NEW DELHI, Dec. 2—Both India and Pakistan have been increasing their preparations for the possibility of a general war.

Soviet ‐ bloc deliveries of tanks, missiles and other military equipment have measurably increased Indian strength in recent months.

Shipments of T‐55 tanks have reportedly raised the total of Soviet‐designed medium tanks possessed by India from 450 to about 600 and her total tank inventory to about 1,450.

The two neighbors are already engaged in dangerous border conflicts, but the fighting so far has been painstakingly restrained and limited.

India, which hopes to see the eastern wing of Pakistan break away politically from the west, is using methods far short of full war to reach that goal. Pakistan, too, has sound reasons to hesitate before intensifying the fighting.

The Indians appear to have already formed two new armored regiments.

In the meantime, Pakistan, according to intelligence reports, has assembled a force of about 10,000 irregular troops in her section of the divided and disputed area of Jammu and Kashmir. When India and Pakistan last fought In August and September of 1965, the conflict began with the infiltration of a similar force of Pakistani irregulars across the ceasefire line in Kashmir.

A general war between India and Pakistan is considered a serious possibility. The rebellion of the Bengali‐speaking people of East Pakistan against Pakistan's central Government and army, both of which are dominated by West Pakistanis, has brought about a bitter political dispute between the two nations, military confrontation, and limited fighting.

Pakistan's troubles grew out of the fact that she tried to crush the autonomy movement in the eastern province with force. An insurgent movement known as the Mukti Bahini (Liberation Forces) has launched a full guerrilla war.

Tensions with India, however, have risen dramatically in recent weeks as Indian support for the guerrillas has increased and become more open and as significant numbers of regular Indian troops have penetrated East Pakistan.

There are now many in the subcontinent who believe that Pakistan, which charges India with waging an “undeclared war” in the east, will eventually attack in the west rather than accept the humiliation of a withdrawal from East Pakistan. It is also thought likely that diplomatic recognition of the insurgents by India would bring general war.

Such predictions can be assessed only in the light of significant changes in the military situation, national political aims and the balance of power.

Two Inconclusive Wars

In the 24 years of their independence, the two nations have fought two large but limited wars that ended in stalemates.

One was the 1947‐48 struggle for Jammu and Kashmir that ended with a cease‐fire line that neither nation accepts as final. The second was fought in 1965. The war reached serious proportions on Sept. 1 when Pakistani forces drove into Jammu and large Indian formations counterattacked in the Punjab five days later.

After 22 days of fighting in which no strategic goals and only minuscule territorial gains were achieved by either side, both nations accepted a ceasefire.

If a new general war breaks out it is almost certain to have a much more decisive result and to bring fundamental changes to the subcontinent.

One reason is that India has made it unmistakably clear that in a new war she would launch a serious attack against East Pakistan. Most knowledgable observers believe that the province is simply not defensible against such an attack.

“Few armies have ever been in a more untenable position,” said one well‐qualified observer who declined to he identified.

Pakistan has the equivalent of about four divisions of infantry in East Pakistan — 72,000 men. They are supported only weakly by fairly small units of old and marginally effective tanks and old F‐86 Sabrejets, which are outclassed by available Indian aircraft.

If the Pakistanis were to put more and better equipment into the east, it is widely agreed, they would only risk losing it.

India's Forces Stronger

The Indians are believed to have seven divisions — plus some independent units—poised around East Pakistan and several other divisions are available. Two that are positioned in Cooch Behar for defense against Chinese forces in Tibet have been “turned around to face the other way” and a large part of a division that has kept peace in the troubled Naga Hills area has been withdrawn.

The Indians also have superior tank and air strength in the east. Each Indian infantry division has a regiment of about 45 tanks attached to it.

The dilemma facing the Pakistanis is thus considered stark. If they do nothing, the combined pressure of guerrillas and limited Indian intervention may well cause them to lose control in the eastern province. But a full‐scale war, observers believe, will result in the rapid loss of East Pakistan, which will then assume independent status.

“The Paks may well go to war for emotional and other reasons, but it makes sense to wait until the loss of the east is already inevitable — otherwise they only speed up the process,” said one source.

The Indians have always been stronger numerically, but in the 1965 war the Pakistanis were superior in some weapons. In the past six years that situation has been significantly altered and India by and large now has better weapons and more of them, as well as more men.

The Pakistanis have both of their armored divisions, nine infantry divisions and an independent armored brigade in the west. Two infantry divisions are on the cease‐fire line in Kashmir and the rest of the Army is deployed near the border with Indian Punjab and Rajasthan.

