Nixon Presidential Materials

Washington, September 3, 1971.
CONTINGENCY PLANNING—INDO-PAK HOSTILITIES

The Papers

At the last WSAG meeting on contingency planning for possible Indo-Pak hostilities (August 17) it was agreed that the State Department would prepare scenarios for US approaches to the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China and the United Nations. Most of this work has now been completed and is incorporated in the several papers that follow this analytical summary.
The papers that State has drafted analyze the problems and suggest diplomatic moves within the separate and artificial categories of “before” and “after” hostilities. This makes it difficult to devise a present strategy toward the Chinese and Soviets with a clear view in mind of where we want to be if there is an extended war. This approach also makes it difficult to calculate the possible inter-play of interests among the great powers at the various stages of a South Asian crisis.
This analytical summary, therefore, is organized so as to raise the issues that the State papers seem to miss. These will be highlighted in your talking points.(2) The summary will cut across the several papers State has produced and construct from them the separate but related approaches we might wish to take toward China and the USSR at the major stages of the South Asian crisis and our derivative postures at the UN. In other words, instead of using State’s “before hostilities” and “after hostilities” approach, this summary deals first with China, then with the USSR and finally with the UN.
You should not be handicapped by this at the meeting since you will be focusing on issues rather than on papers per se. Our approach makes it a lot easier to get to the ultimate issues which the papers generally miss.
Just so you will know what State has done, here is the list of papers which this summary covers. They follow the summary at sub-tabs under the general tab marked “Contingency Papers”:(3)
—“China.” A proposed line to take with the Chinese now before hostilities.
—“Soviet.” This is a proposed approach to the Soviets now before hostilities, both in New York and Moscow. Also at this tab is the report of the August 25 Rogers–Dobrynin meeting.
—“UN.” A posture at the UN before hostilities.(4)
—“After Hostilities.” Approaches to the Soviets and Chinese and actions at the UN after hostilities break out. This concentrates on getting a cease-fire. It does not deal with the tough question of Chicom intervention.

I. Approach Toward China

State’s scenario for dealing with the Chinese on South Asia is contained in two papers—“Contacts with the Chinese on the South Asian Crisis” considers what we might wish to say to the Chinese before the outbreak of hostilities and a scenario for approaching the Chinese after the outbreak of an Indo-Pak war is included in the paper entitled “China, the Soviet Union and the UN—Post Outbreak-of-Hostilities Diplomacy” (pp. 7–9). The following summary draws together the main points made in both of these papers and identifies issues that should be considered.

A. Contacts with Chinese Prior to Hostilities

The paper on contact with the Chinese prior to hostilities asserts that the principal purpose would be to:
—make sure the Chinese were fully informed of our policies on South Asia;
—stress parallel interests we have in discouraging a war between India and Pakistan.
In any such contact, State believes that it should be made clear that we are not challenging the Sino-Pakistani relationship nor threatening China but simply trying to insure that there are no misunderstandings of each other’s policies.
Specifically, State suggests that the following points be communicated to the Chinese through “appropriate” channels:
1. We are seriously concerned about the dangers of war in South Asia.
2. Hostilities may not only result from military over-reaction to provocations but also from the flow of refugees into India.
3. Our actions are designed to ease the burden of the refugees on India and mitigate the prospect of a major famine in East Pakistan.
4. Our efforts are primarily humanitarian and we will not be a party to any effort to capitalize on relief for political purposes.
5. We have urged the Indians to act with restraint and have pointed out to Pakistan the importance of working for a political accommodation in East Pakistan as the best hope for preserving the unity and integrity of the country.
6. We regard the East Pakistan situation as an internal matter, although we recognize that it has international dimensions with involvement of the US, Soviet Union and China.
7. Indo-Pak hostilities would not be to anyone’s benefit. Moreover, if external powers did become involved, it would contribute to rising international tensions that would make it difficult for the US to reduce the level of confrontation in Asia and move toward an era of consultation and détente.
8. For our part we are (a) making sure both India and Pakistan are aware that we would not support an attack by one of them against the other, (b) pursuing an extremely restrained military supply policy and (c) using our influence to prevent border incidents from escalating into general war.
9. As the President made clear in his foreign policy report to Congress, (5) we will do nothing to harm legitimate Chinese (or Soviet) interests in South Asia. No outside power, however, has a claim to predominant influence in the region, and each can serve its own interest best by acting accordingly.
10. We are making similar points to the Soviets and would be interested in China’s overall view of the South Asian situation.
These suggestions appear to be reasonable as far as they go but some very important contingencies and related issues are not addressed. As State suggests the Chinese should probably know what our general approach to the South Asian crisis is but more important to them, and to us, would be our specific reaction should China and India seem to be heading for a military confrontation or even war. It is difficult to sharpen our present approach to the Chinese (or to the Indians, for that matter) unless we have some idea what stance we would take in a Sino- Indian confrontation. Some of the more important issues that would arise in such a situation would include:
—Should the Chinese provoke border incidents with India and/or make threatening noises in support of Pakistan, what would be the US private and public positions? Even strong anti-Indian propaganda, ultimatums and border incidents without a Chinese military buildup along the frontiers could conceivably raise serious problems for the China trip. Should this be pointed out to the Chinese now? (Who wants the China trip more—we or they?)
—How would we react to a gradual buildup of Chinese forces along India’s borders, especially at strategic points? The Indians might regard such a development as a serious threat, or at least would bill it as such in public. Again the spectre of China threatening India could raise some serious problems for the China trip. Would we want to point this out to the Chinese as soon as we detected the beginning of their military buildup or even before they begin to move?

