Within a space of a few short weeks both East and West Bengal have suddenly become international trouble spots. Millions of people have been uprooted by the civil war. Thousands have been killed. Famine and disease are already beginning to stalk the countryside and a full- scale war between India and Pakistan threatens to break out at any moment .

But even more disturbing is the fact that the situation can only deteriorate. The world leaders are, of course, talking glibly about the hope that the East Bengalis and the West Pakistanis will come to a "political settlement." But even the most naive student of Pakistani affairs knows that a political settlement is out of the question now.

CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE

In the coming months, the legal aspects behind this man- made holocaust will be hotly debated in the capitals of the world and on international platforms. But many of the issues which precipitated this convulsion: have been clouded by the cries of "secession" or "genocide" and other accusations and counter-accusations and it the accusing finger is to be pointed at any single Pakistani leader then one must at this juncture take a judicious look a the chronological sequence of events leading up to the rift.

It is worthwhile picking up the threads in January 1970 when President Yahya Khan, who had promised to hand over power to a popular Government, lifted he ban on political activity in both East and West Pakistan as a prelude to the election of a Constituent Assembly to hasten a Constitution-making process and to assuage the fears of the West Pakistanis who believed that the integrity of Pakistan might be jeopardized by the imagined East Bengali separatists. The President had earlier issued a Legal Framework Order (LFO) which gave him the right to ratify or reject the Constitution.

It has already been obvious that the former Foreign Minister Bhutto would emerge as the most popular leader in West Pakistan and he fiery East Bengali leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had already demonstrated his strength on the streets of East Pakistan.

HOPE OF DEMOCRACY RAISED

Political activity began in earnest the moment the ban was lifted and as both the leaders began to barnstorm their respective provinces, Pakistanis began for the first time to look forward to their first taste of democracy.

But as the two leaders launched their campaigns, it soon became clear that they were fighting elections on rigid and diametrically opposed grounds and that there would be hardly any common meeting ground in the Assembly. Bhutto, whose whole political base is essentially founded in militant Punjabis' obsession over the Kashmir dispute, began stomping up and down the Western province, talking of a thousand-year war with India. And to maintain this attitude he assured his voters that he stood for a strong Central Government, a strong army and a new offensive to liberate Kashmir.

As millions of Pakistanis wen to the polls in he country's first free elections last year General Yahya Khan and his aides waited for he results with bated breath. President Yahya certainly intended to hand over power but he had hoped that results would force the East and West Pakistani leaders into an alliance which would preserve the integrity of the country.

THE NEW FACTORS

But the General had not counted on two factors. At the last moment Awami League's major political opponent, left-wing National Awami Party, decided to boycott the elections leaving the field open to the Awami League. At the same time the West Pakistani administration's alleged failure to come to the timely assistance of the cyclone victims was used to conjure up more votes for the Awami League and in terms of preserving the integrity of the country, the results were disastrous.

Almost every Bengali endorsed Sheikh's 6-Point Program which turned the election into a referendum. The Awami League swept the polls and claimed 167 out of 169 Bengali seats and with he support of anti-Punjabi regional parties in the Western province, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was confident of obtaining he support of more than two-thirds of the 313 members of he Constituent Assembly. In West Pakistan Bhutto and his Peoples Party won 82 out of 138 seats allocated to the western wing. The Punjab recoiled in horror for it became blatantly obvious that the Bengalis would be able to draw up their own Constitution the moment the Assembly met.

BHUTTO'S PLANS

But Bhutto, who knew that he could never become he Prime Minister of undivided Pakistan was thinking of the future within hours of election. He suddenly discovered that he had a vested interest in the President's Legal Framework Order. The clause which gave the President the right to veto, or reject the Constituent Assembly's document had become the Punjab's veto.

On the night after elections the flamboyant lawyer revealed a part of his plan to me: "What do you think I will do. The Sheikh will push his Constitution through with his brute majority and the responsibility will lie on the President's shoulders. I doubt whether he will sign he document which is unacceptable to West Pakistan."

In other words, Bhutto had a vested interest in keeping the LFO in force. He had told that he had heard disconcerting reports that the Sheikh was planning to declare that the Constituent Assembly was a sovereign body the moment it met. In other words, the LFO and the Punjab's veto would disappear.

"OUR FUTURE PRIME MINISTER"

In the meantime Bengalis were in a restive mood and there had been no move toward secession. On December 24 President Yahya had described Mujibur Rahman as "our future Prime Minister" and had agreed that the Constituent Assembly would sit in Dacca. The Bengalis began to decorate the city and the Assembly House and the mood in Dacca had relaxed.

The slogan "Bangla Desh" had not been raised and no one was talking of Independence .

But Bhutto had other ideas. At first he tried to oppose the early sitting of the Assembly but on February 13 President Yahya announced that the Assembly would meet on March 3.

POINT OF NO RETURN

The actual point of no return which precipitated the present crisis came two days later on February 15. Bhutto announced that his Party would boycott the Constituent Assembly and at the same time he threatened any other West Pakistani politicians who were planning to travel to Dacca. In short, Bhutto began to pile up pressure on President Yahya.

At the same time Bhutto had met several of President Yahya's Generals who were considered hawks on the subject of East Bengal. They included the present Governor of East Pakistan, General Tikka Khan. In the meantime, several West Pakistanis had defied Bhutto's threat and had traveled to Dacca in the last week of February to participate in the framing of the Constitution. In terms of arithmetic, representatives of two-thirds of the country had congregated in Dacca.

