Nixon Presidential Materials

January 3, 1972

TO
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDDIATE 5002

SUBJ:
MEETING WITH BANGLADESH FOREIGN MINISTER ABDUS SAMAD

TELEGRAM

AMCONSUL DACCA

INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL CALCUTTA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE

THIS MESSAGE IN THREE PARTS - PART ONE

1. SUMMARY. IN CORDIAL INTERVIEW INITATED BY HIM, BANGLADESH FOREIGN MINISTER SOLICITED US ASSISTANCE IN ACHIEVING FREEDOM FOR SHEIKH MUJIB RAHMAN, ASSURED ME THAT USB "MISSION" IN DACCA WOULD BE ALLOWED TO FUNCTION FOR TIME BEING AND WOULD RECIEVE "HONORABLE" TREATMENT, INQUIRED INTO PROSPECTS OF US RECOGNITION OF BANGLADESH GOVERNMENT (BDG) AND INTO STATUS OF PARTIALLY COMPLETED USAID PROJECTS. ACTION REQUESTED: APPRECIATE INDICATIONS OF TYPE OF RESPONSES, IF ANY, DEPARTMENT WISHES ME TO MAE POINTS RAISED BY FOREIGN MINISTER.
2. ON MORNING OF NEW YEAR’S DAY, OFFICE OF BANGLADESH GOVERNMENT FOREIGN MINISTER ABDUS SAMAD TELEPHONED TO CONSULATE GENERAL TO REQUEST THAT I CALL ON FONMIN AT NOON. THIS REQUEST MAY HAVE BEEN RELATED SEVERAL HIGHLY TENTATIVE INFORMAL PROBES BY BENGALI CONTACTS SEEKING A CERTAIN WHETHER I WAS PLANNING CALL ON FONMIN. TO SUCH PROBES ANSWER HAD BEEN GIVEN THAT, IN VIEW OF UNCERTAIN STATUS OF CONSULATE GENERAL, I WOULD NOT INITIATE ANY CONTANCTS BUT WOULD CERTAINLY RESPOND IF FONMIN INVITED ME.
3. FONMIN RECIEVED ME WITH GREAT CORDIALITY IN HIS OFFICE IN BANGABHABAN (FORMER GOVERNMENT HOUSE). AFTER EXCHANGE OF NEW YEAR’S GREETINGS, FONMIN EXPRESSED AOORECUATION FOR "WIDESPREAD SUPPORT OF AMERICAN PEOPLE" FOR BENGALI SUFFERING UNDER MLA AND FOR CREATION OF BANGLADESH, HE CITED NAMES OF SEVERAL SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN WHO HAD ALSO SUPPORTED BANGLADESH BUT SAID HE AND HIS AWAMI LEAGUE COLLEAGUES HAD BEEN "SHOCKED" BY WHAT APPEARED TO BE "HOSTILE ATTITUDE" OF PRESENT ADMINSITRATION TO ASPIRATION OF BENGALI PEOPLE FOR INDEPENDANCE. WITHOUT DWELLING EXCESSIVELY ON THESE POINTS, SAMAD MOVED ON TO QUESTION OF STATUS OF U.S. CONSULATE GENERAL. HE SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED THE NEED FOR SOME TIME ON THE PART OF THE FOREIGN POWERS TO DECIDE ON RECOGNITION OF BANGLDESH, AND HE ASSURED ME THAT DURING PERIOD WHILE SUCH DECISIONS BEING MADE, FOREIGN MISSIONS IN DACCA WOULD BE TREATED "WITH DIGNITY AND HONOR" AND WOULD BE PROVIDED WHATEVER PROTECTION WAS NEEDED, ALTHOUGH IN LATTER QUESTION, HE REMARKED WITHE A SMILE THAT HE WAS SURE I HAD OBSERVED HOW PEACEFUL AND RELAXED DACCA HAD BECOME IN PAST WEEK OR TEN DAYS. TO MY QUESTION WHETHER MISSIONS WOULD BE AFFORDED FACILITIES FOR MECESSARY MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL, EXCHANGE OFFICAL MAIL, AND IMPORTATION OF SUPPLIES, SAMAD SAID HE WAS AWARE OF THESE PROBLEMS AND WAS SEEKING TO SET UP NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEALING WITH THEM. HE THEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF RELATIONSHIP OF USG OFFICE IN DACCA TO EMBASSY IN ISLAMABAD. HE SAID THAT THE BDG HOPED THAT DACCA OFFICE WOULD NOT CONTINUE TO BE REGARDED AS CONSULATE GENERAL ACCREDITED TO PAKISTAN.
