1971-10-26
By Lee Lescaze
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JAINTIAPUR, East Pakistan—Jaintiapur, less than a thousand yards from the Indian border, is a ghost town. Indian shelling drove out the people and only Pakistani soldiers remain while fast-growing vines stretch over abandoned cars, gardens and homes.
At border crossings like this, the Pakistani and Indian armies are said to be massing for a general war, each claiming that its preparations are innocently defensive.
The Pakistani government, in East Pakistan at least, is eager for reporters, United Nations representatives and other foreigners to visit border areas. India prohibits such visits except in a few spots, so here where the almost totally flat 55,000 square miles of marshy plain that is East Pakistan meets India's wooded hills, Pakistan's thin line of troops and lack of manpower or material for a large-scale offensive are evident.
Pakistani officers talk darkly of superior forces opposing them.
"I wish those hills were in Pakistan, even one of them," a major says. "We are living down here and the Indians are dropping stones on our roof."
As he leads the way to his forward position, the major points out India's principal observation post, a white house on the crest of a hill about half a mile away.
"Don't worry, they never fire when we have visitors," he says and stops to let his guest scan the Indian post through binoculars. A man is standing next to the house. He appears to be watching through his binoculars.
"They don't want our foreign guests to see them shelling," the major explains.
At the forward bunker, he points out Indian positions on the facing hills. A small village, its roofs barely visible, houses Indian mortars and artillery, he says. Further up the slope is India's winding supply road, and the major points out a break in the ridgeline perhaps two miles away as the site of the Indian Army's sector headquarters. Nothing appears to be moving.
It is hot in the sun and most of the bunker's small garrison is asleep under mosquito netting, skipping their lunch because of the Ramadan fast. There are other bunkers concealed in the wet plain, but each has only two or three regular army soldiers and a handfull of volunteers (Razakars), a large and ill-trained force that the army has recruited and armed since Pakistan's civil fighting began seven months ago. They have planted bamboo stakes with sharpened points around their positions and laid anti-personnel mines but the major says he doesn't have enough men to send out night ambushes.
Last night, the major says, 25 three-ton trucks drove down the Indian road toward the border. He spent the night on his field telephone checking with his string of forward bunkers, but no attack came.
He is confident, with the stylish pride most Pakistani officers have, that his men can repulse any Indian attack however outnumbered they may be.
"One of my men," he says repeating a boast one hears throughout the Pakistan army, "is equal to 10 of theirs.' Then he laughs and adds: "They may have to be because the Indians have 10 times our manpower."
The Pakistan army does not appear to have much reserve ammunitions stockpiled near the border. Standing orders are not to waste bullets; not to open fire until the enemy is within killing distance.
The only enemy who have come that close are Mukti Bahini guerrilla units fighting for an independent East Pakistan. The major insists they are not a serious problem.
"They run away when they see us," he says. He is not interested in hearing reports of the recent bombings in Dacca and of mukti bahini sabotage elsewhere in East Pakistan.
"The only problem is at the borders," the major said. One guerrilla surrendered recently and told the major that he was paid 50 rupees (less than $7) a month by India as mukti bahini. The major, like many officers, believes all rebels have been misled by Indian propaganda and have no genuine motivation.
"You didn't have to take up arms against us," he told the guerrilla. "We would have made you a volunteer, given you a rifle and paid you 90 rupees a month."
The major's other immediate problem is India's mortars and artillery. Most rounds are fired to cover mukti bahini infiltration, he says. Occasionally India also fires to range its guns on bridges and other targets the guerrillas may contemplate attacking. There are shell holes along the road and in the muddy fields near Jaintiapur, but not many and it is impossible to determine whether shelling has been light or whether the soft ground and thick weeds hide most craters.
One of three buildings in Jaintiapur has been destroyed. Back in the district capital, Sylhet, 26 miles south of Jaintiapur, an East Pakistani says many people used to take their families to Jaintiapur for picnics because it was pretty and cool. and quiet.
"What is it like now?" he asks.