Pakistan would participate in a mutual withdrawal.

As admittedly scant reports from the Indian‐Pakistani border area indicated to senior officials that fighting was continuing, Mr. Rogers summoned Maharajakrishna Rasgotra, the Indian chargé d'affaires, and Nawabzada Agha Mohammad Raza, the Pakistani Ambassador, for separate talks. State Department sources said that Mr. Rogers had urged restraint where “necessary and appropriate.”

One of the non‐American’ participants said later that Mr. Rogers had expressed the United States Government's concern but had made “no new proposals.” He said there had been no suggestion that a United Nations observer force be placed in the Indian‐East Pakistani border area.

The report that Mr. Nixon was weighing a personal appeal to President Yahya Khan. — which came from highly place sources — could not immediately he confirmed. A White House spokesman declined to comment and senior State Department officials said that they knew of no such plan in the immediate future.

However, trustworthy informants said that a Presidential appeal and a request to the Security Council to take up they Indian‐Pakistani problem were both under top‐level Administration consideration.

Charles W. Bray 3d, the State Department spokesman, declined to comment on an assertion that the United States was bound by a “longstanding bilateral agreement” to come to the aid of Pakistan with our own arms and men if she should be attacked by any other country.”

The assertion was made by Benjamin H. Oehlert Jr., United States Ambassador to Pakistan from 1967‐69, in a letter to The New York Times dated Oct. 26 from Palm Beach, Fla., and published Nov. 3. Mr. Oehlert, a soft‐drink company executive, cited no ‘basis for his statement.

Mr. Oehlert could not be reached today for comment.

Mr. Bray, when pressed to say whether the United States was bound by a secret commitment to aid Pakistan with “arms and men,” repeatedly declined comment.

Other ranking officials said privately that Mr. Oehlert was misinformed. They noted that on Nov. 12, Secretary Rogers said that the United States would not become involved if an Indian‐Pakistani war developed.

“There are no hidden hands and no secret agreements,” said one ranking official. “Oehlert is probably referring to 1959 bilateral agreements which the United States made with Pakistan, Iran and Turkey after Iraq had pulled out of the former, Baghdad Pact, leaving them stranded. But the 1959 bilaterals don't commit us to send troops or arms to Pakistan."

These sources stressed that United States and Pakistani membership in the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization provided for action only in accordance with the “constitutional processes” of each member. They also noted that the United States was not a member of the Central Treaty Organization, which replaced the Baghdad Pact Organization after the withdrawal of Iraq in 1959.

Officials explained privately that a public statement by the United States at this time disclaiming responsibility to support Pakistan militarily might heighten rather than calm tensions between Pakistan and India.

“It might unleash the Indians,” one source said. “Alternately, it might upset the Paks and make them so jittery they'd jump. The best thing for us is to keep quiet — even though it confuses the American public.”

Conditions of Pact Unclear

Although the United States and Pakistan signed a bilateral treaty in Ankara, Turkey, on March 5, 1959, the actual conditions surrounding the treaty remain unclear.

The pact, one of three separate treaties signed with Pakistan, Turkey and Iran, provided that the United States “will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon,” in the event of aggression against the three countries.

On March 6, 1959, India's Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru; said at a news conference that the defense pact was limited to combatting aggression by Communist countries. The United States agreed.

The Pakistan Foreign Ministry, however, said on March 7 that Pakistan would invoke the pact “in the event of any aggression from any quarter, including India or Kashmir.”

The American obligations under the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization pact to Pakistan and other member countries is specifically limited in an addition to the text to “Communist aggression.”

The United States was not a signatory to the Central Treaty Organization pact, although it did pledge economic and counter-subversion aid. The pact