Separated geographically by 1,200 miles of Indian territory but hound together by the Islamic faith, the two distant regions of west Punjab and east Bengal were united as the nation state of Pakistan just over 23 years ago.

Paradoxically. the two decades have seen a deterioration rather than an improvement in the already delicate relationship between the two distant wings of the country. Today Pakistan faces the most dangerous and difficult hours of its short history as the newly elected leaders of both provinces attempt to frame a mutually acceptable constitution.

The ultimate responsibility for Pakistan's future now lies between three men: the fiery Bengali nationalist from East Pakistan, Shaikh Mujibur Rahman the flamboyant lawyer and the country's former foreign minister, Mr. Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, who has emerged as the uncrowned king of West Pakistan and President Yahya Khan, martial law administrator, who will have to ratify the constitution.

While both Mr. Bhutto and Shaikh Mujib have assured 130 million Pakistanis that they will come to terms in the constituent assembly, both the leaders have diametrically opposed views on the basic form of the constitution. In fact, both leaders believe that the other will compromise and the constitution will be drawn up on their own terms. To oversimplify the two viewpoints, Shaikh Mujib wants to draw up a constitution which will break Pakistan up into a loose federation of five states and give the Provincial government a degree of autonomy just short of independence. If the Shaikh has his way, the central government will be stripped of all subjects except defence, foreign affairs and the minting of currency.

Mr. Bhutto, on the other hand, stands for an effective central government which would continue to handle most major subjects including financial matters and the powers of taxation. The two leaders should be able to come to terms on many issues but if the constitution is to founder, then it will founder on two vital questions will the subjects of foreign trade and taxation rest with the central government or the provinces? If there is any scope for compromise on these two subjects it is indeed small, for both issues reflect the two leaders' emotional and opposing views on Indo-Pakistan relations and the Kashmir dispute. Moreover, both Mr: Bhutto and Shaikh Mujib know that they will have to sacrifice their political base if they make a major concession on either tax or foreign trade.

There is no denying the fact that West Pakistan, with 57 million people scattered over 310.000 square miles, has prospered dramatically over the past two decades while the economically backward eastern wing, with 73 million Bengalis squeezed into 55,000 square miles of waterlogged land, has remained one of the most backward areas of the world. Rightly or wrongly, the Bengalis believe that the infrastructure in the western province has been built up at the expense of the eastern wing.

More important is the sense of frustration which has been aggravated by the economic repercussions of the western province's confrontation with India over Kashmir. While the Shaikh and his supporters accept the principle that the Kashmiris have the right to determine their own future, the dispute is too remote to arouse emotions in East Bengal. As a consequence, they do not see why they should continue to contribute 50 per cent of the defence bill (about half of Pakistan's budget goes to defence) to station a huge army in the northern region of West Pakistan.

There is also the question of foreign trade. Trade between India and Pakistan has been suspended since the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965. As a consequence East Pakistan must now purchase its coal from China at 172 rupees a ton. The same amount would cost 50 rupees from India.

When Shaikh Mujib enters the constituent assembly he will probably command 167 of the 313 seats in the house and will be in a position to push his constitution through with his majority. It is doubtful whether he can retreat on the question, of foreign trade and tax, and, as one party worker sums up the question: "Remember that the vote was virtually a vote for independence. The only man who is holding it off is the Shaikh with his promise of autonomy". The Shaikh is equally adamant: "No compromise on the six points", he says.

But 1,200 miles across India in West Pakistan, Mr. Bhutto has other ideas: "I cannot accept all of the six points. The country would not last two years". It is doubtful if the former foreign minister can compromise on the questions of tax and particularly trade. Mr. Bhutto who has risen to political eminence on his promise of a 1,000-year war with India, claims to be the author of Pakistan's foreign policy since the Tashkent agreement. He is adamant that relations between India and Pakistan cannot be normalized until India is willing to settle the Kashmir dispute before other peripheral issues are discussed. As he quite rightly says, this would freeze the Kashmir dispute in India's favour for all time. On the other hand, India wants to reopen trade links with Pakistan and settle the Kashmir issue on a "step by step" formula.

