The United States is trying to prevent war between India and Pakistan and maintain equilibrium of influence with the Soviet Union and China through a policy of "relief, restraint and accommodation."
This view emerges from interviews with administration officials and is consistant with President Nixon's 1971 foreign policy message, in which he said:
"We will do nothing to harm legitimate Soviet and Chinese interests in the area (the subcontinent). We are equally clear, however, that no outside power has a claim to a predominant influence. . ."
Our State Department official put it this way: "Our goal is stability in the subcontinent. We have counseled both India and Pakistan to keep cool—not to let tensions escalate in border areas and lead to war. Stability means no war between India and Pakistan."
The key operative factor in this policy is the maintenance of a united Pakistan, which is generally considered the best short-term guarantor of stability.

APPROACH OPPOSED

But many officials oppose this approach based on the belief that ultimately an independent East Pakistan is inevitable. Therefore, they contend that a policy based mainly on the unity of Pakistan is dangerously myopic.
Our State Department official who has recently returned from East Pakistan said, "The Pakistani army may be able to keep the two wings together by force for five or even ten years, but whenever the Bengalis can break away they will."
With respect to power politics on the subcontinent, he said: "It would be absolute folly to cast our lot with Pakistan. India is much the greater power.
"If we naively thought that by buttering up the Pakistanis we could erode Chinese influence in Pakistan we would be gravely mistaken. The Pakistanis know from bitter experience that China is their real friend and that the United States won't come to their aid."
These opposition views are based on several factors, including the belief that even the highly professional Pakistani army over a period of years will not be able to subdue a determined insurgency among the more than 70 million Bengalis of East Pakistan, which is separated from the West by 1,100 miles of Indian territory.
They contrast, however, with operative policy, which was described by a State Department official at the operating level as follows: "It is an effort to preserve the state of Pakistan on the Islamic basis on which it was founded."
It is widely believed in Washington that President Nixon is sympathetic with this view, that he holds President Yahya Khan of Pakistan in extremely high regard and that he believes India is guilty of exacerbating the tense and still explosive situation on the subcontinent.

WAR POTENTIAL HIGH

State Department officials and the Indian and Pakistani ambassadors agree that the potential for an Indo-Pakistani war is high.
The circumstance that could set off such a war, they all agree, would be the execution of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the East Pakistani political leader who is on trial in West Pakistan for "waging war" against the state, or a new influx of Bengali refugees into India in response to a famine forecast for the fall.
The United States has acted to forestall both events, but in both cases success is at best uncertain.
In the case of the Sheikh, Secretary of State William P. Rogers has warned the Pakistanis that "any summary action" could lead to curtailment of U.S. support for the Islamabad government.
To help prevent famine, the United States has made available 360,000 tons of grain and $3 million for the chartering of ships to move it.

NO GUARANTEES

There is no guarantee, however, that the U.S. has the "leverage" to prevent the execution of Mujibur or the means to distribute the grain it has made available.
Recent reports from West Pakistan indicate a general belief there that Mujibur will be executed. The reasoning is that alive he would remain the focus for Bengali secessionists, who might otherwise flounder in search of a leader.
Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly has suggested, however, that he might be put under house arrest in a small village somewhere to avoid making him a martyr and to satisfy the United States condition that no "summary action" be taken against him.
Mujibur was the leader of the Awami League party, which on Dec. 7, won 167 of the 313 Assembly seats in Pakistan's first free election since the establishment of the state in 1947.
It was expected that he would become prime minister after a constitution was drafted by the elected representatives, but disputes over the degree of autonomy East Pakistan would have prevented agreement.
This led to a crackdown on East Pakistan by the army, which consists almost exclusively of Westerners, a reign of terror and slaughter, a massive outflow of refugees across the open border into India and a dramatic increase in secessionist sentiment.
Bengalis and Indians contend that the crackdown was aimed at preventing East Pakistan from exercising its legitimately won electoral dominance under a federal constitution and West Pakistanis contend that the army moved to prevent secession and destruction of "the ideology and integrity of Pakistan."
There is disagreement about who is right and the issues are clouded in a morass of secret meetings and conflicting reports, but virtually all independent observers agree that there was massive carnage and that most of it was caused by the army under the authority of Yahya Khan.
It is reliably estimated that between 250,000 and 300,000 Bengalis have been slain since March 25.
The government of Pakistan has issued a White Paper alleging that 100,000 persons were killed during this period by Bengali nationalists, but independent observers including diplomats and journalists consider these figures grossly exaggerated.
The thrust of U.S. policy indicates that Washington views its interests as best served by helping to alleviate suffering among the displaced in ravaged East Pakistan and among the 7.5 million Bengali refugees in India and by supporting the efforts of Yahya Khan to preserve the unity of Pakistan.
A major side effect of U.S. policy toward Pakistan has been to drive U.S.Indian relations to their lowest ebb. Any show of support for neighboring Pakistan is regarded as hostility toward India in New Delhi.
Furthermore, India signed a 20-year friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, which some observers, including the Pakistani ambassador, have characterized as "a military alliance."
Ambassador Lakshmi Kant Jha of India said in an interview that "if India is attacked the wording of the treaty would lead India to expect that Soviet support would be forthcoming."
Hilaly contends that the treaty marks the end of India's 24-year history of nonalignment. The Indians dispute this, however, on the ground that the treaty only provides for consultation if either party is attacked.
India has tried to emphasize that it is not a party to the dispute while indicating support for Bangla Desh, of independent East Pakistan.
Jha said he believed India would recognize Bangla Desh if one or two other governments showed the way. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is under pressure from the opposition and from within her own Congress Party to do so, but she is believed to feel that the risks are too great at this time.
Jha said, "We still hope the Bengalis will get what they want one way or the other, either politically or through guerrilla warfare." He added that "We believe the big powers could force a political settlement."
It appears that none of the big powers, the Soviet Union included, favor such a settlement.