B. Contacts with Chinese After Hostilities

The State paper is premised on the assumption that:
1. In the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of hostilities, we should attempt to prevent China from intervening directly and militarily on the side of Pakistan by military action against India;
2. In the post-hostilities peace-keeping phase we should move “energetically” to limit the influence the Chinese may have gained in South Asia, and ensure that they accept and will not disrupt whatever political settlement may be achieved between India and Pakistan.
1. Actions in Immediate Aftermath. State believes that there are a “variety of factors” encouraging the Chinese to limit their intervention, like fear of a possible Soviet riposte along the Sino-Soviet border and the damage that bellicose behavior might do to China’s foreign policy posture in general and the prospects for the President’s trip in particular. Therefore, State believes that should Indo-Pak fighting break out “these constraining factors, reinforced by statements of our concern, are more likely to be effective than direct preemptive moves.”
State suggests the following specific actions:
—Through the most direct and rapid channel of communication, convey our concern, our determination not to seek advantages from the crisis and hope that China will influence the Paks to bring hostilities to an early end. We would also indicate the bilateral steps we were taking in Moscow, New Delhi and Islamabad to the same end and particularly express the hope that the Chinese would also cut off arms shipments. Finally, we would suggest our willingness to cooperate in seeking an early settlement.
—If the PRC is a member of the Security Council, seek its support for a resolution calling for an early end to hostilities and creating a basis for a political settlement.
—If PRC is not in Security Council, we would keep it informed of our activities there and seek at least tacit endorsement of any resolution we might favor.
—Include the Chinese in any other international mechanism that might be developed to cope with the crisis.
2. Post-Hostilities Peace-Keeping Phase. State offers no specific suggestions on how we might wish to cut our diplomatic losses to the Chinese in South Asia and insure that they accept and will not disrupt the peace settlement. It is probably assumed, however, that if we succeed in involving the Chinese in putting out the fire, they will then have a vested interest in maintaining the peace in the future.
Again the State paper seems reasonable as far as it goes but some very important contingencies and related issues are not addressed. It makes good sense to involve Chinese in stopping the fighting and working on a peace settlement, but what if they do not see it that way? It would seem to be far too rosy a prognosis to base US policy on a judgment that the Chinese will not line up, at a minimum with threats and propaganda, on Pakistan’s side should there be a war. Certainly there are constraining factors but there are also factors that could impel the Chinese toward deeper and more direct involvement. In this connection, it is instructive to note that the Chinese have quietly stepped up their support to the Paks, almost across the board, since last March. Some of the more important issues this raises are:
—Are there any pre-emptive moves we can take with the Chinese immediately after the outbreak of hostilities to prevent them from intervening?
—If the Chinese do come in on Pakistan’s side what should our posture be? Would we provide military assistance to India against China if we judged that India was the target of generally unprovoked aggression?
It is the answers to these questions that we have to think about not only to deal with the contingency if it arises but to sharpen whatever we may say now.

II. Approach to Soviets

State’s scenario for dealing with the Soviets on South Asia is contained in two papers—”Conversation with the Soviets on South Asia” and “China, the Soviet Union and the UN—Post-Outbreak-of-Hostilities Diplomacy” (pp. 4–7). The following summary draws together the main points made in both of these papers and identifies issues that should be covered.

