New Statesman

With politics officially revived on 1 January by presidential fist, Pakistan now presents the curious paradox of a country under martial law participating in a vociferous and increasingly violent® campaign in anticipation of elections to the constituent convention promised by General Yahya for 5 October. Protest days and general strikes have become common place - East Pakistan faced three calls for hartal (shutting down business) within a week - and no day goes without processions. Huge meetings are being held in every corner of the country, with the size of attendance as a sort of Gallup indicator of political form. The martial law authorities have tried to provide guidelines for keeping the campaign peaceful, but this did not prevent a major riot when the Jamaat-e-Islami, a party committed to a revival of Islam, held its first meeting here in Dacca. The Jamaat’s tendency to dub autonomists as rioters and socialists as infidels provoked a clash which gave them two martyrs and injured 500.

The tone of the political campaign is now being set in both wings of the country. In the West, Mr. Bhutto and his leftist People’s Party are sharing the headlines with Maulana Maudud’s Jamaat-e-Islam. The Jamaat’s smearing of socialists as unbelievers has forced Bhutto spend most of his time talking of ‘Islamic' socialism and demonstrating how his policies are a true reflection of the Holy Koran. But the real politics of West Pakistan are being decided in the drawing rooms of Mumtaz Daulatana, leader of the Council Muslim League and the quintessential feudal politician. In spite of 22 years of urbanisation and a massive upheaval against Ayub, feudal society has survived intact and promises to send the inevitable crop of landlords to the assembly. Daulatana’s skill lies in manipulating the loyalties of these feudal chieftains to his own political ambitions. His strategy embraces the Punjab and now, by matrimonial alliances with the Khuros, Sind as well. Only Baluchistan and the North West Frontier remain inviolable under the influence of the National Awami Party founded by Gaffar Khan, whose strength derives from their role as standard bearers of local nationalism. Such progressive as Bhutto are being forced to invoke their feudal origins to secure feudal alliances and ensure a minimal number of seats.

The constitutional convention promises a showdown on the question of autonomy between the feudal power elite of West Pakistan and the largely middle class and more radical East Pakistani representatives. Bengal nationalism is riding high on the shoulders of Sheikh Mujibur’s Awami League. The only real challenge to them comes from the Left who, anxious to ride the autonomy issue, want to supplement it with a call for social revolution. Mujib is attempting an outflanking operation by promising extensive nationalisation as the core of his social policy, which is adding to the unease of the already shaken business community in East Pakistan.

On the face of it the autonomists should impose their will on the assembly since Yahya has promised that East Wing representation will be proportionate to her population, which will give her 168 out of the expected 300 seats to legislature. This presupposes that massive pressures will not only elect members pledged to bring about autonomy but, more important, will keep them to their electoral commitments. Furthermore, it assumes that voting procedure in the assembly will be based on simple majority. In such an event the voting lineup is likely to take a straight East-West turn unless some of the smaller provinces break ranks and line up with East Pakistan. This prospect has been minimised by Yahya’s prescient move to break up West Pakistan into the component linguistic provinces of Sind, Punjab, Baluchistan and the North West Frontier. With the major grievance of the small provinces resolved, there will no longer be any political compulsion to make common cause with the East Wing. Indeed there is a distinct possibility that the smaller provinces may rediscover the necessity of a strong centre, which will be expected to divert resources from the larger and more developed regions to make good the lack of development in their own regions.

A direct East-West confrontation within the Assembly thus seems imminent. It is felt that Yahya will exercise his veto to frustrate any attempt by East Pakistan to use their parliamentary majority to shove a constitution down West Pakistan’s throat. That is the least he could do in the face of considerable misgivings within the central bureaucracy and even the armed forces at Yahya’s precipitate advance to democracy. The Punjabi element which predominates in both these power elites feels that in the future dispensation they will have to share if not surrender power and may have to foot the bill into the bargain. The talk of a Punjabi backlash has been common currency in both wings.
Whatever the validity of this assumption, the right-wing parties, based mainly in West Pakistan, are rephrasing their political line to reach out to this submerged but still relevant constituency. The lead here is being given by the fanatical Jamat-e-Islam and the Pakistan Democratic Party. Neither has any real hold in East Pakistan. Indeed the electoral arithmetic of feudal politics makes their prospects even within West Pakistan uncertain. They have therefore pulled out all stops in an attack on the hydra-headed monster of socialism-secularism-secessionism embodied in the parties of the left - the National Awami Party and, if one stretches a point, Mr. Bhutto’s People’s Party and the Awami League. This bogy is specifically aimed at the emotions and prejudices of the armed forces, who need little convincing that godless socialism is determined not only to subvert the Islamic faith but to disintegrate the nation.

Tensions are greatly aggravated by the latent violence which hangs over the nation’s political life. The rusty machinery, resurrected after a decade of stagnation and repression, cannot contain the passions of its followers. With political issues being presented in their most provocative form the punch-up at Dacca involving the Jamaat-e-Islam is not likely to be the last. In Sind violent rioting has broken out between Sindhis and immigrant settlers. There is now every likelihood that violence may be deliberately provoked as part of the strategy to discredit the whole idea of a return to democracy. With industrial unrest keeping pace with political tension in the countryside, where ‘revolutionary’ parties talk openly of the need for a ‘Yennan’ on the Ganges, the months ahead promise only uncertainty. If the nation finally manages to get as far as a constituent assembly it will still have to face the improbable attempt of West Wing feudals and Bengali nationalists to fashion a mutually acceptable constitution within the 120 days demanded by Yahya. If they fail? Another election of a constitution imposed by Yahya which by definition cannot satisfy both regions.

The pressures on the elected representation, particularly from East Pakistan, to compromise on their demand for autonomy is very great. But this is precisely what they cannot do. Given the heightened state of expectations which are the legacy of the uprising against Ayub, every East Wing leader is a captive of his own rhetoric. Today no one in Pakistan would care to predict where we shall be in 1971.