Library of Congress - Kissinger Papers

December 5, 1971.
K: Mr. President.
P: Hello. It’s all directly on just what we discussed.
K: And what are they going to do?
P: Stick with the ceasefire and withdrawal and give nothing at all on that. That he [Rogers] says is Pakistan’s position.
K: Exactly.
P: The Somalia Resolution(2) basically.
K: Exactly.
P: And he said that was what we would do and we would stick right with it and I said, “Absolutely . . .” He said that was what he was going to do and I said that’s what I wanted done. So, that’s that.
K: Terrific, Mr. President.
P: Now, I asked him what the hell we could do about the British, the French. He said nothing. So dammit, I think—well, the British I guess want to get along with India in the future. I said to him that I didn’t think there was a hell of a lot that—he said that the British had to be on the winning side as you said because they figured they had to get along with India in the future. I said, “Well, maybe it means something to them but it doesn’t mean anything to us except a $10 billion drag in foreign aid over the last 20 years.” I said, “Maybe let the Russians pick up that tab.” Well, that sort of shook him. He said, well, we really didn’t want to get that out too much because you know it will look [omission in the source text] I said, no, I’m just referring to what we do and that’s what I mean. I don’t think even you, Henry, [know] how tough I feel about that aid business. We are not going to aid countries that engage in aggression and then don’t do a goddamn thing when we ask them to get out.
K: Mr. President, if we don’t [do?] act this toughly, I’m completely aboard. This is going to be a dress rehearsal for the Middle East in the spring.
P: That’s right, that’s right.
K: And I’m much more worried about the impact on the Russians.
P: Right.
K: And in fact we ought to consider seriously getting Vorontsov in and telling him if the Russians continue this line, these talks on the Middle East and others just aren’t going to be possible.
P: Yeah. Well, get him in. Why don’t you send a letter from me to Brezhnev?
K: All right.
P: Why not play it a little tougher and just say that I have very good talks—I’ve got an idea, just let me look at it tomorrow—I had very good talks with Mrs. Meir when we were here and that we can make progress on this matter at our further discussions there possibly. However, I must tell you that in the event that this present situation goes on in Pakistan that that will seriously jeopardize those talks.
K: Excellent, I think you should.
P: And a letter from me to him. Let’s see what happens.
K: Or at least a message.
P: Huh? What’s that?
K: I think that’s right.
P: It may or may not help but let’s—but that will pass on. See, in other words, do it in a way that we are passing on to him that we have made very good progress. Now, Mr. Chairman, we would like to know what you are going to do on this, we are keeping our side but I am very distressed after the talks I’ve had with Mr. Gromyko and Dr. Kissinger has had with Mr. Dobrynin to see what are the developments here in India and Pakistan. Now, the point is, what do we want the Russians to do though? You know, about India and Pakistan.
K: They could get it stopped. They could at least take a more helpful line in the UN.
P: Yeah. Well, how about getting that message to him immediately. Now, that should not be public, you understand. I don’t want that to be out in the public.
K: Oh, no, no. We could do that as an oral message.
P: An oral message. But to who, that stupid Dobrynin.
K: No, no; to Vorontsov here. Dobrynin’s DCM.
P: Well, I want it to be from me to Brezhnev.
K: You don’t want it in writing, do you?
P: It doesn’t bother me, if that will help. Whatever will help the most do.
K: Well, let me draft something and show it to you first thing in the morning.
P: Why, what would be the dis—well, the main thing—rather than waiting a day, if it’s going to be oral, get him in today.
K: Okay, why don’t I get Vorontsov in today.