A. Contacts with Soviets Prior to Hostilities

At the last WSAG meeting on South Asia (August 17) there was some hesitancy on the part of Under Secretary Irwin and Assistant Secretary Sisco to agree to produce a scenario for approaching the Soviets and especially on the specific issue of prior clearance of any actions with the White House. We attempted to nail both these points down with a subsequent memo from you to the WSAG members,(6) but Secretary Rogers and Ambassador Beam went ahead with apparently already planned approaches to Ambassador Dobrynin and Gromyko. With some prodding, State has sent over a short paper on further approaches but it falls far short of being the comprehensive scenario we were looking for.
You will recall that Ambassador Beam in his August 23 talk with Gromyko and Secretary Rogers in his August 25 meeting with Dobrynin did little more than to convey our concern about the dangers of war in South Asia and gently probe Soviet intentions. They both, not unexpectedly, got back platitudes and positive statements of Soviet intention to exercise restraint and to urge restraint on the Indians. The Soviets also said they were not working towards the dismemberment of Pakistan and do not support separatist and guerrilla operations in East Pakistan.
State “proposes” that our next move with the Soviets should be to attempt to elicit support for, or at least not opposition to, the UN relief effort. They note the apparent close identity of Soviet and Indian negative attitudes toward UN involvement in any aspect of the current situation, and apparently (without so stating) hope that a shift in the Soviet position would also help to bring the Indians around. Specifically, State proposes to instruct Ambassador Bush to discuss these issues with the Soviets at an early date along the following lines:
—Express our concern about the refugees in India and famine in East Pakistan.
—Note the limited Soviet contribution and hope that they will provide support to the concept of an international relief effort as the best way to separate humanitarian relief from political problems.
—Express hope the Soviets will not continue to oppose UN moves designed to reduce tensions and cope with refugee problems.
—Note that if there is famine in East Pakistan there will be an increased flow of refugees to India and the danger of hostilities will increase.
—Recognize our common interests in peace and stability in South Asia and hope for working with the Soviets to de-escalate the crisis.
Then, after we have talked with the Chinese along the lines State suggests, they would go back to the Soviets and reiterate our “basic position,” i.e. that we have common interests in the peace and stability of the region and that we will continue to take such actions as we can to deescalate the crisis. State also proposes saying:
—We have made our commitment to peace and restraint clear to the Chinese and would hope that the Soviets will do the same.
—As the President made clear in his report to Congress in February, we will do nothing to harm legitimate Soviet (and Chinese) interests in South Asia, but no outside power has a claim to predominant influence and all should conduct their activities in the region accordingly.
This is hardly the detailed scenario we were looking for and it would seem to be largely diplomatic eyewash. Now that we and the Soviets have said the appropriate peace and restraint phrases to each other something more substantive would seem to be in order. We might be able to score a few propaganda points on the UN issue but the basic fact is that the Indians are leading the Soviets on this one and our efforts to be most effective should be concentrated on New Delhi, although making the Soviets feel uncomfortable will not hurt. Bush’s point on recognizing our common interest in peace and stability in South Asia and opening the door to Soviet cooperation would seem to be a good one, but it needs to be said at a higher level where we can be sure it will have an impact.
Beyond these comments, there are other issues that should be addressed now, such as:
—Can we and should we maneuver the Soviets into using their negative influence with the Chinese to keep them from getting directly involved on the side of Pakistan?
—How can we achieve our objective in South Asia and contain the current thrust of Soviet influence?
—What can we do to encourage the Soviets to use more boldly their substantial influence to restrain the Indians?
—Is there a potential trade-off whereby we squeeze Yahya and they do the same to Mrs. Gandhi and, if so, how do we approach the Soviets on this delicate issue?