Essentially, most Punjabis suspect that East Pakistan will want to resume trade with India and Mr. Bhutto would, in fact, be accepting India's policy if foreign trade went to the provinces. Mr. Bhutto admits that the question will prove difficult but says that he would concede trade with India if Mujibur Rahman accepts, that Kashmir is a national issue. But this in itself is a contradiction because if Rahman accepts Kashmir as a national issue as Bhutto sees it, he would have to station an equally large defence machine in the Punjab and defeat the purpose of his six point programme.

Mr. Bhutto believes that taxation will present less of a problem provided the Shaikh is prepared to incorporate clauses in the constitution which will guarantee that the central government does not find itself dependent on the whim of the provinces for financial support. Basically, the western province, and particularly the Punjab, opposes the Shaikh's formula on taxation because they suspect that the Kashmir issue will have to be shelved if the provinces refuse to meet their share of the Defence Bill. While Mujibur Rahman's formula does cater for the central purse, his theorists say that each province will in future pay for the number of divisions it raises in its own province.

In is equally doubtful whether Mr. Bhutto can accept such a formula. One must also realize that his strong political base in the Punjab is founded on his anti-Indian stand rather than his policy of socialism and West Pakistan's now leader will find it difficult to compromise on either of these issues "We Punjabis have spilt blood over Kashmir and Mr. Bhutto would be lynched if he gave away anything that conceded Kashmir to India," one of his workers says.

The next stumbling block is the question of whether the constitution should incorporate a bicameral or unicameral system of parliament. Under the present arrangement the seats in the assembly are allocated to the provinces according to their population and the more populous eastern wing therefore enjoys a built-in majority in the house. Quite naturally, the East Pakistanis who will have an advantage in parliament on the basis of their larger population, want one house.

Another factor which must be considered is the growing feeling among West Pakistanis that they would be better off without the impoverished eastern province if the Shaikh is not prepared to compromise.

Much will now depend on whether either of these two political leaders will be willing to risk his political base and compromise on these vital issues. At the moment the prospects appear to be bleak. If they fail to come to an understanding on both of these points ore can outline the logical sequence of events which must lead Pakistan irresistably towards separation. If neither the eastern nor western wings is willing to back down. it is obvious that the constitution cannot be framed with the broad consensus of both provinces. As a sequel, Mr. Bhutto will find himself representing West Pakistan as the leader of an "opposition" block in the constituent assembly. Under these dangerous circumstances one can visualize a direct confrontation between the two provinces and a further deterioration in their relationship, While Mr. Bhutto would champion West Pakistan's stand and emerge as an even greater hero in his own province, the East Pakistanis would inevitably push their own constitution through the assembly with their overall majority.

This would pitch the country beyond the point of no return, The Bengalis would quite naturally argue that the constitution had been drawn up and passed under democratic procedures. Technically, they would be correct but the document would, in realistic terms, be totally unacceptable to almost half of the nation. In Mr. Bhutto's words, the president would be placed in a painful dilemma. It is doubtful whether President Yahya Khan can or will ratify any constitution which has been rejected by one province as a whole. But it is not difficult to visualize the repercussions if the president refuses to ratify a constitution put before him by Rahman. The Bengalis would argue that a constitution drawn up by a democratically elected assembly had been frustrated by the western province. Under the circumstances, Rahman's own workers believe that the Shaikh would have no
other option but to break off all further negotiations with the western wing. They are also adamant that they would refuse to participate in new elections.

"What would further elections prove ?" one Awami League worker says." Remember that these elections turned into a vote for independence. The Shaikh may stave this off if we get our autonomy but if the president refused to sign the constitution, the Shaikh would have to take the first plane back to Dacca and declare independence". he says emphatically. This is the universal view in East Pakistan: from leftist to rightist and from peasant to intellectual.

At this point. the future stability in south Asia would depend upon the army's reactions. The question is still unlikely and hypothetical, but them can be no doubt that if the army chose, at this juncture, to imprison Rahman and the collective will of 73 million Bengalis, Pakistan and south Asia might be plunged into a momentous convulsion of violence and instability.

Peter Hazelhurst