While the Indian Prime Minister continues to exercise restraint, many of Mrs Gandhi’s compatriots, from within and without the ranks of government, believe that the refugee problem can only be solved now by military action and-such a national debate is raging on the pros and cons of war.

The hawks, for instance, maintain that the cost of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict amounted to only a fraction of the continuing cost of the upkeep of six million refugees. The doves argue that the cost of a war cannot be measured in financial terms alone for it is likely that China would intervene on Pakistan’s behalf. However, the hawks are confident that in its present mood Peking is unlikely to make any dramatic thrust into Indian territory and in any event the risk of a showdown must be taken.

In this prevailing atmosphere of uncertainty India’s Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses has compiled a comprehensive document dealing with the cost of and feasibility of war, the balance of military power in the region and India’s ultimate objectives.

The document which comes to the alarming conclusion that India has no alternative but to go to war was prepared by the Director of the institute, Mr Subrahmanyam, and was presented to a closed door seminar of senior editors, officials and representatives from the Indian intelligence services.

In a nutshell, after examining all aspects of the situation in West and East Bengal the Subrahmanyam report suggests that India should carve out a portion of East Bengal in which the refugees can be settled. At the same time Mr Subrahmanyam suggests that if a certain section of East Bengal is wrested from the control of the Pakistan army the provisional government of Bangla Desh could be set up in the area with all the de facto and de jure attributes of sovereignty.

“There is no doubt that the Security Council would meet to call upon both nations to end the fighting. Whether the fighting should be ended immediately or continued for a period of time is a matter for India to consider. At this stage, it should be India’s endeavour to get Bangla Desh as one of the recognized parties to the dispute.

“In fact, this is the appropriate way to win the international recognition for Bangla Desh. It should be made clear that the cease-fire cannot be signed in the Bengal sector, unless the Bangla Desh commander is recognized as an independent sector commander for the purpose of ceasefire and Bangla Desh government is recognized as a party to the dispute as a whole.”

While one may not agree with Mr Subrahmanyam's conclusions the document does reflect the growing mood of impatience in India and it certainly demonstrates that war is seriously being considered in the most responsible circles in India.

Before coming to his conclusions Mr Subrahmanyam deals exhaustively with all aspects of an armed conflict: the cost, alternatives to war’ Pakistan’s military capability, the factors against and in favour of Indian action and the possibility of Chinese intervention.

The lengthy document, entitled Bangla Desh and India's National Security—the Options for India, first deals with the viewpoint that it would be better to absorb the six million refugees with international financial assistance than embark upon militant action which would lead to a full scale war.

“Is the problem only a question of absorption of the refugees?” It is clear that the Pakistani military regime is going to perpetuate its colonial type of rule in Bangla Desh and the partisan war is likely to continue.

“This again confronts India with the question whether this country will be able to stay uninvolved.... The sympathy of the Bengal people is wholly with the partisans. Consequently, the attempt to prevent the people of Bengal from giving sanctuaries to the partisans and helping them out in various ways will create major problems for India.

“If with a prolonged partisan struggle in Bangla Desh, the leadership becomes more and more left oriented, it could have long term repercussions on the situation in West Bengal”.

The document goes on to claim that under the circumstances Pakistani troops would certainty chase the partisans across the border in hot pursuit and India might drift into war which is not of India's choosing or timing.

“A policy of wait and see can only result in continuous insecurity along the Bangla Desh border with a high potential for escalation into full-scale conflict at any time. There is every possibility of our being compelled to deploy a large force around Bangla Desh and incur additional expenditure on such deployment. Pakistan is likely to keep the strength of its army in Bangla Desh at between four and five divisions on a permanent basis and has already started to replace these divisions there.”

Mr Subrahmanyam claims that even if the economic aspect of the refugee problem is absorbed by the outside world India will still have to face even more onerous threats to her security.

In the first place he chides the Government for creating a sense of commitment in India to the cause of the East Bengalis.

"Our going back on these commitments is likely to have an adverse impact on the credibility of the government within the country as well as outside and this erosion of our credibility is likely to compound our security problem in future.”

This is an obvious allusion to possibility that ruling Congress Party might suffer heavy losses when several large states go to the polls next year.

He also points out that the large concentration of refugees in West Bengal is likely to create tension in the sensitive and turbulent state.

The document also points towards the danger that the situation in East Bengal and the stories of refugees might spark off widespread religious strife between Hindu and Muslim communities in India.
He goes on to claim that if the present situation is not resolved both India and Pakistan will have to increase their already astronomical defence budgets. “If Bangla Desh does not come about, and Pakistan continues the colonial rule, tension between India and Pakistan will continue to persist and this in turn would result in increased amount of defence outlays in both countries. After bringing the Bangla Desh situation under some sort of control, it is quite likely that Pakistan might retaliate by creating difficulties for India in Kashmir.”

