India is stiffening her defences in readiness for an attack by Pakistan from Kashmir or the Punjab. Pakistan is building up her border defences in East Pakistan against the threat of the Mukti Fouj guerrillas and, more importantly, an assault by India in the Punjab. While there are no signs that either side is taking overt measures to mount an offensive within the next month or two a limited war arising from a series of accidents cannot be ruled out. The Indians have reinforced their holdings of Kashmir with light tanks and their heavy armour is taking part in late summer exercises as near to the Punjab as the Government sponsors of the “Green revolution” will permit. Although the Punjab has frequently been called ideal tank country it is covered by natural tank traps, irrigation ditches. This may account for the fact that India has been buying easily transported steel bridges.

The Pakistan General Staff has been disturbed by the possible consequences of the recent treaty between India and Russia and it now appears less confident of Chinese military support in case of hostilities. Further evidence that the political climate may be changing is to be found in the increasing assistance that China is giving to the Naxalites (Maoist) guerrillas in south¬eastern regions of East Pakistan. Meanwhile the Indians are showing far less enthusiasm for training and arming the Mukti Fouj than before the Russian treaty was signed. Indeed, the guerrillas, weakened by internal political strife and rivalry between their political and military leaders, are all complaining loudly about the lack of promised support from India.

As soon as the monsoon ends and the floods recede, the Pakistani Army will launch an all-out offensive in East Pakistan against the Mukti Fouj. The army will be hampered by a shortage of troops and lack of training in countering guerrilla warfare. Of the 62,000 troops in East Pakistan more than 40,000 are guarding the frontier with India and vital military airfields. Of the rest, one division and a few odd units are now being trained in riverine warfare in readiness for the autumn operations. In the interior of East Pakistan, the Army, with superior fire-power, should be able to keep the guerrillas on the move. It also hopes to force them to split into groups of four or five men, because the newly-trained Mukti Fouj would greatly prefer to operate in larger units. But as long as the guerrillas retain the whole-hearted support of the population and can retreat into India, they are unbeatable, although there could be months, or even years, of stalemate.

SHORTAGE OF TROOPS

Because of the troops shortage in East Pakistan, the Army commander cannot consider following the guerrillas into India for fear of a major counter-attack by the Indian Army. Indeed, supplying the troops already on the border is posing major problems which have been further exaggerated by the damage to roads and railways inflicted by the Mukti Fouj. Indian divisions in Burma during the Second World War managed to defeat the Japanese on 120 tons of supply daily. In Europe, one division used over 400 tons of supplies daily. Allowing for the fact that the Pakistani’s are not using much ammunition at present, and that they are able to draw on locally produced petrol and rice in some areas, they are at the end of a dangerously long line of communications.

The sea route from Karachi to Chittagong and the rail, sea and road routes from there to the frontier are vulnerable at so many points. The guerrillas have been harassing river traffic for months and two coasters in Chittagong harbour and two large barges in transit were sunk recently. The immediate objectives of the guerrillas will be to establish a salient - perhaps in the extreme north-east - large enough to be treated seriously in the international sphere as the home of the Bangladesh Government. They had hoped for some help from the Indian Army, but apart from artillery cover this is now unlikely.

Some five per cent of East Pakistan - mostly, though not entirely, composed of frontier salients - is estimated to be in the hands of the Mukti Fouj. I have even seen the Bangladesh flag flying over a considerable area within 40 miles of Dacca. In addition, the guerrillas control temporarily vast areas of the countryside by night. Dacca and the major towns, though subject to raids, are in the hands of the West Pakistan Army, which may obtain temporary advantage over the guerrillas when it begins to distribute rice and other foods. Civilians now being brought into Government House, Dacca, in the new Government, Mr. Malik, are at best useful advisers.

The civil administration, such as it is, must largely depend on the Army for the distribution of food from the harbours to the countryside. Food is already scarce in many areas for even where it is plentiful people have no money to buy it. The Army will have the power to feed the “good guys” and let the “bad guys” in villages that have openly supported the guerrillas go hungry. The 60 or so United Nations observers will not be able to ensure that food reaches all. Thus famine may well cause the civil war to be further prolonged.