P: Get him in today and tell him I’ve just talked with you on the phone; that the President would send this in writing but he wants this oral message to go from him; I don’t want to use the hotline; you know, give him a little of that crap and that, Mr. Chairman, we have developed this very good relationship, I’m delighted but I must be very frank with you. On [At] first in the Mid-East we made very great progress and I would be interested to discuss this—Dr. Kissinger will discuss with Dobrynin when he returns. Then, now, on India–Pakistan we find your attitude very hard to understand and what are you going to do? And we have got to play it with that with them on that and the same time, Henry, on the—it will make them realize that’s where our three-day strike is also going to help.
K: Exactly.
P: You see, we have just got to—and Bill to my surprise, I didn’t do any convincing so apparently whatever the WSAG meetings or something, he got . . .
K: Oh, yeah, I gave it very hard to Sisco so he got it from Sisco. . . .
P: He was totally on board.
K: Good.
P: But all he said was, he says I’m glad—I told him what a good job Sisco had done but that didn’t seem to—he said, well, fine; we couldn’t have done it until now though because we wouldn’t have had the public opinion on our side.
K: Yeah.
P: That’s wrong, of course, we should have done it earlier.
K: Right, we should have done it earlier.
P: But, nevertheless, it was well worth doing now rather than not at all.
K: Exactly.
P: But, Henry, don’t feel that the whole thing is lost yet—
K: Oh, I don’t think it’s lost if we play it hard.
P: And incidentally, when I say play it hard, let me understand, we are not going to roll over after they have done this horrible thing. They [We] are not going to roll over and say, “Now, India, everything will be like it was and we’ll come help you again.” And I mean we will cut the gizzard out and let the Russians come help the Indians.
K: Right.
P: The arguments from the New York Times and others will be “we will buy ourselves a century or decades of hatred and suspicion from the Indian people.” Bullshit! What is [has] $10 billion of foreign aid bought us?
K: Exactly.
P: But hatred and suspicion from the Indian people.
K: Exactly.
P: Tell me one friend we’ve got in India, do you know any?
K: Exactly.
P: How about putting it that way? Just as cold as that. Let’s start getting some top anti-Indian propaganda out.
K: And that won’t be unpopular in America.
P: That’s right. I want to be sure that you fill Connally in on this.
K: I’m seeing him tomorrow morning.
P: Now, I have decided that what we will do is to have a meeting. I’m going to call Haldeman, you don’t do anything about it.
K: Right.
P: But I have decided to have a meeting to start at 1:30 so we will have an hour and a half meeting tomorrow on the damn thing.
K: Terrific.
P: I think we better. I think that Connally should be there due to the aid(3) part of it, don’t you agree.
K: Absolutely.
P: I don’t want Mitchell there; I don’t think it’s that sort of a thing. I think Laird should be there if he is around. If not,—
K: Packard would be good.
P: Packard, right, And that’s it.
K: And Moorer, I guess Moorer.
P: Yes, to report on the military situation.
K: Right.
P: Um-humm.
K: The same group as which as did the Middle East thing with the addition of Connally.
P: Yeah.
K: Connally to replace Mitchell really.
P: Well, now, let’s ask—maybe we shouldn’t have Connally, what do you think?
K: I think Connally would be good.
P: Yeah. Well, I think he would be good for the discussion, yeah, because he will be tough as hell. Yeah. Because this will be a subject for discussion; I’m not going to have those cameras for the whole meeting, only for the first 10 minutes.
K: Right.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to South Asia.]
P: Yeah. Well, now getting back to this thing on India, there was no question at all—I mean I didn’t lean him at all, I was trying to see what the position was but Bill is completely on board.
K: Terrific.
P: No, no—he said, no give at all on this resolution; we can’t do it. And that’s that. He’s told Bush to pass the word around that that’s the line that we’re going to—and he said we would veto another resolution— another ceasefire alone. I said, fine; you bet your life we will veto it.
K: Good, good. I told that to Sisco and Bush this morning and they must have brought him around. And that WSAG meeting.
P: All right.
K: Good, Mr. President.
P: Fine, bye.

Footnotes:

2 See footnote 2, Document 229.
3 A transcript of a telephone conversation between Kissinger and Connally on December 5 in which they discussed cutting off economic assistance to India is published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 159.