Chinese reactions to the threat of war between India and Pakistan, so far, has been restrained and balanced, indicating an evident desire to avoid closer entanglement. On Wednesday the New China news agency finally gave space to the reports from Pakistan of “an Indian invasion” in the East, but it avoided comment of its own, merely attributing these reports without elaboration to Pakistan Government sources. On Thursday, in the first official comment from Peking, Chou en Lai was said to have “expressed concern” over India’s “military provocations.” This statement, avoiding any mention of what action China might take to support her ally, must fall a long way short of the kind of pledge which President Yahya Khan has been seeking.

The arrival in Pakistan of a Chinese Government delegation earlier this week, led by the Minister of the First Ministry of Machine Building, does not seem to indicate an increased commitment. It was described by. the Chinese as being a “friendly visit,” with the specific purpose of attending the inaugural ceremony of a heavy machinery plant at Taxila which had been constructed with Chinese aid.

The Vague expression of support for Pakistan, offered by the leader of the delegation on his arrival goes no further than the polite but non-committal treatment accorded a fortnight ago to Mr. Bhutto during his visit to Peking. It is noticeable also that it is the Pakistan radio and press which gives most publicity to Chinese pronouncements on this subject, as if anxious to underline a commitment which is none too clear, while the Chinese are generally silent. None of this means that the Chinese would “stand idly by” if full-scale war broke out. But it does suggest some scepticism in Peking about President Yahya Khan’s wilder claims, and a firm intention not to encourage him to take adventurous action by promising too much.

Over the past few months Peking has also become more aware of the need to steer clear of the Bangladesh dispute. Early Chinese pronouncements giving the impression of unequivocal support for Yahya Khan’s repression in the East, caused considerable concern among friends of China abroad. Perhaps of more importance in modifying China’s attitude has been the Pakistan Government’s evident lack of success in restoring peace to East Bengal. As Mr. Bhutto was told in Peking “a reasonable settlement” should be found to the “East Pakistan question.” Similarly, the visiting Chinese minister now in Islamabad has spoken in connection with the alarm on the Indian border of the need for such disputes to be “solved peacefully.” Both formulae imply a considerable degree of Chinese caution and desire for a compromise solution.

A stronger Chinese commitment may still be expected if the evidence grows of a serious Indian threat to East Pakistan. Geographically and politically, such an upset in the South Asian balance of power could not be tolerated. At the least one would be eager to see Chinese maneuver in the military- cum-diplomatic kind conducted during 1965-war. But there must at this stage be a delicate balance between them encouraging India from going too far, without encouraging Pakistan to do so.

But the rainy season is over, the ground is drying, and the Pakistani army can venture from the cities into the field again. Will it do so? And, if it does, will there be a further flood of refugees? The weather favours India. It has blocked the northern passes and ensured that the Chinese threat is militarily unreal, at least. The tank country of the Punjab is in good shape, and Pakistan is divided politically and militarily. The temptations must be there but Mrs. Gandhi is holding back. Perhaps she accepts that a war will solve only a few short-term problems and bring even more. Perhaps she is allowing the rich nations to look into their hearts and their pockets. The key lies with them, and another flow of refugees will shorten the time element even more. Letters and appeals are no longer enough.