The Pakistan tragedy was highly predictable and largely of her own making. Yet stark tragedy it remains. The concept of two peoples separated by geography, culture and language, bound together over 1,000 miles of hostile territory only by Islam might seem an unreality in these days of nationalism and power politics. Yet it was the dream millions clung to for 24 years. And now comes a rude awakening. Ever since the parliamentary system collapsed in 1958, the Army has provided the steel around the religious cement. Through the centuries, through the days of the British Raj to the 1965 war, Moslem warriors from these parts had never surrendered. The legend of invincibility once has been shattered. What was once the proud Army elite of nations has been humiliated in the East and forced to stand down in the West. And, worst of all, because of the despised Hindus. A soldier President has been forced to eat his words.

This is no time to gloat. The fallout from this defeat is not pleasant to witness. It will be up to historians to decide finally where the real responsibilities lie - with the British, with partition, with Mr. Jinnah, with Ayub Khan or his successor Yahya Khan, with squabbling politicians, or with the Indians, whose role is not pristine. By humbling himself to accept India’s cease-fire ultimatum in the West, Yahya has at last acted rationally. The 75 millions in the East were undeniably lost. But when in address to the nation he bombastically opted for carrying on the fight; it was feared that Moslem fanaticism had gained the upper hand.

Wiser counsels, military as well as civilian, must have prevailed. Also, the unfeasibility must have been seen of Pakistan’s only chance two weeks ago - of a major incursion into Kashmir both to draw off the enemy overrunning the East and to secure a political and psychological quid pro quo for the East. The success in 1965 bred overconfidence, which refused to take account of changed circumstances. India’s army which Pakistan attacked in the West had been well trained and equipped in the intervening six years, thanks most recently to its Russian ally. Not only did it outnumber the Pakistanis, but it also had weeks to prepare for the inevitable. For 10 days communiques spoke of resounding victories. In fact, what was a relatively mild offensive was quickly halted by tenacious Indian resistance and strong defensive positions plus vastly superior firepower on the ground and in the air.

Other bids in the north and centre to break through the Indian communications lines to the long desired Kashmir Vale were even less productive. Neither could visitors to the front find any evidence of a build up to herald a large-scale assault. When the East collapsed last week, the penny must have been dropped on the High Command. The only military-politico alternative to the Indian cease-fire would have been an all-out drive into Kashmir. Experience showed this was not possible. It would have been more likely to provoke a powerful Indian response. Yet if the truncated nation has, in extremis, managed to preserve itself, what then are its chances of survival? The loss of 75 million Easterners will not be the too bitter pill to swallow. The Bengalis were as scorned as they were exploited. For the Punjabis, the conquest of Kashmir would have been more than adequate compensation. But as this was not to be, the East will soon be erased from the national consciousness.

Less easy to dispel is the haunting knowledge of up to 80,000 West Pakistani soldiers, policemen and civil servants in Indian hands. Mrs. Gandhi must recognise their value as a bargaining counter. Absorbing these embittered soldiers back into the national life will not be easy. Their demos could result in anger pouring out into the streets.

PUBLIC DUPED

The political crystal ball is even more clouded. Public opinion has been duped and grossly unprepared for the disaster. The reaction of these volatile people could be violent, aimed at foreign scapegoats such as the British as much as at the regime which let them down. One certainty is that Yahya is thoroughly discredited, both as a national leader and a soldier. He is held responsible for the bloody oppression of the Bengalis which sparked off the whole unhappy train of events, as well as the present collapse. Yet as his house was folding up around him like a pack of cards the President was still going through the motions of handing over power to a civilian administration with a new constitution based on a certain autonomy for the East and a Parliament composed of representatives of both wings.

At best, he could have remained as a figurehead President, though rapidly waning public and Army support made this doubtful. The real question is who will actually rule this sorely damaged land as Prime Minister. As leader of the elected majority in the West, Mr. Bhutto would seem the natural choice. As an 1 lth-hour gesture to show his good intentions, Yahya appointed him interim Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister. The interim Prime Minister, Nurul Amin, will probably be reconsigned to the shadows from which he briefly emerged. Mr. Bhutto, a consummate demagogic politician with wide popular backing, has always been hungry for power. But does he want it at this moment in time? He showed no particular haste to return home after indulging in a typical outburst of histrionics at the United Nations. He certainly does not want to be smeared with any of the blame for the present mess. His followers have already denounced the military regime for abandoning the East.

Economically, the new, more compact Pakistan could be viable, though on the Middle East level, with a sharp decline from the relatively comfortable living standards enjoyed mainly by the corrupt upper middle class and the so-called “22 families” who hold the money bags. The West for long benefited from the market in the East for its third-rate consumer goods and basic commodities often sold at more than the world prices. So painful readjustment by industry and commerce will be necessary if new outlets are to be found. With the “green revolution” in the Punjab, the West is now self-sufficient in food grains and will not starve. Outside aid will start again. Sacrifices will be heavy and will inevitably fall more on toiling peasant masses and the struggling wage-earners than on Karachi “fat cats.”

Unemployment, already serious, will mount, and more and more workers will be obliged to return to breadline existence in the villages. Yet the place can be made a going, if poor, concern. The psychological impact is likely to be more profound. The world’s largest Moslem nation of 120 million has been reduced to 55 million, less than the Moslem population in India. The whole Pakistan rationale as an Islamic homeland on the subcontinent has gone. The creation of a new rationale for Pakistan’s existence looms as perhaps the most formidable task this saddened land faces in the trying days ahead.