1971-12-30
By Herbert Spivack
U.S. POLICY AND BANGLADESH
Foreign Relations of the United States
Volume E7
Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL BANGLA DESH-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Islamabad, Calcutta, London, Manila, Moscow, and USUN.
December 30, 1971
TO:
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4993
SUBJ:
U.S. POLICY AND BANGLADESH
REF:
ISLAMABAD 12575
Department of State TELEGRAM
PAGE 01 DACCA 05866 301348Z
41
ACTION NEA-06
INFO OCT-01 SS-14 NSC-10 NSCE-00 INR-05 CIAE-00 NSAE-00
EUR-10 IO-03 L-02 PRS-01 RSR-01 RSC-01 /054 W
039903
P 301115Z DEC 71
FM: AMCONSUL DACCA
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN PRIORITY
DACCA 5866
1. URGENT PREOCCUPATIONS AT TIME REFTEL RECEIVED AND IN DAYS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING RECEIPT HAVE UNFORTUNATELY DELAYED OUR EXPRESSION OF ADMIRATION FOR THIS COGENT AND PERCEPTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. INTERESTS IN DEALING WITH NEW BANGLADESH GOVFRNMENT. VALIDITY OF THIS FINE PIECE OF WORK, HAS IN OUR VIEW, BEEN REINFORCED BY WHAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE.
2. RECENT STATEMENTS BY BANGLADESH LEADERS REVEAL INCREASINGLY MATURE AND UNDERSTANDING APPROACH TO QUESTION OF RECOGNITION. RATHER THAN EARLIER CHAUVINISTIC AND BREAST-BEATING PRONOUNCEMENTS, THESE MORE RECENT STATEMENTS APPEAR TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR MATURE CONSIDERATION ON PART OF OTHER POWERS BEFORE RECOGNITION EXTENDED TO BANGLADESH AS WELL AS INDICATE WILLINGNESS MAINTAIN DE FACTO RELATIONSHIP UNTIL FINAL DECISIONS FORTHCOMING—ASSUMING THAT THOSE FINAL DECISIONS EXPECTED TO BE FAVORABLE.
3. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL BOTH IN ENABLING THIS OFFICE TO BE SOMEWHAT MORE PRODUCTIVE AND IN EASING TRANSITION FROM PRESENT LIMBO TO WHAT APPEARS AS OF NOW TO BE INEVITABLE RECOGNITION OF BANGLADESH, IF (A) US OFFICIALS AT SUITABLE PLACES (NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, CALCUTTA, AND IN LIGHT OF MANILA 11728 MANILA) ENTERED INTO INFORMAL AND UNOFFICIAL DIALOGUES WITH BANGLADESH OFFICIALS TO CONVEY TO LATTER SOME SENSE OF U.S. FLEXIBILITY ON MATTER RECOGNITION— AT VERY LEAST, TO ASSURE THEM THAT US NOT IRREVOCABLY COMMITTED TO SUPPORT OF UNITED PAKISTAN, AND (B) I AND MY STAFF (WHO ARE PERSONALLY ACQUAINTED WITH MANY IMPORTANT FIGURES IN BDG) WERE AUTHORIZED TO ENTER INTO STRICTLY INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH BANGLADESH OFFICIALS HERE FOR DISCUSSION OF VARIOUS PRACTICAL MATTERS RELATING TO OUR PRESENCE IN DACCA. IN BOTH THESE CASES, IT WOULD, OF COURSE, BE MADE CLEAR THAT CONTACTS CONCERNED IN NO WAY CONSTITUTED RECOGNITION OR PROMISE OF EVENTUAL RECOGNITION.
4. RELATED TO FOREGOING, I WOULD HOPE THAT IN OUR CONTACTS WITH PAKISTANI OFFICIALS AT ALL LEVELS WE ARE SCRUPULOUSLY REFRAINING FROM ENCOURAGING THEM TO HOPE FOR OUR SUPPORT IN EFFORTS TO RETAIN FRAME-WORK OF UNITED PAKISTAN. GIVEN OUR VERY STRONG FEELING HERE THAT ANY SUCH EFFORTS ARE DOOMED, WE FEEL THAT ENCOURAGEMENT BY USG IN THAT DIRECTION WOULD SERVE NEITHER PAKISTAN’S INTEREST NOR OUR OWN.
GP-3
SPIVACK