Nixon Presidential Materials

1971-12-10

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Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to Pakistan (Farland)

By Henry Kissinger

Page: 0

Foreign Relations of the United States
Volume X1
South Asia Crisis, 1971

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 643, Country Files, Middle East, India/Pakistan, December 1–10. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. No time of transmittal appears on the message.

Washington, December 10, 1971.
Ref: [message number not declassified](2)
We are making strongest démarche to Soviets today which proposes that they join with us in supporting provisos contained in my message of December 9(3) and paragraph 3 of your [message number not declassified] which provides (a) India and Pakistan should agree to an immediate ceasefire with the separate armed forces “standing fast”; and that the United Nations or other international organization provide observers to see that the ceasefire is effective; (b) that India and Pakistan “at any effective level” immediately open negotiations aimed at a settlement of the war and troop withdrawal; and coincident therewith negotiations be started looking towards the political satisfaction of Bengali aspirations; i.e., a political settlement.
It is essential that Government of Pakistan refrain from making additional proposals until we have had opportunity to move within the above framework.
In discussing the foregoing procedure with Yahya, you should emphasize that the President has made the strongest démarche to the Soviets and included warning to them that we have obligations towards Pakistan which will not permit aggression against West Pakistan. President added that should Indian offensive be launched in the West, with Soviet acquiescence, a US/Soviet confrontation would ensue.




Footnotes:


2 Document 271.
3 Document 259.