The situation in East Pakistan is getting worse. It is already a human and political disaster. It threatens to become a catastrophe of enormous proportions. The economy is breaking down and famine is imminent. The distribution of aid is hampered by ruptured communications, guerrillas, and the refusal of the Islamabad Government to allow itself to be by-passed. Refugees are still pouring over the border into India, and their plight has been made even worse than it was by the monsoon floods. The guerrillas are reported to be planning a new campaign for when the monsoon ends in October. Government forces are planning another offensive for the same period.

On top of all this there appears to be no glimmer of a political solution in sight. President Yahya’s appointment of a civilian governor, Dr Abdul Malik, was a gesture that could be seen as a belated attempt to repair the damage done by the military administration, but since Lieutenant-General Niazi shares power as martial law administrator of the province there is not much hope of substantial change. The recent amnesty for resistance fighters does look like a genuine effort at conciliation but it will not have much effect unless it is part of a much more comprehensive change of policy, and there is no sign of this.

The Government of Pakistan is, in fact, in no condition to solve the problem on its own, even assuming there is anything as straightforward as a “solution” available. It is in trouble at home, while in East Pakistan it is committed to an unsuccessful policy of repression. The middle ground between an all-out military campaign and the total secession of East Pakistan is rapidly disappearing. Perhaps only negotiation with Shaikh Mujibar Rahman could now provide a political settlement; he would have to be acquitted and released first.

The purely military approach, which has already been tried, would probably lead to a Vietnam-type situation, with the Pakistani forces embroiled in a worsening war of attrition. It could also lead to war with India. To go to the other extreme and permit secession would have very wide repercussions in India and Pakistan and would raise a series of new problems, but the way things are going at present it may eventually emerge as a solution which West Pakistan is neither strong enough nor united enough to prevent.

Meanwhile, there is the threat to peace and the problem of human death and suffering on a huge scale. Both these factors lift the situation beyond the sole concern of the Government of Pakistan. This is not an internal affair. It is the legitimate concern of international organizations and of other governments. For these there are two urgent tasks. One is to prevent the situation being aggravated by great power rivalries, in particular by Soviet support for the Indian position, Indian support for the Awami League and Chinese support for the Government of Pakistan. The other is to relieve human suffering in East Pakistan and in the refugee camps on the Indian border.

Even charity cannot avoid politics in this situation. The Government of Pakistan demands control over the distribution of relief supplies and has rebuffed attempts by a British charity to crash the border. At the same time the rebels are powerful enough in some areas to prevent or interfere with the distribution of food. They take the view that the relief supplies are bring used as a political weapon by the army to win the loyalty of the population. Their position is supported by the Indian Government, which says that international agencies and foreign powers should communicate with the elected representatives of East Bengal, namely the Awami League.

Somehow outside powers will have to force a passage through the thickets of this dispute. The difficulty is that both rides have sufficient power on the ground to press their point by hampering distribution. An easy answer is therefore not available. Yet it should not be beyond the wit of determined men to make a beginning.

One suggestion from Delhi is that an international consortium of voluntary organizations should distribute aid. This still does not solve the problem of the consent of rival forces in the area, but backed by the pressure of the great powers and the United Nations it might have a chance. Something like it should certainly be tried. If present conditions continue a very large number of the inhabitants of East Pakistan will not live long enough to discover who is going to win the privilege of ruling them. They must not be allowed to die waiting.