New Society

Last week, when I was in East Bengal, I fell into conversation with a prominent Awami League leader. I asked him whether Mujibur Rahman, while advising his East Pakistani followers to turn their homes into forts and getting hold of whatever they could lay their hands on, had prepared any contingency plans for an armed strike by President Yahya Khan. He did not give me a direct reply. Instead, he said, “Mujibur Rahman said he would win our liberation through non-violent means.”

But now that fighting had broken out, how long did he think it would take for the matter to be settled? “About a month,” he replied. “We’ll starve the Pakistani soldiers to death, or, if they come out of their cantonment, we’ll shoot them down.” His optimism was naive but it seemed cruel to be hurtingly frank with people who were, and still are, being crushed by the iron heel of an army. Besides, if quick victory has been denied the hastily formed and ill equipped liberation forces, it has also been denied the West Pakistani troops. For if the military strike came as a surprise to the Awami League leaders, so did the resistance of the East Bengalis to West Pakistani generals. They thought they knew their Bengalis - small, slim men; demonstrative, self pitying but with no grit, stamina or inclination to fight; remonstrative children all, who could be thoroughly silenced by a few well- placed blows.

They could just not visualize a fighting force of sorts springing up almost overnight. But this happened. What is more, in the first phase of the civil war, which lasted roughly from 26 to 31 March, this liberation army succeeded in forcing West Pakistani troops to withdraw to their cantonments and garrisons. However, this did not last long. As soon as the soldiers got reinforcement and supplies, they moved out of their cantonments. They have by now occupied most of the towns and they control important highway intersections. They had all along kept control of major seaports and airports. They have depopulated intentionally or otherwise, the areas surrounding airports and the cantonments. This makes any future large scale movement by freedom fighters towards these targets hazardous.

But all this does not mean that armed resistance by the freedom fighters was in vain or unwise. Quite the contrary. It was important both for psychological and political reasons. Firstly, people had to give vent to their anti-West Pakistani feelings, which they had bottled up for 23 years. Secondly, it was only in the heat of engagement, however ill-planned and badly executed, that they could forge unity in their own ranks and attract new recruits. Thirdly, by reacting instantly, keeping up resistance and even attacking Pakistani troops, they managed to keep the issue before the public at home and abroad. This gave the political leadership time to set up a provisional government and give substance to Mujibur Rahman’s proclamation of independence.

That phase, too, is now over. Both sides have pressing problems on hand; and neither side has all the cards stacked in its favour. The Pakistani army has the advantage of being the legal government, in control of Dacca and the communications system. But it has the disadvantage of a 2,500 mile supply line and a hostile population. The Bangladesh government for its part, has the popular support but it also has the immense task of creating new institutions (such as, a central bank with its own currency) and of consolidating its position administratively and militarily. Recognition by some friendly governments would, of course, not only boost its morale - an important factor - but would also open up channels for barter trade and for the purchase of arms. It is here that the stands taken by India, Russia, America and China begin to become crucial.

Despite its sympathies for the people of East Bengal, the Indian government is unlikely to be the first to recognize a Bangladesh government. It might follow a lead by Russia or by some communist country like East Germany or Rumania. Indian reasoning runs like this: If Delhi were the first to recognize Bangladesh, the focus of attention would shift from the conflict between East Bengalis and West Pakistanis to the friction between the Indian and Pakistani governments. Both Russia and America are known to have urged President Yahya Khan privately and not so privately, to arrive at “a peaceful settlement.” But the time for a peaceful settlement, which must mean something less than complete independence for Bangladesh seems to have gone. Anything less than independence would certainly be bitterly opposed by East Bengali communists of all hues - pro-Moscow, pro-Peking and neutral. And these have all been gaining quite a lot of support since the army repression began on 25 March.

Whatever the public statements of the Chinese government, members of Mohammed Toha’s East Pakistan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) and Maulana Bhasani’s National Awami League have been fighting the Pakistan army along with Mujibur Rahman’s followers. Any other tactic by them would have been suicidal. In fact, all three of them have already earned quite a reputation for courage. In contrast, many of the Awami League leaders simply vanished from the scene. In the Jessore area, for instance, of the four Awami League legislators, only one had engaged himself in relief and supply work; others had fled to India. “We were elected to be parliamentarians, not army commanders,” an Awami League legislator said in Calcutta last week.

Newspapers in both Pakistan and India have interpreted the Chinese stand as clear cut - for the Pakistan army and against the East Bengali liberation movement. But a close look at their statements makes only one thing clear: they are accusing India for interference in the internal affairs of its neighbour. That is all. On the direct question of the East Bengali liberation movement, the Chinese seem neutral. Here, some speculation is in order. As against India, Russia and America, the Chinese do not want to see a quick end to the present conflict. Why? Because, the longer the conflict drags on, the better the chances are of its assuming the character of guerrilla warfare, and the better the overall chances (as the Chinese may see it) of the nationalist struggle becoming a useful class struggle, also.

Moreover, the Chinese probably need time to work out a route for the supply of arms and ammunitions to the communists of their own brand. It could be that we are in for a Vietnam type situation in East Bengal. There is one big difference, however. The American establishment proved too rich and powerful to disintegrate even in the face of the strains that appeared in American society as a result of a long involvement in Vietnam. The socioeconomic system in West Pakistan is nowhere near that rich or tenacious. The strains that must soon appear, as a result of fighting a war 2,500 miles away, could pave the way for its disintegration. Revolutions, remember, are often born out of wars.