4. THROUGHOUT INTERVIEW SAMAD REFERRED TO THIS OFFICE AS "U.S. MISSION IN DACCA”, AND PRESS REFERENCE HAVE MAINTAINED THIS STYLE (SEE BELOW). I EXPLAINED THAT HIS QUESTION WAS, OF COURSE, TIED IN WITH MATTER OF RECOGNITION, AND THAT THERE WERE IN ADDITION. CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE AND OTHER FACTORS INVOLVED. I MADE POINT, HOWEVER, THAT DACCA OFFICE HAD AT ALL TIMES BEEN ABLE TO REPORT FREELY TO WASHINGTON AND THA HE WOULD BE ASSURED THAT THIS WOULD CONTINUE. FONMIN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION, BUT REPEATED HIS HOPE THAT, AT FORMAL AND OFFICIAL LEVEL, USG WOULD NOT SHOW DACCA OFFICE AS CONSULATE GENERAL ACCREDITED TO ISLMABAD. I SAID THAT I WOULD CONVEY HIS FEELING TO WASHINGTON, BUT I POINTED OUT THAT OUR VARIOUS DIPLOMATIC AND FOREIGN SERVICE LISTS WERE ISSUED ONLY ONCE OR TWICE A YEAR, SO THAT WHATEVER DECISION MIGHT BE TAKEN, THERE COULD BE CONSIDERABLE TIME LAG BEFOR NEW LISTINGS APPEARED, FONMIN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT, BUT HAD SIMPLY WISHED TO GET THE POINT ACROSS.
5. SAMAD THEN TURNED TO WHAT I SUSPECT WAS MAJOR PURPOSE OF HIS INVITATION TO ME. HE SAID THAT BDG, IN ADDITION TO DIFFICULTIES WHICH IT WAS EXPERIENCING, LIKE EVERY NEW GOVERNMENT, IN GETTING ITSELF ORGANIZED, SUFFERED FROM GRIEVOUS ADDITIONAL HANDICAP OF HAVING ITS CHIEF OF STATE AND ACKNOWLEDGED LEADER HELD CAPTIVE MY "FOREIGN GOVERNMENT”. HE SAID THAT SHEIKH MUJIB RAHMAN’S PRESENCE IN DACCA WAS DESPERATELY NEEDED TO HELP RESOLVE PROBLEMS AND INCIPIENT DIFFERNENCES OF OPINION WHICH WERE BEGINNING TO SHOW THEMSELVES INSIDE COUNTRY, HE REFFERED SPECIFICALLY TO NEED TO DISARM IRREGULARS AND INSTITUTE DISCIPLINE IN VARIOUS "BAHINIS" ALL OF THEM ARMED AND SOME OF THEM SUBJECT TO DIVERSE POLITICAL INFLUENCES. ABOVE ALL, HE SAID, SHEIKH’S PRESENCE WAS NEEDED TO BRING ABOUT COALESCENSE OF NATIONAL SPIRIT AND HARNESS ENERGIES OF BENGALI PEOPLE TO HARD TASKS OF RECONSTRUCTION AND SELF GOVERNMENT. SAMAD SAID THE HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL IS USG WOULD EXERT ITS INFLUENCE ON PAKISTAN AND ON PRESIDENT BHUTTO IN PARTICULAR TO FREE MUJIB IMMEDIATELY. HE SAID FURTHER, THAT IT WOULD GO A LONG WAY TOWARD ELIMINATING "SUSPICIONS NAD HOSTILITY" TOWARD USG IF LATTER’S APPEAL TO BHUTTO COULD BE PUBLIC ONE.
6. SAMAD SAID THAT BDG RECOGNIZED NEED FOR SOME KIND OF RELATIONSHIP WITH "PAKISTAN - THAT IS TO SAY, FORMER WEST PAKISTAN”: THERE WERE MANY MATTERS, FINANCIAL, POLITICAL, AND OTHERS WHICH WOULD HAVE OT BE RESOLVED BY NEGOTIATIONS. BEYOND THAT, HE WENT ON, BDG COULD BIT ESCAPE GEOGRAPHIC IMPLICATIONS OF ITS SITUATION AS PART OF SUB-CONTINENT; IT INCLUDED PAKISTAN. HOWEVER, HE STESSED, CONTINUED IMPRISONMENT OF SHEIHK MUJIB BY PAKISTAN WOULD KANEI IT UNNECESSARILY DIFFICULT FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO BEGIN ON PRESSING AND AND IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS AND WOULD SOUR PROSPECTS FOR FRIENDLY RELATIONS IN FUTURE. END PART ONE OF MESSAGE

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