Le Monde (Weekly English Edition)

"Thank God the unity of Pakistan has been saved in the nick of time." This was the relieved reaction of West Pakistan political leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, chairman of the Pakistan People's Party, to the news last week that the army had taken over in East Pakistan a few hours after the flag of revolt was raised by its 70 million people.

There are few observers today however who are quite as ready as Mr. Bhutto to assume that Pakistan unity has in fact been saved.

Late last week Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the East Pakistan Awami League which won an overwhelming majority In the December elections to the National Assembly, declared Bangla Desh (the Bengal Nation) independent. The decision was taken after attempts to reach a compromise with Mr. Bhutto on a constitution for Pakistan came to naught.

ALREADY TOO LATE

There was a final bid by President Yahya Khan last week to head off the imminent crisis, but it was too late in the day. Even as he was conferring with Sheikh Mujibur, army units were being moved into East Pakistan and the stage was set for a swift suppression of any revolt.

The Awami League may have a large following, but obviously party members were not trained to fight a modern army. When the clashes took place, the army apparently had no trouble putting down the resistance. Casualties seem to have been high with some estimates putting the number Or East Pakistan dead at 10,000.

The situation was still confused early this week: Pakistan's official radio claimed that everything was back to normal In East Pakistan, while secessionist sources asserted that heavy fighting was still going on. The fact however that the curfew imposed in Dacca was lifted on Monday would seem to indicate that the army had successfully quashed the revolt.

Pakistan army units, for the most part manned and officered by Punjabis, Sindhis and Pathans from the West wing, were in full control of Dacca by 11 p.m. on March 25. The city's inhabitants, who for some three weeks had shown their defiance of the central government by acts of civil disobedience inspired by the Awami League, hastily threw up roadblocks to stop the soldiers .

But this resistance by a people who had nothing but their hands to fight with was quickly broken. From the windows of their hotel, where they had been confined on orders from the central government, Western correspondents could see the movement of trucks transporting soldiers, while three old tanks bulldozed aside the barricades that had been set up.

SHOOTING INTO WINDOWS

All night long machine-gun fire crackled and rifle shots rang out. Even an occasional shell burst could be heard. Army patrols fired Into windows. They were firing only on suspects, but not on women and children," explained a soldier.

Dacca University, hotbed of nationalist activity, is believed to have been shelled and some of its buildings destroyed. Small stockpiles of weapons had been collected there by student supporters of Bengali Independence. Near the hotel where the journalists were held, an army commando unit which had been blazing away with automatic weapons set fire to the offices of the newspaper The People, which belatedly threw its editorial weight behind the Awami League. Foreigners who watched the operation got the impression that it was carefully prepared.

According to a reliable Western observer thousands, not hundreds, were killed in the fighting. The journalists were expelled late on March 26. On their way to the airport they could see every hundred and fifty yards what remained of small roadblocks made up of tree trunks, slabs of concrete and twisted metal.

The question being asked is why President Yahya Khan decided on this course of action when a peaceful solution to the crisis was expected. From the very beginning of the Bengalis' "non-cooperation and non- violence" movement, the military authorities-- particularly General Tikka Khan, named military governor to enforce the emergency measures which followed the central government's martial law decree--lost control of the situation in East Pakistan. (The clandestine secessionist radio later reported that General Tikka Khan, known as "the Butcher" to the Bengalis because of his earlier activities, had been assassinated, but the authorities in Islamabad denied this.)

Thousands of Bengalis trekked daily to Dacca to assure Sheikh Rahman of their support for the cause of Independence. A people's militia, armed with bamboo poles, trained for war In the public squares. Bengali flags sprang up all over the city and secessionists combed the streets on bicycle drawn rickshaws, blaring from megaphones Sheikh Mujibur's exhortations to "carry on the fight calmly."

GLOOM AFTER JUBILATION

But as the talks between President Yahya Khan and the political leaders dragged on, the cry Shadin Bangla (Independent Bengal) began to be heard. Among the Sheikh s closest supporters the mood of triumphant enthusiasm gave way to gloom.

President Yahya Kahn had certainly accepted, In principle, a compromise formula which would have Involved the transfer of power to elected representatives of the people and empowered each wing of the country to prepare separate draft constitutions. But the official announcement of this agreement was being put off from day to day.

