Guardian(UK)

1971-03-16

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Future of Pakistan depends on talk

By S. R. Ghauri

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Karachi, March 15. After some sabre rattling in a West Pakistan political circles, the opinion that Pakistan can be saved only though a political settlement between East and West wings of the country, is gaining ground rapidly. The Central Government’s writ no longer runs in East Pakistan. Any attempt to reimpose and exercise the Government’s authority by force would precede a decision that East Pakistan would have to be held down as a colony of West Pakistan as long as possible.

The use of force would be followed by a formal declaration of independence by Sheikh Mujib and the confrontation between Bengalis and the armed forces would degenerate into civil war. President Yahya Khan has no intention of going down in history as the man who presided over the liquidation of Pakistan nor do the armed forces visualises for themselves the role of occupation troops in their own country. All eyes, therefore, are fixed on the outcome of the Yahya-Mujib parleys in Dacca. Their failure could mean the failure of Pakistan’s brotherhood.

The need of the hour, therefore, is that the President and Sheikh Mujib should devise ways of transferring power to civilian governments in the provinces and at the centre in Islamabad without leaving any party with a feeling of defeat or humiliation. This is more easily said than done. But as the very existence of the country is under serious threat, it could not be beyond ingenuity to reach an agreement which would not seriously injure the sensibilities of those engaged in the present dangerous confrontation.

To begin with, it appears that the President will have to declare the National Assembly a sovereign body - which under the present legal framework it is not. This would mean that any Constitution passed by the Assembly would automatically become operative without the approval of the President. Once the sovereignty of the Assembly was conceded by the President, the remaining process, including withdrawal of martial law, would be comparatively easy. The abrupt lifting of martial law appears impossible. But if the inauguration of the Assembly preceded a declaration by the President of its sovereignty, the Awami League might not insist on the transfer of power before the opening session was convened.

RULE-MAKING



The Assembly could then begin its sittings. After framing rules of procedure it could draw up an interim Constitution and elect the leader of the majority party who would be called on by the President to form a Government. Provincial assemblies could start functioning immediately after the passage of the interim Constitution. Provincial Assemblies would then elect their own governments. In East Pakistan the Awami League would form a Government. In Sind and Punjab, the People’s Party has a clear majority. In Baluchistan the National Awami Party Moscow Group will be in power.

But Mr. Bhutto’s People’s Party can throw a spanner in the works by insisting on sharing power with the Awami League in the Central Government. At a conference in Karachi he said the country’s geography demanded that the two major parties of East and West Pakistan should form a coalition at the centre. This looks an impossible arrangement for various reasons. The most important of them is that Sheikh Mujib and Mr. Bhutto have come to dislike and distrust each other intensely. While Sheikh Mujib is not acceptable in the powerful province of Punjab, Mr. Bhutto is persona non grata in East Pakistan.

Coalition can work only if the parties to them are more or less of like mind, or have some agreement on fundamental principles. The League and the People’s Party, in their approach to internal and external policies are poles apart. Even if they were forced into marriage it would not last very long. But in the peculiar circumstances that the League does not represent any province of West Pakistan, although it has a clear majority in the National Assembly, some sort of coalition is essential. I think Sheikh Mujib would rather enter a coalition with other parties - say the Council of the Muslim League from Punjab, the National Awami Party from Baluchistan and the Frontier areas, and some Independents from Sind whom he could easily turn into Awami Leaguers by dangling the carrot of power before them - rather than have Mr. Bhutto in his paradise.