Congressional Record

Senate: The War In East Pakistan

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, we are at war in East Pakistan. We have not declared war, and we have no troops in Pakistan, but we are, nonetheless, in the eyes of the East Pakistanis and Indians, at war. It is our own grainships that are carrying Pakistani troops to the East. It is our planes that are searching out the ragged, desperate, ill-armed Bangla Desh, and then, finally, it is our guns, rifles, and ammunition that cut them down‹wholesale and indiscriminately. Without our help, the Pakistanis would be severely hampered in their warmaking powers and because that is so, because we are effectively allying ourselves with one belligerent in a civil war, we ourselves are belligerents and our actions become all the more despicable.

There is only one position for the United States in this situation and that is as an advocate of peace. A relentless advocate for sick and hungry people. In order to place this country in a position to pursue this policy, I have cosponsor the Saxbe-Church amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. This amendment would terminate all military and economic assistance to Pakistan, until such time as effective internationally supervised relief measures are instituted in East Pakistan. This, Mr. President, is intervention for peace and not war. It is intervention for life and not death, and it is intervention with food and medicines, not guns and planes. I do not see how it is possible to act for peace in the area while we are still actively engaged in providing the wherewithal for war. I believe that cutting off aid to force relief measures would be the most justified, indeed the required, use of our ability to pressure the Pakistan government.

But there is yet another dimension to the problem. On Monday, July 5, an editorial appeared in the Washington Post concerning our trade record with Pakistan. The editorial was entitled U.S. Arms for Pakistan: A Shameful Record. The editorial retraces how what we all were told over a period of days by the State Department. The editorial also describes the consequent shifts in the State Department line. It is by now, to many of us, an old story.

The other day the President s special assistant, Dr. Henry Kissinger, met a not so cordial welcome at the New Delhi Airport. The reasons are as good as they are obvious. India and Pakistan are treading the thinnest of wires between war and peace and at the same time we are continuing to supply arms to the Pakistanis. Our relationship with India is rapidly deteriorating, while at the same time we are providing the wherewithal for the slaughter of millions of East Pakistanis. Who is gaining by this? Certainly not war-ravaged West Pakistan. Was no lesson learned from the Biafran tragedy? Will we sit by, not idly, but as undeclared belligerents, aiding in the misery and death of millions of East Pakistanis?

In Pakistan after consistently being told that no arms were being shipped, we find more and more appearing. What right have we to equip the West Pakistanis to fight the Bengladesh? What right have we to intervene in a civil war for any reason other than humanitarian relief and rescue? If the State Department can answer these questions, I am sure we would all be very interested. But even if the State Department could provide answers, why should we expect that the American people would listen? Why should we think we are hearing the truth? The raw facts are, Mr. President, that either the State Department has no control over the foreign activities of this Nation, or else they choose to exercise that control with one hand while dishing out public information with the other.

We have, due to the inexcusable bungling of the State Department, backed ourselves into a corner in our relationship with India. At the same time that Mrs. Gandhi is resisting the urging of somber countrymen to go to war, welfare supplying the weapons to Pakistan that exacerbate the situation. I simply do not understand, Mr. President, whose interests we are serving by our actions in that area. We enable Pakistan to continue waging war, which in turn causes India to move closer and closer to a state of war, and all the while millions of East Pakistans are dying or being made refugees. It is not a role that we should be proud of.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Post editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

 From the Washinton Post, July 5, 1971 U.S. Arms for Pakistan: A Shameful Record 

Arms Aid to Pakistan

(Mr. MORSE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, on July 1, 1971, I introduced House Joint Resolution 765 which affirms that all military assistance, and all sales and deliveries of military equipment and weapons to Pakistan and all licenses for military sales including those already approved shall be suspended for a period of 365 days unless the President determines that such assistance, sales, or deliveries are required for reasons of overriding national interest and so reports to the Congress. Senator MATHIAS will introduce similar legislation in the other body today.

As a joint resolution, this legislation will not only convey the sense of Congress. It will also have the force of law.

It is important that Members understand the urgent need for rapid action on this resolution. An editorial in the July 5 Washington Post traces the background of our policy regarding arms deliveries to Pakistan. From my understanding of this editorial, several points of interest regarding my resolution emerge:

First. The Department of State until late June 1971, was convinced that following the eruption of civil war in East Pakistan on March 25, 1971, the United States had been able to bring to a halt all arms deliveries to Pakistan.

Second. On the strength of this conviction, the Department of State repeatedly and formally stated to the Congress and the press that no arms had been or were being provided to Pakistan on or after March 25, 1971.

Third. In all likelihood without the knowledge of administration officials at the policy level, on May 8, 1971, the Sunderbans, a Pakistani ship carrying arms still in the supply pipeline as of March 25, 1971, set sail for Pakistan from New York.

Fourth. On June 22, a second Pakistani ship carrying U.S. arms still in the supply pipeline set sail for Pakistan from New York. At this point solid investigative reporting by the New York Times uncovered the existence of the supply pipeline loophole.

Fifth. On July 2 a third Pakistani ship carrying supply pipeline arms left New York for Pakistan.

Sixth. Four to five more ships are scheduled to leave in July and August and even then no one can be certain the supply pipeline will be unclogged and exhausted. By its decision, still in force, to suspend further arms sales to Pakistan, I believe the United States demonstrated that it was adopting the only policy appropriate for an outside power with respect to the tragic civil war in East Pakistan; namely, a policy of neutrality, noninterference, and noninvolvement. In my judgment, the important step which we had to take from the standpoint of our military sales policy was this halt in all further sales. But we cannot at the same time ignore the diplomatic and political significance of the pipeline deliveries.

In an article in the New York Times former Ambassador to India Chester Bowles warns on July 6 of the possible sequence of events which may soon confront us. It is:

First. India in a desperate effort to cut off the flow of refugees, return the present refugees to their own homes, and prevent the establishment of an extreme left- wing government in East Pakistan may move troops into East Pakistan.

Second. Pakistan may then be expected to reply by attacking India in Kashmir and the Indian Punjab.

Third. China may deliver an ultimatum to India.

Fourth. The Soviet Union may then support India to ward off China and the escalation may continue. In this scenario, which Ambassador Bowles believes is a very real possibility, could the United States ultimately avoid involvement? I believe the minimal step which the United States must take is to halt all arms deliveries to Pakistan including those deliveries in the supply pipeline which have not left our shores. With each one of our actions we must convey conviction that we favor an immediate standdown in the level of violence in East Pakistan.

In spite of our hopes that the strife will soon end and thus permit the United States to avoid some of these painful policy decisions, the July 6 New York Times reported that Bengali insurgents have now knocked out the Dacca electrical power station. This suggests that resistance is far from ended. It may continue for months, perhaps years.

I insert the Washington Post editorial and Ambassador Bowles observations in the RECORD at this point:

 From the New York Times, July 5, 1971 South Asia: The Approach of Tragedy By Chester Bowles



From the Washinton Post, July 5, 1971 U.S. Arms for Pakistan: A Shameful Record