CHICAGO—I am among the few West Pakistanis to have denounced the rigid policies and criminal conduct of our military government. The army intervened in East Bengal to offset the results of Pakistan's first freely held elections, transforming the demand for autonomy into a movement for independence.

Now I must oppose India's massive military intervention. It violates the U.N. Charter and reinforces the dangerous trend toward direct foreign interventions in civil conflicts. How reprehensible the international community deems the Indian action is best indicated by the overwhelming vote in the U.N., including those of India's stanch allies, Yugoslavia and Egypt. That India has ignored the U.N. resolution is a witness to its disregard of international opinion, and another reminder of the helplessness of humanity confronted with aggression.

The Indian Government does not view with favor demands for regional autonomy, much less secession. The sword of central authority has fallen swiftly on recalcitrant peoples in India. West Bengal, the Indian half of Bangla Desh, has been repeatedly subjected to military intervention and is currently under direct federal rule. Its peoples share with East Bengalis a contiguous boundary, culture and language.

Only religion and competing nationalisms (Hindu and Moslem) separates them. A sovereign, secular and socialist Bangla Desh can be enormously attractive to the Marxist majority of West Bengal, and threaten the “integrity” of India. To prevent this, India must keep Bangla Desh in bonds.

The power of the East Bengali people cannot flow out of the barrels of Indian guns. The direct military intervention is intended to promote an Indian protectorate rather than a genuinely independent Bangla Desh. It is aimed at probing the dwindling power of India's Bengali clients — the Awami League and Communist (Moscow‐oriented) leaders in exile; and the conventionally trained frontier Bahini.

Mrs. Gandhi's outright rejection of U Thant's proposal indicated that the goal of dismembering Pakistan took priority over the refugees' welfare. While sympathetic U.S. Senators were given guided tours of the refugee camps, severe limits were imposed by India on international relief organizations preventing oven reliable estimates on the actual number of refugees.

Apart from the war victims, at least four million stranded minorities (Bengalis in West, non‐Bengalis in East Pakistan) may be massacred unless there is an immediate cease‐fire and a settlement negotiated. Furthermore, military victory in East Pakistan Will not eliminate India's refugee burden. The bulk of the refugees, being Hindu, are unlikely to return to predominantly Moslem Bengal. And (unless they are massacred) more than two million Biharis in Bangla Desh can now only return to India (they came to East Pakistan as refugees) where their presence might spark fresh communal riots.

Prominent Americans who invoke the refugee problem to justify Indian military intervention are either irresponsible apologists for India or ignorant of the complexity of communal conflicts on the subcontinent.

By summer's end the generals had begun bending to seek a settlement. Beset by the pressures of massive Soviet armaments, Indian troops on the frontier, Inflation and growing resistance at home, they were willing to concede in October the autonomy which in March they had so brutally tried to prevent. Important Bengali leaders, initially interested but abjectly dependent on Delhi, began refusing discussions on any terms except immediate and total independence. Indian military moves put an end to the dim hopes of settlement.

One hopes the world community will act forcefully to bring about (1) immediate cease‐fire on the subcontinent, (2) withdrawal of all ellen forces from disputed territories, and (3) under United Nations supervision, free elections in Bengal, Kashmir and Nagaland. These may begin to have a chance on the subcontinent when the peoples of these ravaged lands have exercised their right of self‐determination.