Indian troop dispositions are not known exactly, but the general outlines of Indian preparations are fairly clear.

India had until recently 13 full infantry divisions and 10 mountain divisions. There are reports that this year she began to raise one or two new divisions. She also has one armored division, an independent armored brigade, other independent tank units and the tank regiments attached to infantry divisions.

The mountain divisions are about equal to regular divisions in number of infantry, but their artillery is smaller and they have less of it. They also have little armor.

In “normal” times India is believed to keep seven to eight of the mountain divisions deployed along the Chinese border. Some sources believe that in the present crisis and with winter snow beginning to close the Himalayan passes, this number may have been reduced to the equivalent of about five, with the withdrawal of some whole units and of individual battalions from others.

The Indian build‐up on the western border may thus have reached nine or more infantry divisions, along with the armored division and other armor.

This gives a rough parity to the two sides in the west. If East Pakistan fell quickly, India could dramatically reinforce her forces with troops from that area.

The Pakistanis, with about 1,000 tanks, have fewer than India, and many of them are old Shermans and Chaffees of limited utility. Their best tanks are the American Patton—they have about 270—and the Chinese T‐59, which is a copy of the Russian T‐54.

The Indians also have many old and light tanks, but they had about 450 Russian medium tanks and with new deliveries may now have 600. They also have about 250 Vijayanta tanks made in India. These are a modification of the British Centurion, but they have an excellent high‐velocity 105‐mm. gun that is gyro‐stabilized and that can be fired while in motion.

The Pakistanis, using American armor, must also use American doctrine and stop to fire.

India Strong in Air

The Indians also appear to have an edge in the air. According to Indian publications, India has 625 combat aircraft to 270 for Pakistan. The Pakistanis have small numbers of the high‐performance Mirage III fighter and the American F‐104, but India has at least 120 MIG‐21 supersonic fighters and perhaps more.

In the 1965 war both sides seemed to run out of momentum quickly. By the cease‐fire India claimed to have taken 670 square miles of Pakistan and admitted having lost 200 square miles of her own territory. Pakistan asserted that she had occupied 1,600 square miles of India and had lost 450 square miles.

No cities were captured, no major communications lines were cut and no obvious war aims were achieved.

However, the capabilities of ,both armies for sustained mobile warfare are open to question. India now manufactures some of her own military supplies, but some sources believe that stocks of fuel and ammunition would last less than 60 days. Pakistan has even graver logistic problems and probably could not fight all‐out for as long.

A critical question is what would be the plausible war aims of either side and, especially for Pakistan, how another stalemate in the west could be avoided.

Some sources feel that the only realistic Pakistani aims would be to try to capture the Vale of Kashmir or to attack into Jammu and try to cut the road from the Indian Punjab to Kashmir, which would isolate Indian forces in Kashmir and Ladakh.

The Pakistanis attempted the second strategy in 1965 when they attacked thinly‐held Indian positions in Jammu (significantly, the Pakistani unit commander was the present President, Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan). But the advance had to be halted when India counter‐attacked in the Punjab.

Today India has strong defenses in the area where the Pakistanis advanced in 1965.

Any Indian attack into Pakistani Punjab faces such physical barriers as the Ichhogil Canal in front of Lahore, which is 90 to 120 feet wide and 15 feet deep, and across which India failed to make a permanent bridgehead in 1965.

However, Indians visited many nations in Europe this spring in an attempt to buy military bridging equipment.

Some Indians, frustrated by past stalemates and cease‐fires, are undoubtedly anxious to punish Pakistan in any new war and to drive deeper into West Pakistan.

If East Pakistan Fell . . . …

Logistics and other old problems may limit the accomplishments of both sides. But the critical situation in East Pakistan suggests that a new war would be a very different affair from the wars of the past.

If, as seems likely, East Pakistan fell, it would be a staggeringly important development in itself. It would also allow India to turn the full force of her 828,000‐man army toward the west. A major attempt could be made to thrust into West Pakistan.

But even if the Indians avoided such an attempt and accepted a cease‐fire in the west, they would from then on have unquestioned military superiority over West Pakistan and the balance of power in the subcontinent would be changed forever.

The possibility of Chinese intervention is one factor that could alter the optimistic view held by many Indians and endorsed by some independent observers. India hopes that her new treaty with the Soviet. Union will help forestall such a possibility. There is also a hope that the winter snows would prevent serious Chinese action.

“The Indians,” said one foreigner, “are certainly going to want to get this whole mess cleaned up before the snow melts in the spring, just in case.”