NEW DELHI, Nov. 28—Most everything they say in Washington about Indians they say in New Delhi about Americans: arrogant, undependable, obsessed with their own problems, shortsighted and not really very clever for such a big country.

That catalogue of resentments is relieved in Washington only by the pledge of continued economic aid to India on “humanitarian grounds,” as President Nixon explained it. Among leading Indians, in turn, there remains a great fund of goodwill for many Americans and for the idea of America—democracy and diversity—that India successfully implanted in Asian soil.

But irritations dominate the relationship now. They have been rubbed raw by more than American neutrality in India's tense duel with Pakistan over the fate of East Bengal and by India's new intimacy with the Soviet Union. Here, as in Washington, the bitterness also runs to deeper disappointment with the drift of a once‐promising friendship.

The Indians still want much from the United States, and more than anything at the moment they want American Pressure to force Pakistan to grant at least autonomy to the eastern wing of her country. Many of the resentments are therefore suppressed even in private conversation with officials.

Puzzled and Chagrined

It does not take too long, however, for ministers, editors and other thoughtful Indians to show their hurt. They are puzzled and chagrined to find the United States, attaching neither emotional nor strategic value to the triumph of democracy in India. Moreover, though they welcome the new American approach to China, they plainly resent the fact that the Nixon Administration has invested so much more time, hope and thought in its Peking venture while the ties to India have been allowed to deteriorate.

In some quarters here those feelings serve to reinforce the hankering for nuclear power with which to impress the world with India's great size and potential power. The Government appears to have decided that a decision ought to be deferred for at least five years, but the itch is there, relieved only by the costs involved.

Even those Indians who argue passionately against the nuclear temptation wonder whether a nation in modest vestments will ever get the United States to embrace it as the most important friend in South Asia, worthy of more than just treatment equal to that accorded a disintegrating Pakistan and surely worthy, they think, of vastly more attention than Vietnam and the rest of Indochina.

For a time in 1962, after China invaded Indian territory, the Indians felt that Washing ton had finally—that is, favor ably—recognized the stakes here. By then India had ceased to “export morality,” as it is put here, and had conquered her fear of alignment. She needed help and the White House responded.

But less than a decade later it is the Russians who have dropped firm anchor here while the United States pro fesses to be unconcerned.

The Indians' version of their embrace by the Russians last summer reveals a good deal about their desperate, desire for big‐power friendship and support and their chagrin that the United States has failed to court them in like manner.

Treaty Languished a While

The Soviet‐Indian treaty of friendship, support and consultation in case of crisis that was signed here in August was drafted in 1967–1968. Moscow then was seeking an ally to help contain China and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was seeking not only guarantees against China and Pakistan but also leftist domestic support at a moment of peril for the divided Congress party.

The relationship blossomed, but the passions for a formal treaty cooled and the papers were laid aside. Mrs. Gandhi went on to fashion a staggering two‐thirds majority in the election this year. An agricultural revolution dispelled the ever present dread of famine. The promise of rapid development at home replaced the maneuvering abroad.

Then came the shattering developments in East Bengal, and there were the Russians, treaty in hand.

As the fear of war with Pakistan gripped India once more and as millions of Bengali refugees arrived to drain the development kitty, the United States again appeared far away and preoccupied with other concerns. At that crucial moment, the Indians say, President Nixon's national security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, delivered a warning that China might not remain aloof from war and that if attacked, India should not expect the kind of emotional and indirect support she received from the United States in 1962.

Shattering Counsel Repeated

When Mr. Kissinger stopped over on his secret journey to Peking via Pakistan last July, it is said, he repeated that shattering counsel. Treated coolly, he responded appropriately. Soon enough the Indians learned of his real errand. Bitterly they concluded that they now understood the American refusal to cut off the residual arms shipments to Pakistan and the American's reluctance to be pitted even diplomatically against China on India's behalf.

Sensing the shock here, the Russians invited Mrs. Gandhi to Moscow to sign the friend ship pact. She thought that was a bit too much and invited Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to New Delhi instead. He brought not only the vague ly phased treaty of consultation but also, it is said, some interesting private assurances.

He offered an immediate sup ply of weapons, with the most advanced missile and radar components flown in immediately and other material arriving in eight shiploads to date. He promised firm diplomatic protection and propaganda support in the United Nations and elsewhere so that Indian policy could proceed without fear of crippling United Nations intervention.

Though he thought the treaty itself and China's customary prudence would militate against her intervention in any conflict between India and Pakistan, he promised additional indirect support if needed. A Chinese threat against India would require large troop movements from the Sinkiang region south ward, he noted. Moscow could prevent such diversion, he is said to have indicated, by the simple expedient of maneuvering its troops in ways calculated to cause apprehension in Sinkiang.

Arguments Against War

And if Turkey and Iran should divert too much armament toward Pakistan, he is said to have added, Moscow could manage to agitate their frontier areas as well.

That said, Mr. Gromyko counseled strenuously against war, which he thought would injure India and set back the cause of stability in East Bengal. But in a style that was welcomed here almost as much as the treaty itself, he emphasized that India could count on the indicated Soviet backing whatever happened.

The Indians do not mistake any of this for charity. Indeed, they see—and admire—a persistent and deftly managed Soviet effort over 15 years to make India the linchpin of their campaign for “collective security” on Asia's southern tier. from Turkey across to Thailand and Malaya.

Nor do the Indians feel entirely comfortable without stable strategic and political tie to the United States to balance the growing Soviet influence. But it is Moscow that is remembered for rushing to the rescue at a moment of panic and isolation and for letting India turn the diplomatic and military pressures back onto Pakistan.

The countervailing motions from Washington have Seemed to the Indians at best confused —with the counsel of the embassy here often disregarded —and at worst unconcerned about the long‐term damage that may result from short term disagreements.

Licenses Finally Rescinded

From March until October the United States argued that it could not properly rescind the licenses under which spare parts were still being shipped to Pakistan, to the great annoyance of the Indians. But then, to establish a better climate for Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the, White House, the shipments were suddenly stopped without difficulty.

Indians gained the impression that only through the visit did President Nixon finally focus on some of the larger issues raised by the turmoil in East Bengal. Yet they suspect that their problems retain low priority on his agenda.

That suspicion may be the most galling of all. After, suffering through two decades of massive dependence on aid from the United States and many other nations, it simply hurts to read in the Nixon doc trine that the Americans will pursue not ideals or commitments to democracy but only the most narrowly defined “interests.” It hurts and it angers.