Dealing with the illusion that either the world community would enforce Yahya Khan into a realistic political settlement or that the Liberation Army would defeat the West Pakistanis. Mr. Subrahmanyam says that “all of these unrealistic hopes have been belied now”.

“It is now obvious that the Pakistani economy has absorbed the cost of Bangla Desh operations and also the extra cost for raising two new divisions. The Pakistani rulers have exercised their choice in favour of colonial domination over Bangla Desh even if it meant a slower pace of development in West Pakistan. The monsoon has shown itself not neutral between the Pakistan Army and partisans. but generally compounding the difficulties of those who have less facilities. The western powers have shown their inability to suspend aid for which they already made commitments. The world community is not in a position to do more than what it has so far done, so long as the issue of Bangla Desh is treated as an internal issue of Pakistan and a refugee problem for India.

“The world community feels itself constrained to act in the absence of internationalization of the problem, despite grave provocations to India. In fact it is the restraint exercised by India which, to a very great extent has put a limit on what the world community can do. It is, therefore, unrealistic for India to expect the world community to treat the problem as an international one. when she herself has so far not done anything to give it an international dimension.

“Consequently, there appears to be no chance of a solution to the Bangla Desh problem being found by international pressure. Those who plead for a nonaction policy have not appreciated this aspect.”

The document goes on to deal with the balance of military power, the fears that Indian cities would be vulnerable to air strikes and the Pakistan Air Force’s ability to neutralize the Indian Air Force.

“For a country like Pakistan, which has no aircraft industry and limited means of maintaining its aircraft in operation, any diversion or effort away from its main objective— namely neutralizing the Indian Air Force—is wasteful and will reduce to that extent its capability against the Indian Air Force. This is not to rule out completely irrational acts on the part of some desperate men at Islamabad, but the total effect of such efforts is not likely to be of a significant order.

“The same holds good for Pakistan naval effort too. They are reported to have three oceangoing submarines in their waters now with a fourth one likely to join in the next few days. In addition, it is believed that they may have a dozen or more smaller underwater craft which could be used for coastal mining, harbour sabotage and torpedoing ships close to the coast. But these vessels have very limited ranges and will have to be deployed very near Pakistan waters.

"It is doubtful whether Pakistan can attempt the latter action on a large scale or the former type of action can produce significant damage. Eighty per cent of India's trade, including most of its oil. comes in foreign bottoms and Pakistan is not in a position to impose a blockade on India.

“On the other hand hostilities between India and Pakistan will prevent East Bengal from being reinforced and will bottle up the forces there without much chance of their being supplied.

Mr Subrahmanyam attempts to assess the likely stance of Pakistan's military allies in the event of another conflict. “The United States is not likely to intervene, not after the Vietnam disclosures. The Soviet Union is not likely to do so—in any case not on the side of Pakistan, Pakistan's partners in Cento, Turkey, and Iran, though in a position to render some assistance by way of supplies, cannot, in view of limited industrial capacities and stockpiles, supply significant quantities.”

Mr Subrahmanyam then examines the question which haunts the mind of every Indian hawk. Will China intervene as she did in 1965? According to the institute’s assessment China is maintaining about 100,000 troops in Tibet and their strength can be increased at short notice.

However. Mr. Subrahmanyan comes to the conclusion that Chinese intervention can be ignored. “Even if we assume that China can double its present troop strength only a portion of that can be deployed in battle across our northern borders. In fact the forces that can be deployed will be limited by the logistic capacity of the various passes into India to maintain the troops in battle. Against this we deploy about nine divisions on our northern borders. (Our divisions are bigger than Chinese divisions in Tibet.)

“Granting it is not possible to keep every inch of the border guarded, and also admitting that some Chinese incursions could take place, in case they decide to intervene there is still the problem for the Chinese to stay in this side of the Himalayan border after the passes close in the winter.

“In 1962, when the Chinese met only limited resistance for various reasons, it took them a full month to come down from Thagla to the foothills. The damage that China can do within a period of two to three months, when India-Pakistan hostilities take place, can therefore be only limited to some incursions in certain parts of Nena and Ladakh.

“There is not the same risk of the Chinese cutting off Assam as there was in 1962 since in the course of hostilities the northern Bangla Desh is likely to be overrun by the Indian forces and the communication lines with Assam will be broadened rather than narrowed down or closed.

“In any case, logistically the Chinese cannot bring in heavier equipment across the Himalayan passes and therefore even if the Chinese come down they will be meeting the Indian armed forces equipped with heavy weapons. Further, this time there should be no reluctance to commit the Indian Air Force into battle on the Northern Border, unlike in 1962.

“Considering therefore the comparatively limited stakes the Chinese have in this issue, it does not appear to be militarily meaningful for the Chinese to undertake this type of operation involving such high military risks.”

The institute estimates that India will lose about 40,000 men if she goes to war.” War is abhorrent but those who advocate a policy of non-action have not put forward any reasonable solution to our problems.”
Peter Hazelhurst