THE universal chorus that greeted the outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan was that the war would not bring any good to anybody. Wrong. It brought eagerly sought office to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. It gave Mrs. Indira Gandhi new power and stature. And it gave 75 million Bengalis their freedom.

If there was one party to which it did no good, it was China. In fact, China may have emerged a clear loser in the game: indications are that not only has China lost a country but that the Soviet Union may have gained one.

The Maoists in Bengal, now reduced in number, may be in no position to raise their heads for at least a generation; the Russians on the other hand are looked upon by the Bengalis as saviours. Moscow seems willing and able to translate this popular goodwill in Bangla Desh into a paying political investment.

The first setback China suffered through the Bangali rebellion was on the ideological front. Here was a genuine people's liberation movement suddenly challenging a military establishment. No liberation struggle in recent history has enjoyed such total support from the people as the Bangla Desh movement did. But the struggle found China, the champion of oppressed peoples, siding with a military junta.

The political compulsions behind the Chinese policy were clear enough. Pakistan was a friend, India an adversary. Also, China's new-found pragmatism made liberation movements less important to Peking than in the past. Even so, the long-term implications of the policy could not have been lost upon Peking.

Some evidence existed to support the theory that China was cleverly trying to eat the cake and have it too. Why, for example, should Peking back a basically conservative and even pro-Western leader such as Sheikh Mujibur Rahman? It was more logical to work for his ouster and the emergence of a Maoist leadership. Prolongation of the civil war was one way in which this could be brought about, for all were agreed about the radicalisation of the Bengali movement if the fighting lasted indefinitely.

The impression gained strength from reasonably reliable reports that China was slipping arms to the Bengali guerillas while overtly supporting the West Pakistan generals. The London Daily Telegraph said the movement was taking place across the Siliguri salient in the northwest corner of East Bengal where there is a gap of only 11 miles between Nepal and East Bengal. Chinese Communist Party sources in Hongkong also pointed out that Peking had never criticised the Mukti Bahini guerillas.

However, the Maoist group in Bangla Desh quickly isolated itself by running against the current of Bengali sentiment. Its leader, Mohammed Toaha, tarred both Yahya Khan and Sheikh Mujib with the same brush. In the strictly Marxist-Leninist sense, he may have been justified in calling them both class enemies, but it reflected poorly on his tactical sense. There was no hint here of the pragmatism Peking itself had lately sanctified.

The result was that many of Toaha's young followers left the Maoist fold and joined different cells of freedom fighters. Mukti Bahini groups reportedly sought out and killed Maoists. Clashes took place in areas where the Maoists had worked up some influence - Pabna, Rangpur, Jessore, Khulna, Noakhali.

At least one dramatic incident was publicised. This occurred in the Bakarganj area last month when a Mukti Bahini group publicly and ceremoniously accepted the formal surrender of a Maoist unit whose leader had just been killed. Thousands of villagers watched as the sullen Maoists slowly marched to the centre of a playing field and laid down their weapons. Clearly, the Bengalis were in a struggle to the death, and those among them who stood in the way for ideological reasons were no different from the government troops who interfered for entirely different reasons.

Popular resentment against the Maoists had rubbed off on China. Once the India-Pakistan War began and Peking's support for Islamabad became more vociferous, Bengali disillusionment with China was complete. China was seen as a friend of the enemy. Educated Bengalis have said China would even have intervened militarily in defence of Islamabad but for fear of reprisals by the Soviet Union. China's loss was Moscow's gain.

In contrast to Peking, Moscow handled the situation rather cleverly. It started off with a great emotional advantage because it was guaranteeing India which in turn was guaranteeing Bangla Desh. But Moscow did not stop at that; there have been indications that it successfully used its leverage with New Delhi to work itself into a position of influence with the Bangla Desh political leadership. The foundations of this influence are so laid that it could grow in the coming months.