B. Contacts with Soviets after Hostilities

State’s thinking on how we should approach the Soviets after the outbreak of hostilities is based on the following assumptions:
1. In the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of hostilities we should see that Soviet support to India does not encourage India to keep on fighting until its maximum political demands are met.
2. In the post-hostilities peace-keeping phase, as with the Chinese, we should more “energetically” limit the influence the Soviets may have gained in South Asia and ensure that they accept and will not disrupt whatever political settlement may be achieved between India and Pakistan.
3. Actions in Immediate Aftermath. As in the case of the Chinese, State believes that these are a “variety of factors” encouraging the Soviets to limit their intervention, like their presumed desire not to force the Chinese to intervene on Pakistan’s side and the fact that India can probably handle Pakistan alone without direct Soviet military support. Therefore, again as in the Chinese case, State believes that should Indo- Pak fighting break out “these constraining factors, reinforced by statements of our concern, are more likely to be effective than direct preemptive moves.”
State suggests the following specific actions toward the Soviets:
—Approach them immediately, perhaps on the hot line, with a message from the President stressing our concern with the gravity of the situation, our determination not to seek advantages from the situation, our hope that the USSR will act likewise and will use its influence to end hostilities.
—Issue immediate Presidential statement deploring the resort to violence, calling for a cessation of hostilities and requesting other interested external powers to work toward this end. The statement, however, would be couched in generalities, not foreclose any of our options and not attempt to get the Soviets to condemn one side or the other.
—Call in Ambassador Dobrynin at the highest appropriate level and [say?] soon we hope that the Soviets will associate themselves with our call for an end of hostilities, support Security Council discussion and reasonable resolutions, and cut off arms shipments. We would inform him of our intention to make a parallel approach to the Chinese.
—In public statements at the UN and elsewhere, hit hard on such themes as:
—Soviet responsibilities to bring an end to the fighting;
—need for Soviets to suspend military and economic aid as we have;
—we seek no special advantage from the conflict.
2. Post-Hostilities Peacekeeping Phase. As with the Chinese, State offers no specific suggestions on how we might cut our diplomatic losses to the Soviets in South Asia and ensure that they accept and will not disrupt a peace settlement. It is probably assumed, however, that if we succeed in involving them in putting out the fire, the Soviets will then have a stronger vested interest in maintaining the place in the future.
Viewed from today’s perspective this is probably the right tone and type of posture we should take toward the Soviets in the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of war between India and Pakistan. The whole point would be to encourage them to use their influence with the Indians to halt the fighting, or at least not to let it drag out and see tensions increase among the great powers as a result. There may be other things that we might wish to do but this objective seems right.
The question which remains, but which State does not address, is what if the Soviets do not choose to use their leverage with India. This is very possible and we need to develop our thinking on this subject.

III. The UN—Before and After Hostilities

Whatever is done at the UN is in the nature of being supportive of rather than independent from the major thrust of bilateral policies toward the major actors—India, Pakistan, China and the Soviet Union. The important thing about our UN posture at this point is that it backs up, or at a minimum, runs parallel to our positions in the major capitals. The details are for the technicians to figure out.
State has developed a scenario for a number of things that could be done at the UN after the outbreak of hostilities. (pp. 9–11 of paper on “China, the Soviet Union and the UN—Post Outbreak-of-Hostilities Diplomacy”.) These are largely the normal moves of going to the Security Council and supporting a resolution calling for the end of hostilities and seeking a basis for a peace settlement. Again, the important thing about our UN posture after the outbreak of hostilities is also that it supports and is not independent of other actions we may be taking elsewhere.

Footnotes:

2 Saunders and Hoskinson sent a memorandum to Kissinger on September 3 outlining talking points for the WSAG meeting scheduled for September 8. (Ibid.)
3 The papers cited here are identified and summarized in the text by Saunders and Hoskinson, with the exception of the paper dealing with the approach to take to the South Asian crisis at the United Nations before hostilities developed, and the report on the meeting between Rogers and Dobrynin on August 25. For a memorandum reporting on the meeting between Rogers and Dobrynin, see Document 135. On August 27 Eliot sent to Kissinger the paper entitled “Contact with the Chinese on the South Asian Crisis.” On September 1 he sent him the papers entitled “Conversation with the Soviets on South Asia” and “China, the Soviet Union, and the UN—Post Outbreak-of- Hostilities Diplomacy.” All three are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–082, WSAG Meeting, South Asia, 8/17/71. Eliot sent “South Asia at the United Nations” to Kissinger on September
3. (Ibid., Box H–115, WSAG Minutes Originals, 1971)
4 The paper entitled “South Asia at the United Nations” laid out what was seen in the Department of State as the potential offered by the United Nations to try to contain the crisis short of war. The United Nations provided a channel for famine relief for East Pakistan and refugee relief for India. The United States could use the United Nations to stress the gravity of the situation and the danger of war, to express concern to India about Indian reluctance to accept a UN presence in India, and to emphasize the importance of a political accommodation in Pakistan to defuse the crisis
5 Reference is to the report submitted to the Congress on February 25, 1971. For text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 219–345.
6 See footnote 4, Document 135.