THE Soviet-Indian Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, concluded recently, adds a new element to the Asian situation. It furnishes a concrete example of friendship and cooperation in an area which is more in need of peace than any other area of the globe. It should be regarded in the first place as a stabilising factor for peace and peaceful coexistence in this region, as a "treaty of peace against war", to quote
India's Minister for External Affairs Sardar Swaran Singh.
Outwardly, the Asian scene appears as a confused maze of conflicts and political paradoxes: the war in Indo-China which has now been going on for twentyfive years; the tragedy of East Pakistan; the tension on the Indo-Pakistani border; Japan's demands for "an atom bomb of her own", although the country itself has lived through the horrors of atomic bombing on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; a multitude of pacts, alliances and blocs like the SEATO, CENTO, ASEAN, ANZUS and ASPAC, and a number of old and new political labels and doctrines"Vietnamisation", "Nixon Doctrine", etc., the exchange of smiles between Peking and Washington after having stubbornly stated for twenty years irreconcilable hostility between them; and, finally, a special knot of problems connected with the Middle East ( or West Asia, as some Western capitals like to call it) with its extremely acute confrontation between the Arabs and Israel.
Main Element
But, for those devoted to the ideals of peace and progress, this outward complexity should not overshadow the main element: the confrontation between the forces of peace and war, between imperialism and the national-liberation movement. It is through this confrontation that the fate of sovereignty and social reforms and also the destinies of peace in a vast region will be determined. But it would be a folly to ignore at the same time many elements which really complicate the struggle of the peace-loving forces and disrupt their unity. Colonialism, on the one hand, has deliberately left the shoots of strife and unsolved issues between nations. Imperialism and neo-colonialism are at great pains to cultivate these shoots. On the other hand, bare nationalism, when not filled with the content of deep-going social changes and collapsing in face of the very first difficulties of an internal nature, is capable of going to its extreme and seeking an outlet in religious fanaticism and irreconcilable attitude to national differences and demands of economic equality.
Imperialism and the forces of war are suffering defeat on the whole, for this defeat has been predestined by history. The six million tons of bombs dropped on Vietnam have not brought victory to the military-industrial complex. But imperialism would not live up to its name and its nature if it did not strive to impose its own terms. Next to direct military pressure, it looks for detours and for fresh reserves for its "divide-and-rule" policy.
Foreign Policy Strategy
The Soviet Union's foreign policy strategy in the present conditions of Asia is simple and consistent: to serve the cause of full restoration of the rights of the peoples which have fallen victims to aggression and of elimination of dangerous hotbeds of war, to serve the cause of lasting peace in that area. Of course, this is not a sort of unilateral charity. This kind of policy pre-supposes reciprocity. It is also free of any "great-power selfishness". Those trying to ascribe great-power tendencies to the Soviet Union, as for example, "the left" opportunists from Peking, are laying the blame at the wrong door. The hegemonistic aspirations of the PRC leadership make it readily take up the imperialist slogan that the chief contradiction of the world is allegedly the antagonism between "super powers" and "normal" states. Making a great noise about the slogan of "super powers" Peking makes active use of any means to set some countries against others. It is here, in the attempt to set some nations against others, that today lies the common point between "left" opportunism and imperialism. It is enough to compare the conduct of Peking and Washington at various stages of the Indo-Pakistani conflict and during the latest Pakistani events for this analogy to emerge with particular clarity.
A foreign policy strategy for peace must be sincere, honest and open. These were precisely the starting points that guided the Soviet Union in its decision to conclude a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with India. The Soviet Union extended a hand of friendship to India as soon as the latter became independent. Similarly the Soviet Union stretched a hand of friendship to Pakistan, implying reciprocity, being convinced that such reciprocity is incompatible with behind-the-stage military-political overtures to imperialism and with the stirring up of strife between nations. The Tashkent meeting became a symbol of disinterested Soviet good offices and the ending then of the Indo-Pakistani conflict showed especially clearly that the flames of enmity serve only those who are seeking a foothold for their "divide-and-rule" policy in the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent.
The Soviet people believe that the peoples who have recently freed themselves from the colonial yoke are first of all interested in peace and good-neighbourliness, in a foreign policy which lays the foundations for peace, rather than destroys them. That is why the Soviet Union has always taken sympathetic attitude to all constructive aspects of India's foreign policy and to the principles established by Jawaharlal Nehru which his followers are trying to put into effect.
Salient Features
The Soviet-Indian Treaty, as a political document of great international significance, sums up the identity of interests of the two peoples: the struggle for the preservation and consolidation of peace, against colonialism and racial discrimination, for an end to the arms race and for general and complete disarmament. As stated in the treaty, regular contacts between top leaders and diplomatic agencies of the two countries at all levels are one of the main methods n achieving these aims. The Treaty defines the obligations of he two sides—not to participate in military alliances directed against the other side, not to
undertake secret or open commitments incompatible with the Treaty, to desist from giving help to a third country in conflict with one of the contracting parties and also to hold immediate consultations if any of the sides is the object of an attack or threat of attack.
The Soviet Union proclaims its respect for India's non-alignment policy, and India likewise pays a tribute to the policy of peace of the Soviet Union.
Apart from these political articles, the Treaty envisages the utilisation of all forms of cooperation in other fields: economic, trade, science, technology, transport communications, culture and arts.
In their relations the two states will respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other, refrain from interference in each other's domestic affairs and base their cooperation on the principles of equality and mutual benefit.
There is no doubt that the Soviet-Indian Treaty, as it is implemented, will reveal more and more of its constructive facets.
The Soviet-Indian Treaty is not directed against any third party. The pattern for peaceful and friendly relations and cooperation found by the Soviet Union and India in their bilateral relations constitutes a standard to be emulated in building up a new type of international relations in that area.
(August 11. 1971)