The future of West Pakistan, quite as much as the eastern wing, is now inextricably intertwined with Shaikh Mujibur Rahman's fate.

The western wing is dominated by 40 million Punjabis who hail from the affluent, progressive Punjab in the hinterland. The remaining 23 million West Pakistanis are found in the three minority provinces of the Sind, the north-west frontier province and Baluchistan. The southern coastal region of the Sind, with a population of 13 million, is feudal and economically backward even though it contains the key industrial complex of Karachi.

To the north of the Punjab nearly eight million Pushto speaking Pathans inhabit the north-west frontier adjoining Afghanistan. In the extreme west, bordering on Iran and Afghanistan nearly two million Baluchis inhabit the sparsely populated but vast neck of land now known as the province of Baluchistan.

From its inception Pakistan has been plagued by regional chauvinism. Regional antipathy against the Punjab began more modestly in the minority provinces of the west, than in the east.

But in recent years the urge towards regional insularity and the desire for a greater measure of autonomy were intensified by two factors.

First, in 1950 the four provinces were welded into one unit known as West Pakistan. And under this homogeneous unit the Punjabis began to dominate almost every sphere of life by virtue of their larger population, their industriousness and their sheer enterprise.

Secondly, since ex-President Ayub Khan assumed power as the martial law administrator in 1958. the country has been ruled for 13 years by an army which was recruited, and has its roots, in the Punjab. Quite naturally military rule and the fact that a greater part of the budget has been devoted to the maintenance of a Punjabi dominated military machine has increased these regional antagonisms, not only in east Bengal but in the minority provinces of West Pakistan as well.

Nationalism

During the past 25 years this regional nationalism has emerged in many forms. In the northwest frontier the former Red Short movement led by the exiled Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, has been demanding a separate state, the Baluchis have been in a state of mild insurrection for several years and the regionalists in the Sind have from time to time raised muted demands for autonomy.

But the intensity of these regional compulsions in West Pakistan was really felt for the first time during the first two months of 1969 when ex-President Ayub Khan’s regime was falling.

Initially the uprising was triggered off by students' demands for educational reforms, within weeks the crowds were demanding Ayub's exit and, as the Field Marshal lost his grip during his last month in office, the movement suddenly transformed itself into a full-throated cry for regional autonomy and a demand for the disintegration of West Pakistan as a monogeneous unit.
Significantly, with the exception of the Punjab, the vociferous demand for autonomy was raised from every corner of the country: from Dacca, from Quetta in Baluchistan, from Karachi in the Sind, and from Peshawar in the North-West Frontier.

Regional and parochial parties mushroomed overnight and an unwritten alliance, designed to contain Punjabi hegemony once and for all, was formed between the regional leaders of East Pakistan and the minority provinces of Sind, Baluchistan, and the northwest frontier in West Pakistan.

Significantly, leaders of the regional parties in the Sind, the northwest frontier and Baluchistan who led the uprising, were the first to support Shaikh Mujibur Rahman's six point demand for autonomy. Similarly the East Pakistanis, without reservation, lent their support to the minority regions’ demands for the reorganization of West Pakistan into four separate provinces.

Essentially the minority provinces in West Pakistan want East Pakistan armed with sufficient power to check an otherwise predominant Punjab in the central affairs of a proposed federation. And it is here that West Pakistan's future will depend on the well being of the Shaikh.

On March 25, 1969, President Ayub Khan handed over power to his successor General Yahya Khan and in the ensuing months the regional and nationalistic urges in the country receded. But this does not mean that parochialism disappeared, as many West Pakistanis would like to believe.

Aspirations

The demands for regional autonomy in West Pakistan receded for two very obvious reasons: first, President Yahya Khan had convinced his country that he would transfer power to a popular government under a democratic parliamentary system. The minority provinces of West Pakistan were relieved because they knew that East Pakistanis would dominate the constituent assembly and any future government by virtue of their larger population. As such the Sindhis, Baluchis and Pathans felt assured that East Bengal would be able to neutralize the threats of Punjabi hegemony.

Secondly, President Yahya Khan took an arbitrary decision and broke up West Pakistan by proclamation. This step undoubtedly met the prime demand of the minority provinces in West Pakistan, much of the wind was taken out of the sails of regional leaders and subsequently they fared badly during the elections.

However, after the events since March, the future in Pakistan can now only take three possible turns: East Bengal might ultimately win its independence.

Alternatively East Bengal might remain within the union of Pakistan but under a West Pakistani sponsored local government which would neither represent the aspirations of the Bengalis nor would it wield effective political power within a federal government.

If one is to predict the future by the past pattern of regional compulsions then the present mood of euphoria in West Pakistan would disappear the moment East Bengal achieved its independence and the minority provinces would feel completely vulnerable to the threat of Punjab’s hegemony.

From the minority provinces point of view the political counterbalance to Punjabi domination will disappear with either of the first two possibilities.

Ironically the integrity of the western wing might only be preserved by President Yahya Khan giving effective and real power to the Bengalis. Yet this can only be achieved if the West Pakistanis come to terms with the man they propose to execute.
Peter Hazlehurst