The commission of inquiry President Bhutto has set up to discover the main causes for the disastrous surrender of Pakistani troops in the Eastern Wing will find much of the documentary evidence has been destroyed and that those officers who played a vital role, including the Army Commander Lieut.-Gen. A. K. Niazi, as prisoners of war not available. A further frustration is that no one will ever ascertain what went on between the President and the junta in Islamabad.

But there is already ample evidence to support the fact that the war with India was lost long before Pakistan fighters made their pre-emptive strike against Indian air fields on Dec. 3, or the first bombs damaged the runway in Dacca. For the overall efficiency of the Pakistan army has severely run down by years devoted to the administration of martial law and those political involvement, this form of work entailed, at the expense of sound military training. Further, the Army in the East which was composed of almost four divisions, was not adequately equipped for war with India. Indeed its only air cover was provided by one squadron of Sabre jet fighters. The Eastern Command was, when hostilities began, completely cut off from possible reinforcement or resupply by the Indian Navy deployed in the Bay of Bengal.

Chronically short of artillery and equipped with outdated World War II field telephones, the majority of officers knew they were doomed long before the action began, for, in addition, the Bengali population were openly hostile and the defence forces were exposed to terrorist attacks from the Mukti Fouj guerrillas.

In the West, Pakistani generals claim the cease-fire was agreed before troops had been properly blooded or warmed up to the campaign as the positions they attacked, to cut the main Indian line of communications into Kashmir, were far more heavily defended than had been expected and there was insufficient time to outflank these three-storeyed concrete emplacements. The speed and scope of the disaster in the East was due to Gen. Niazi's refusal to take the advise of his staff or digest the information from the Intelligence Corps in Islamabad, who had warned him early last May that Indian troops were being redeployed around East Pakistan. Later, when it became obvious on Nov. 9-10 that an Indian attack in the East was imminent, Gen. Niazi failed to implement the No. 1 contingency plan to withdraw troops from the frontiers and evacuate the entire northern part of the country as well as the south-west.

The operational staff in Dacca claimed the defensive advantage obtained from the cover provided by the wide rivers of the Madhumati in the south¬west, the Meghna in the east and the Brahmaputra in the north-east would be each worth a division. But Gen. Niazi, supported by President Yahya Khan over a thousand mile away in Islamabad repeated endlessly that he "would be offensively defensive and not yield one inch of Pakistan territory.

The main Indian thrust was predictable. Guided by Mukti Fouj guerrillas they crossed marshlands and paddy fields, by-passing, here as elsewhere, heavily defended towns and the elaborate defensive positions the local Pakistan commanders had been encouraged to construct on main roads. Sympathetic villagers offered meat and rice as well as garlands. In the West, two columns advanced on Jessore avoiding the well-defended route from Beanpole, which was left to rot until the cease-fire 11 days later. These Indian incursions rendered the withdrawal of Pakistan troops virtually impossible when Gen. Niazi gave the belated order to retreat during the early hours Dec. 6. One of the few classical encounter of the war was fought near Jampur by the Indian Mountain Brigade, which with Mukti Fouj guerrillas under its command entered from the Assam frontier.

CRUCIAL RAID

As the invading columns moved in from the north-east and west, the main issue was being fought out above Dacca Airport in a series of spectacular daylight raids in which the Indian MiG pilots improved their techniques in a matter of hours as they dived among the flak and took on dogfight with Pakistani Sabre jets in order to bomb the airport. After two nights it was no longer possible to repair the craters in the runway, the Sabres could not take off and as India gained control of the air space, the campaign was all but won.

On Dec. 7, inspired by the Chief Secretary, Muzaffar Hussain, the Governor of East Pakistan, Mr. A. M. Malik sent a top secret message to President Yahya Khan saying : "Our losses very heavy. Front in both Eastern and Western Sectors has collapsed. Jessore has already fallen. No communications, thus administration ineffective. As food and other supplies running out, even Dacca City will be without food in seven days. No amount of sympathy from world Powers will help, nothing except direct military intervention and that should have impact within 48 hours. If no help expected, beseech repeat beseech you negotiate so that civilized transfer of power takes place and million of lives saved. Is it worth sacrificing so much when end seems inevitable?"

President Yahya's response was to appoint a four-man committee - the Governor, Gen. Niazi, Muzaffar Hussain and Maj.-Gen. Rao Farman Ali Khan - "to arrange and ensure the safety of the Armed Forces by all political means you will have to adopt with your opponents." As the military situation deteriorated Gen. Farman Ali drafted terms for a settlement, which were transmitted by the United Nations representative in Dacca to the Secretary-General for the Government in Delhi. He requested: "one, an immediate cease-fire; two, repatriation with honour of the Armed Forces to West Pakistan; three, repatriation all West Pakistan personnel wanting to return; four, guarantees for the safety of the Biharis; and five, no reprisals.

An angry President reacted by saying that Gen. Farman had gone beyond what he had approved. At the same time President Yahya convinced Gen. Niazi that American and/or Chinese military assistance would be forthcoming within 36 hours. Meanwhile the Indian troops advancing from the East were delayed longer than was expected by the rivers, despite the use of helicopters to transport men and equipment. Gen. Niazi held on until Dec. 14, after the Governor's house was rocketed by the Indian Air Force and the senior civil servants were forced to take refuge in the Intercontinental Hotel, which had become a Red Cross neutral zone.

Angered by the non-appearance of military assistance, the Army Commander called on the American Consular-General late in the afternoon of the 14th and was made to face the truth. Speechless with disappointment, he called in Gen. Farman Ali to redraft cease-fire terms which were flashed to Washington for Delhi. Delays in the United States prevented the reply from reaching Dacca before the early hours of the 16 . Dacca was then poised for a blood bath, with many small Pakistan units manning machine- guns on the roof-tops. Although the Indians had overwhelming fire power, had it been necessary to take the city by force, the destruction would have been grim indeed.

The Mountain Brigade reached Dacca, to the annoyance of the force from Tripura, on the 16th. A tearful Gen. Niazi signed the surrender terms at dusk on the racecourse and over 70,000 Pakistanis became prisoner-of-war. No one then had sufficient determination to press on with the war in the West, for the soldiers too had lost their heart for the battle.

The commission will find there is a great deal of evidence against the former President and his way of life, which includes the extremely stupid generals he appointed as commanders. There is evidence too of cupidity but not, I think of plots involving groups of Pakistani officers and Indians, as many people now suggest.