Washington: After this round of the Indo-Pakistan War, it
is quite possible that Washington will never again look
upon the Indian subcontinent as an area that involves
this country's vital interests or presents a compelling
case for large-scale American aid. Indira Gandhi's armed
bid for subcontinental hegemony only hastened a process
of American disenchantment with the region's intractable
and seemingly self-made woes. The former worry that
India might "go communist" is being replaced by a
feeling that communism might be the loser if it did.

India may have succeeded in settling Pakistan's hash.
But American officials fear the cost may be a fearful
massacre among the 1.5 million non-Bengalis who live in
East Pakistan, a possible upheaval in West Pakistan, an
economic setback that the subcontinent's hungry millions
cannot afford, another round of gruesome communal
clashes that have so disfigured the region's history and
an inheritance of political chaos in Bengal which could
eventually, with Chinese inspiration, threaten the
integrity of India itself.

President Nixon tried to head off these horrors as soon
as Yahya Khan's massacre of his Bengali subjects made
them appear possible. In order not to antagonise Yahya,
he avoided any public condemnation of Pakistan's actions
and permitted the continued delivery of a small quantity
of arms that Pakistan had already purchased in this
country. In the meantime, of course, Washington was
paying most of the foreign share for the maintenance of
the 9 million refugees that Yahya Khan's repression had
driven into Indian

This cost Nixon some political embarrassment. American
public opinion, to the degree that it was interested at
all, naturally sympathised with the oppressed Bengalis.
When Nixon failed to take a public position of moral
outrage, this was used against him by Indian
propagandists and Democratic politicians, particularly
by potential presidential candidate Edward Kennedy.
But the administration felt that its uncomfortable
decisions were paying off. Yahya seemed ready to accept
a face-saving arrangement with East Pakistan - something
that would put the Bengalis on the road to independence
without quite admitting it, and make it possible for the
refugees to come home from India.

There is a great deal of sour feeling around the White
House over what is looked upon as Indian duplicity in
thwarting these plans. This is bolstered by the belief
that India deliberately blew the arms-to-Pakistan issue
out of proportion to embarrass the President (it
totalled a militarily insignificant US$5 million) and
that New Delhi double-crossed the President when he
stopped the shipments in November. The halt in shipments
was kept secret in order not to embarrass Yahya Khan,
but it "leaked" within 10 days. State Department
officials believe the Indians did it to convince Indian
public opinion that Mrs. Gandhi had, after all, won some
ground in her visit with Nixon.

India still has champions in the United States, notably
Edward Kennedy and other liberal senators. But the
public at large is not particularly interested in the
subcontinent anymore, and official Washington has lost
its enthusiasm for preserving India as a non-communist
alternative for other poor nations seeking their own
roads to development. Vietnam-weary Americans no longer
care very much about the paths the poor countries choose
to follow. And few officials expect that any nation in
its right mind would want to emulate India's record of
economic non-achievement.