An independent State of Bangladesh could become a reality early next year should India increase the political and military support she is giving to the Government-in-exile and the guerrillas fighting in East Pakistan. But if Indian help is withdrawn or lessened as a result of world pressure, then East Pakistan will become a second Algeria, without a Gen. de Gaulle in Islamabad. Thus the war could continue for years, for it is not only a matter of the Mukti Fouj Bangladesh guerrillas winning but of the Pakistani army losing - and it is most reluctant to admit defeat.

The recent escalation by Indian troops of the undeclared frontier war in East Pakistan suggests that India is making a determined effort to prevent the by- elections for a handful of Deputies to the National Assembly in East Pakistan in constituencies where Awami League members have been blacklisted. This would in turn sabotage the National Assembly meeting due to take place in Islamabad on Dec. 27. President Yahya Khan has announced that a civilian Government to which he will hand over political power would be formed on Dec. 28. There is little doubt that such a government would be headed by the veteran Bengali politician Mr. Nurul Amin, one of the two Bengalis elected to the National Assembly last December who was not a representative of the Awami League.

It is possible that President Yahya Khan will attempt to out-manoeuvre India by establishing a National Emergency Government within the next few days. There would be Bengalis in the Cabinet with the present Governor of East Pakistan, Mr. Malik, a likely deputy to the ailing Mr. Amin. Although spurious, this Cabinet would be far more difficult to attack or undermine politically than the present martial law authority. Much would, of course, depend on the actions of Mr. Bhutto, chairman of the Pakistan People’s Party, and without question the most powerful politician in Pakistan today. He has attacked those politicians who forged a coalition of three splinter groups of the once-powerful Moslem League as “three corpses in one coffin” and it will be extremely difficult, if not downright impossible for him to join a national Government which includes these and four other small Right-wing parties who now form the national coalition.

But war and the threat of war cause strange bed fellows. There is no doubt that a frontier incident, accidental or premeditated, could cause a full-scale conflagration between Pakistan and India at any moment and the opening of a second front in the Punjab or Kashmir, where the two rival armies, led by their armoured divisions, are already deployed in offensive postures. However, at the moment, President Yahya Khan is making dove-like sounds. Some weeks ago he said he would go to war if India occupied Pakistani soil or if fighting took place between Indian and Pakistan Regular soldiers. He has now apparently accepted both these happenings with little more than an after-dinner tirade against “that woman.”

It must be stressed that Indian intervention in East Pakistan is on a far smaller scale than official Pakistani communiques suggest. Indian armed forces occupy no more than a few square miles of the frontier area. The President apparently still hopes that the great powers will put sufficient pressure on Mrs. Gandhi to persuade her to cease the violation of Pakistan’s frontier. He is, at least for the moment, keeping the “hawkish” generals on a short leash and strict orders have been given that Pakistani troops must under no conditions cross into India, nor are they to return Indian fire unless military installations are endangered.

The Bangladesh 'overnment-in-exile, led by Mr. Tajuddin Ahmed, the right- hand man of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and former Secretary-General of the Awami League, is housed in Calcutta. Its aim is to obtain some Bengali soil on which to establish itself. This done, it will call for Indian and world recognition.

SHORT RATIONS

The three Pakistani divisions deployed almost entirely along the frontier consume about 600 tons of supplies daily. Doubtless they have stores of essential weapons, food and clothes sufficient for two months, while ammunition is now being manufactured inside East Pakistan. But petrol, fuel oil and lubricants pose a formidable problem and the morale of the Army which is sky-high since the recent encounters with Indian troops, would not be helped by shrinking stores and short rations. Indeed, although few Pakistani soldiers are willing to discuss the problem, the position of the Army in East Pakistan is already difficult. In case of any further movement towards war the Indian Navy is in the Bay of Bengal. Ready to intercept shipping. Attacked from without by the Indian Army and from within by the Mukti Fouj, the position of the Pakistani Army would be most unenviable.

Attacks and pin-pricks of the Indian Army around the frontier effectively prevent any units being spares for internal security duties. Thus the Mukti Fouj is daily growing stronger as it controls more and more of the countryside. It is like Vietnam in 1963, when the Viet Cong has small cells and sympathizers in every village and its forces controlled everything but the towns, main routes and military installations. The calibre of the Mukti Fouj varies almost as much as individual political leanings. In some areas, well-trained guerrillas cooperate with former Bengali civil servants in establishing a reasonable administration and maintaining security. In other districts there is anarchy and the people are subjected to the whims and reprisals of an armed, untrained rabble. There are frequent disputes between the internal and external supporters of Bangladesh, which are further aggravated by the extremely poor communications which exist between the men in Calcutta and their political representatives, some of them blacklisted members of the National Assembly, who are operating inside East Pakistan.

It is clear East Pakistan would take the Army years of painstaking work using the methods employed by the British in Malaya. But the Pakistanis have no intention of attempting this. Although “hearts and minds” campaigns have achieved some success in limited areas, the all-powerful generals, concerned by the shortage of manpower, are now ruthlessly preparing for the next stage of the campaign. Villages, clumps of trees and scrub within the radius of a mile or two around airports and military installations have been cleared to give Army an unimpeded field of fire. Hundreds of thousands have been rendered homeless in the Dacca area alone.

There is no doubt that Lt.-Gen. Niazi, who commands the Army in the East, has several contingency plans to withdraw troops from the frontier to take up new positions protecting the Khulna, Dacca and Chittagong. Some Pakistani soldiers and more arm-chair strategists. Advocate a pre-emptive attack on Kashmir. The war cannot last, they argue, because neither side has sufficient advanced weapons to fight for long. In the peace negotiations, occupied Kashmir could be exchanged for East Pakistan. There are in West Pakistan a number of businessmen who advocate support for Mrs. Gandhi’s demand for the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who they think could negotiate some face-saving formula which would enable the Army to withdraw intact from the East. There are, too, an ever-increasing number of West Pakistan civilian officials who says : if East Pakistan wants to break away, let it.

War or no war, the situation is bleak for it is unlikely that the new civilian Pakistani Government will have the power to cope with the desperate problems President Yahya Khan proposes to hand over to it. A change of leadership in the Army would merely produce another Gen. Khan, and this, on a longer-term basis, leaves Mr. Bhutto, with or without the colonels, as the man most likely to succeed.