In the month that has passed since President Nixon’s plans to visit Peking were announced the Soviet Government has shown in many different ways how seriously it regards the prospect. Reports from the Far East suggest that Mr Nixon may go earlier than expected, perhaps even in late October. Moscow clearly recognizes that the diplomatic moves now opening are on the grandest scale, as they must always be when they concern China’s relations with other worId powers.

It was China which, by the communist victory in 1949 and its alliance with Soviet Russia, brought about one of the greatest swings in the balance of power that the world has known. It was China which, ten years later, withdrew its huge potential power from the communist camp and set a new balance in the world by remaining aloof from all blocks. Nothing so decisive as either of those two swings is at issue now, but what is involved could be no less significant. it is whether China's isolation is to end; whether she can slowly and cautiously begin to deal with the United States and other world powers, a giant among giants.

Faced with movements so vast and so wholly unpredictable. Moscow has responded quietly in words but increasingly firmly in action. A month ago the Soviet leaders could in theory have reacted to the news io three main ways. They could have tried to forestall Mr Nixon by making speedy offers to Peking to heal their own breach with the Chinese leaders. Or they could have shot off in the opposite direction and made substantial offers to the American Administration with a view to reaching agreement on Berlin, the Salt talks, and other matters now being negotiated; they would have hoped thereby to remove from Mr Nixon any temptation to use the Peking talks as a means of pressure on Moscow. Or they could have answered the Washington-Peking rapprochement with their own diplomatic-strategic countermoves.

In practice, of course, diplomacy dees not normally divide itself so neatly into separate and exclusive courses. It probes along any and every course as seems opportune. No doubt that is what Soviet diplomacy will do now. So far, however, there are no signs at all of any overtures to Peking: if anything, Moscow criticism of Peking seems stronger than two or three months ago. Press and radio denounce China for its “militant ultra-nationalism”, its divisive tactics within the communist camp, its “unprincipled deals” and its “adventurism” in the world outside. If all this denunciation is a cover for secret approaches to Peking the camouflage is impenetrable. As regards America, the Russian attitude shows little change except perhaps in a quickened air of suspicious alertness. It is in the diplomatic-strategic count or moves that the Soviet response shows itself most clearly.

A month ago it was as if the Russians had heard that a strong relief column was setting out from Washington to link up with Peking. They have speedily outflanked the column from the south by their own move to Delhi. Their newly announced treaty with India is declared to be directed against no third party, and that assurance may be accepted: by its very nature a treaty of peace and friendship has no teeth. Yet the warning to Peking is none the less obvious.

The Soviet Union is in fact following the traditional diplomatic practice of strengthening relations with a friendly power at a time of uncertainty in other relations. If, in future, new tension builds up between Peking and Moscow, or between Peking and Delhi, it may be expected that Moscow will make the most of all the provisions in the new treaty for joint consultation. It would be a gentle means of keeping China—as well as Pakistan—guessing about what was being discussed. Whether India at a time of Russo-Chinese tension would go to the length of actually moving troops towards the frontier may be doubtful, but Russia would almost certainly move troops at a time of new Chinese-Indian tension. The treaty is a nicely calculated move in Russia’s plans for consolidation where she can consolidate.

In another area. too. Russia is seeking to underpin her positions. Mr Brezhnev's forthcoming visit to Belgrade is another sign that she would like to close ranks in eastern and south-eastern Europe so far as possible. From West Berlin the more helpful news of progress towards a four-Power agreement on the city may be another pointer in the same direction. While not yet conclusive, it could be a sign that Russia wishes to maintain calm—even a heavy calm—in eastern Europe if other diplomatic fronts are going to be active.

All in all, Moscow seems worried but not frightened. It is not frightened because it is still not sure that America's move towards Peking is a move of bad faith towards Moscow. Three or four days ago an article in Pravda discussed this very question, with remarkable openness. The Russian dilemma was clearly exposed. After all, as the Pravda article implied, the Russians cannot suddenly denounce Mr Nixon’s approach to Peking when, for twenty years past, they have been declaring that the United States and other western countries should be on normal speaking terms with Peking. Moscow has condemned the policy of confrontation: it cannot now logically condemn negotiation.

So it asks whether the negotiations will be sincere and devoted to world peace as a whole. Pravda finds the answer in the old watchword: deeds not words. Russia, one is asked to believe, will be reassured about Mr Nixon's intentions if the United States goes on honestly with the withdrawals from Vietnam, and if it presses on with the Salt talks (limiting nuclear arms) and with the negotiations over the Middle East and European security.

Starting from a different point, western opinion can very largely concur in Pravda's prescription. It is true that the Russian response is so far only provisional. There will probably be unwelcome surprises before the end. But so far, at any rate, the response does nothing to affect in any way the original western welcome for Mr Nixon’s proposed journey, both for its own sake and as part of the wider process of negotiation and normalization in the world.