The change followed the arrival in Dacca of Mr. Bhutto on March 21 The PPP leader came with his own personal bodyguard toting machine guns. These rather theatrical precautions were not entirely unwarranted, considering the hostility that the Bengalis feel towards the PPP leader. The armed guard in any case underlined the fact that the time was not ripe for fraternal discussions between Bengalis and Punjabis. Mr. Bhutto s followers were muttering that the army had not done its job.

SO MANY DIFFERENCES

The crisis has highlighted--and the word is certainly an understatement of the case--the traditional antagonism between the Bengalis and the Punjabis (everybody from West Pakistan, whether he be Sindhi, Punjabi or Pathan, is a Punjabi to the Bengalis). The Bengalis originally wanted merely to put an end to West Pakistanis domination of their province, without trying to break with the central government.

But there is also a psychological difference between the two peoples, and more concrete, differences of language, culture, life style, extending even to the manner in which Islam is practised. Popular resentment has also been exacerbated by the excesses of West Pakistani soldiers behaving like a colonial garrison. Today that resentment has deepened to bitter hatred.

There is no better illustration of the gulf between the two wings of Pakistan than the circumstances in which the political discussions took place in Dacca. At no time did the party leaders get down to a round-table discussion or try to hammer out a compromise solution. President Yahya Kahn consulted each of them separately, and Mr. Bhutto met Sheikh Mujibur only once, when the Pakistani president sent the PPP leader a text of the agreement he had reached with the Awami League chairman.

Mr. Bhutto promptly rejected the compromise on the grounds that it appeared to him to open the way to constitutional secession for Bengal and contained the germs of Pakistan's disintegration. He objected to foreign aid and foreign trade being handed over to regional governments. Nor would he agree to the Awami League setting up a provisional government although it held a majority of the seats in Pakistan's Constituent Assembly.

Sheikh Mujibur on the other hand was more emphatic in demanding that martial law be lifted and his province's autonomy be recognized than he was about his right to set up a cabinet. The autonomist leaders did not however push their demands to the point of seeking independence. They showed themselves In fact conciliatory to the point that their principal demands had been met by President Yahya Khan. Sheikh Mujibur was not pressing for Independence, at least not at that point.

Yet while the political discussions were going on, reinforcements were being sent to Bengal and military chiefs were drawing up contingency plans in Dacca. Sheikh Mujibur was not unaware of all these preparations, nor of the reservations expressed by some world powers regarding the eventual emergence of an Independent Bengal. But up to the very last minute he appeared to have nurtured the rather naive hope that a compromise solution giving him a large measure of satisfaction would be negotiated,

Only hours before the army intervened he had even ordered government offices and essential businesses to resume work (they had been shut down on his orders as a protest against the imposition of martial law). By backing down in this fashion, the Awami League leader first exposed the vulnerability of his position. He was arrested at about 1:30 on the morning of March 26, according to Islamabad.

Mr. Bhutto adopted a more ambiguous position. Much less than condemning the army's attitude as he left Dacca, he even made a few gestures of sympathy with the soldiers accompanying him to the airport.

The Bengalis see in Mr. Bhutto's attitude a confirmation of what they have been saying all along--that the PPP leader is "objectively"" in collusion with the Pakistani military-administrative establishment. Pakistan's leaders could not in any case accept any uncertain compromise which would threaten the country's unity.

Such an agreement would have had serious economic repercussions. In West Pakistan, it would have deprived Pakistan's governing class of much of its strength, and the central government of the income it derives from East Pakistan's jute exports which pay for a considerable lot of the military hardware that was used against the Bengalis' bamboo poles.

NO REVOLUTIONARY TRAINING

The Pakistani Army could not accept limitation of its resources by permitting Bengal to become autonomous. "Believe me," said a cool-headed Bengali early last week, "I have worked for twenty years in the establishment. The army won't give up power so easily."

Dacca's Bengalis showed fine fighting spirit in the first hours of the confrontation. But the Awami League had given them no preparation for an armed revolutionary struggle. Its leaders, all drawn from middle class city backgrounds, were erstwhile advocates of non-violent struggle, and during the political discussion they did their best to control the hotheads in their ranks.

Even a passive resistance movement could embarrass the authorities responsible for applying martial law. The army will have more trouble trying to exert its authority in the countryside--especially during the monsoon period--than in the cities. And it is hard to see how the Bengalis, after the horrible blunders committed in Dacca, can be won over to a less bitter attitude to the Western Pakistanis. On the contrary, there is every possibility that the trend towards violence will spread, and that the Independence movement will take firmer root.