If China had a Maoist group - which now stands condemned as un-Bengali in Bangla Desh, the Soviet Union had a pro-Moscow communist group which has gained in prestige. This is the National Awami Party led by Muzaffar Ahmed, a professor of economics. (This is not the National Awami Party led by Maulana Bashani. Following the ideological split between Peking and Moscow, Bashani-NAP became known as pro-Peking while Muzaffar-NAP became pro-Moscow. In the wake of the liberation movement, Bashani ceased to be pro-Peking, leaving the Toaha group as the principal pro-Peking platform.)

A measure of the significance Muzaffar Ahmed's NAP has attained lately is that the Awami League which had initially shunned it was compelled by September to enter into a working arrangement with it. This is believed to have been wrought by the Soviet Union acting through India.

As the resistance movement began to be coordinated after the initial confusion, the Awami League was suspicious of everybody outside its party fold. This showed most in guerilla enrollment so that non-Awami League groups, feeling as strongly about the freedom struggle as the Awami League, grew bitter. Among those who complained publicly was Muzaffar Ahmed's NAP. Muzaffar and another leader, Mrs. Motia Begum, said the screening of volunteers had been tightened deliberately to prevent their people from joining the guerilla forces. The NAP's official organ, Mukti Yudhya (Liberation Struggle), said the Awami League was the biggest political party in Bangla Desh but this did not mean it was the only party.

In the following months the leaders of the Bangla Desh provisional government (all Awami Leaguers) settled in Calcutta where they were visited by American and Russian emissaries. If the Americans got anywhere with their consultations, it remains unknown to the world. But the Russian contacts led to a tangible development. In the first week of September the establishment of a war council to advise the Bangla Desh government was announced. A prominent constituent of the council was the NAP represented by Muzaffar Ahmed.

Another constituent was the Communist Party of Bangla Desh, and thereby hangs a tale. Muzaffar's NAP had always followed the relatively moderate line of Moscow and stuck to the framework of a parliamentary party. In the revolutionary atmosphere that developed in Bengal, this constitutionality of the NAP tested the patience of its younger and more ebullient members. To stop them from going elsewhere in frustration, the NAP promptly set up its own communist party. This group, the Communist Party of Bangla Desh, therefore is the alter ego of the pro-Moscow NAP. There is no doubt about the leverage the Soviet Union has obtained in the advisory War Council and, through it, on the Bangla Desh establishment. Although Sheikh Mujib's charisma and the emotional appeal of his automony movement made the Awami League unchallenged in Bengal, the pro-Moscow NAP was quietly holding its own and systematically gaining acceptance among educated idealists. The Islamabad government recognised the fact recently by banning the party. Now that the Maoists have missed the bus in Bengal, the NAP's strength may grow. Maulana Bashani attended the inaugural session of the War Council, indicating that he was cooperating with the pro-Moscow elements. This could mean that eventually the venerable Maulana's substantial peasant following in northern Bengal could swell the pro-Moscow ranks.

At the college-educated level, there already is talk that perhaps it was just as well that China did not support the liberation movement. For such support would have meant a big boost to the extremists, with unpredictable consequences for the new country. The moderate Moscow communists, they say, are comparatively easier to deal with.

Developments in the next couple of years could further assist the moderate communists. The smell of independence has touched off great expectations among the Bengali masses. The Awami League government certainly is going to disappoint the people An some of these "milk and honey" dreams. There could even be some leadership problems within the Awami League in the absence of Sheikh Mujib.

If for one reason or another the Awami League loses some of its present popularity, the beneficiary clearly will be Muzaffar Ahmed's party. The Russians may be expected to shore up the NAP for just such an eventuality especially if they become, as is likely, one of the major aid donors to Bangla Desh.

These Soviet advantages underline the basic weaknesses of China's South Asia policy. After the 1962 war with India, Peking was in a strong position and could have befriended advantageously a defeated India. Instead it chose to identify itself with the military government of Pakistan. In the years that followed, China's policies became identical with those of its capitalist adversary the US. Now Peking has a newly powerful Mrs. Gandhi to deal with. And the Russians have a head start in Bangla Desh. Peking may have to put its pragmatism to subtler use if it is to retrieve its position in South Asia.