BHUTTO THREATENS YAHYA

But on February 28 Bhutto flew to Rawalpindi to remind President Yahya of the consequences he would have to face if he ratified the constitution which was unacceptable to the Punjab and subsequently to the Punjabi army.

President Yahya made his first mistake. He succumbed to the Punjabi pressures and without consulting Sheikh Mujib, as the leader of the largest party, he postponed the Constituent Assembly on March 1.

BENGALIS LOSE FAITH

The Bengalis, who saw the move as a conspiracy, went wild and the army was called out to quell the disturbances in Dacca. The Bengalis had lost their faith in the President and the first cries of "Bangla Desh" were heard on the streets of Dacca. The hawks in the Awami League began to call for Independence and the Sheikh promised to make a dramatic announcement at a mass rally on March 7. On March 6 the President attempted to retrieve the position and announced that the Assembly would meet on March 25. But things had gone too far. On the next day, staving off militant cries for Independence, the Sheikh announced 4 preconditions for future talks. The most important was the withdrawal of Martial Law itself (this would eliminate Bhutto's veto in the form of LFO).

But one thing was clear at this juncture: The Sheikh, facing a tremendous pressure was still prepared to participate in the Union of Pakistan.

The Punjab sighed with relief. The Bengalis had been allocated a built-in majority in the Constituent Assembly by virtue of their large population but every Punjabi believed that they had found a leader who could stand up to Sheikh. He would certainly not compromise the Kashmir issue by resuming trade ties with India (as the Bengalis had advocated) and opposed all of Bengal's demands for autonomy which would strip the Central Government of all effective power.

AUTONOMY IS NOT SECESSION

But across India, in the impoverished Eastern Wing, the fiery Bengali leader and his Awami League lieutenants were adamant that they would not concede one inch of their 6-Point Program for autonomy. The Sheikh had made it plain too, that when he talked of autonomy he did not mean secession. "I want constitutional guarantees which will end this economic exploitation forever. We have larger population so how own the majority secede from the minority," he told me at that time.

YAHYA'S OFFERS

To give weight to his demand for immediate withdrawal of the Martial Law, the Sheikh launched a massive civil disobedience movement. Life in the entire Province was disrupted and as the cries of "Bangla Desh" became louder, the President flew to Dacca on March 16 with two alternate offers (1) he said he was willing to restore the power to the elected representatives of the people immediately if the Sheikh was willing to form a Provisional National Government at both the center and at the provincial level or (2) he would restore the power to the Provinces and the Interim Government led by the President himself would administer the day-to-day needs of the country unroll the Constitution was framed.

BHUTTO'S DEMAND

At that time, the two leaders said there was room for optimism. But in the meantime Bhutto had heard of the proposals and had publicly declared that West Pakistan would go up in smoke if the Peoples Party was not included to the proposed Coalition Government. To prove his point, he launched a massive and violent campaign in the Punjab and flew to Dacca on March 21 to Join the talks with the other West Pakistani leaders .

When President Yahya asked the Sheikh whether he was prepared to take Bhutto, leader of the largest West Pakistani Party, Into the Central Coalition Government, the Sheikh cited democratic precedents and said that as a leader of the single largest party he must be allowed to select his own partners. Again his willingness to participate in the Central affairs of Pakistan does not suggest that the Sheikh was planning secession. But the President succumbed to Bhutto's strident threats again and the proposal for a National Government was dropped.

YAHYA'S SECOND FORMULA

As time began to run out, the Sheikh and Yahya Khan agreed to a second compromise formula: immediate restoration of the power at the provincial level. The Sheikh asked the President to issue an immediate proclamation withdrawing the Martial Law and restoring the power to East Pakistan and the four Provinces of West Pakistan. The Sheikh agreed to the suggestion that the President could continue to administer the Interim Central Government until a constitution was framed. But in the meantime Pakistan's future was being decided by other forces. Bhutto had met the hawks in the Army and a mass movement on the streets of Bengal had slipped out of Mujib's control.

BHUTTO'S NEXT MOVE

As the soldiers slipped into battle-dress in the barracks, angry and frustrated Bengalis began to raise the flag of "Bangla Desh" in Dacca. It was Bhutto who finally brought the President to take the decision which set East Bengal on fire. When the President put the Sheikh's proposal to the West Pakistan leaders, Bhutto pointed out that if the Martial Law was withdrawn, Pakistan would be broken up into five sovereign States, the moment the President restored the power to the Provinces. He expressed the fear that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was trying to liquidate the Central Government. Because when the President withdrew the Martial Law, he had no sanction to carry on as Head of the State.

LAST STEP TO HOLOCAUST

Half-convinced, the President went back to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and expressed these fears. He promised Mujib that he would withdraw the Martial Law the moment the National Assembly met and gave the Central Government some form of validity. Sheikh Mujib reiterated his demand for the immediate withdrawal of the Martial Law and President Yahya, now Sully convinced that he was dealing with a traitor, turned to his Generals.

Taking events to their logical conclusion there is no doubt that the present holocaust was precipitated by President Yahya Khan when he postponed the Assembly without consulting the Bengalis. But even more so by Bhutto's deliberate decision to boycott the Assembly on March 3.