Delhi, Nov 8
With India and Pakistan moving inexorably on a collision course towards war, many Indians have come to the false conclusion that the date for the actual onset of hostilities will be determined solely by the advent of winter and the change in the weather in the snowcapped Himalayas.

From the Indian layman’s point of view, winter is regarded as a godsend this year. Light snow has already begun to fall along the Sino-lndian border and within a few weeks the Himalayan passes will close, preventing Pakistan’s major ally, China, from making a diversionary thrust against India’s 10 mountain divisions which are permanently committed to the northern front.

It is argued that under these favourable climatic conditions, India could safely reduce its forces on the northern Chinese front by two to three divisions to back up a potential offensive against four and half Pakistani divisions in East Pakistan. If one is to accept this assumption it is, therefore, obvious that India would want the war to break out later in the year while Pakistan would want an early war under climatic conditions under which the Chinese could at least pin down 10 of India’s 27 divisions in the north.

There are, however, other factors which indicate that the onset of hostilities will be influenced only marginally by climatic conditions this winter. In the first place one must examine the intrinsic compulsions which will eventually embroil India and Pakistan in war. Confronted with what appears to be an insoluble refugee problem, India can be expected to give more assistance to the East Bengal guerrillas in the next few weeks to the extent of throwing her own troops into East Pakistan, disguised as rebels.

It is not hard to determine the logical sequence of events which will lead to war. If and when the West Pakistanis begin to believe that they are losing their grip on East Pakistan because of pressure from the guerrillas, President Yahya Khan, in desperation, will obviously have to strike at the rebels’ source of strength, India. Under the circumstances, he would probably strike on the more favourable fighting grounds on the western front and particularly in the disputed territory of Kashmir. From India's point of view, this would mean war on all fronts.

While it would appear unlikely that an already debilitated Pakistan could afford a war, President Yahya Khan might be forced to take a desperate risk to save the eastern wing. His reasoning would be that, in the event of hostilities, the United Nations would almost certainly intervene and in the subsequent ceasefire negotiations, Pakistan would hope to bargain for a package deal: Pakistan would maintain peace in Kashmir provided India refrained from assisting the guerrillas in East Pakistan.

It is obvious that the moment war broke out. India would launch a massive offensive to capture a sizable chunk of East Pakistan while conducting a defensive and holding operation backed up by diversionary' thrusts on the western front and Kashmir. It is already well known that if war breaks out, India will hope to carve out a large section of East Pakistan in which the refugees can be resettled. India will probably, therefore, insist that the provisional government of Bangla Desh will have to be a party to the subsequent negotiations.

This poses several crucial questions for the Indian Army. Will China come to Pakistan's assistance, as she did during the 1965 conflict, to pin down 10 Indian divisions in the north? Can three or four mountain divisions be moved from the northern front to the eastern front when the snows close up Himalayan passes on the Sino-Indian frontier in early December. Can the Pakistanis launch an offensive in Kashmir after snow closes vital regions of the territory later this month?

It is well known that India has decided to take a gamble on the possibility of a Chinese thrust for it has already moved two or three mountain divisions from the northern frontier to the borders of East Pakistan.

Major-General B. M. Kaul, former corps commander-in-charge of the eastern front during the Sino-lndian war, believes that the climatic conditions will play only a marginal role in determining the onset of war.

“If the Chinese do. in fact, decide to intrude, the weather will not be an impediment if they use limited forces even if many of the passes are closed. It must be remembered that their objective will be to pin down our forces and keep them away from the Pakistan front”, he says.

“In any event, if the Chinese have decided to help Pakistan the weather will not prevent them from operating in three vital sectors, Ladakh. the Chumbi valley and on the Nefa frontier during the latter part of this month.”

The retired general believes that it is unlikely that the Chinese will make a thrust in the central sector of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan for two reasons. First, he feels that the Chinese will make only Intrusions into disputed territories and they would be reluctant to cross defined frontiers because of international repercussions.

Secondly, heavy snows and climatic conditions in Bhutan and Sikkim would inhibit movement in this area.

“The real danger lies in the Chumbi valley. Remember it is a valley, and they could attempt to come through there and link up with the Pakistanis in the eastern wing right through to the end of December. I would expect them to move in Ladakh. They are on a plateau and the Aksai-China road runs through Ladakh without any insurmountable passes to inhibit troop movements in winter. It is also foolish to believe that the snow in Kashmir would prevent the Pakistanis from launching an offensive late in the year.

“It must be remembered that during the 1948 conflict in Kashmir, the fighting continued until December 31 and snow-moving equipment has improved vastly since then.”

If India is indeed planning to launch an offensive in the riverine territory of East Pakistan, climatic conditions are marginally in Mrs Gandhis favour. The rains have stopped and the otherwise waterlogged ground is hardening but the river-laced terrain would preclude an armoured thrust and fighting would be left to the infantry.

The cold winter air and the hard ground on the western front adjoining the Punjab and Rajasthan will suit both sides equally and it is, therefore, obvious that if and when the war breaks out, the timing will be determined by factors other than climatic conditions.