Frontier (Calcutta)

As, of today, evidence has piled up to suggest equally (a) that China is determined to support the West Pakistan regime wholeheartedly against the nationalists fighting for statehood in Bangladesh; and (b) that China has kept her options open and that it is quite possible that her present stand on Bangladesh may shift radically according to the direction the Bangladesh struggle takes. If the first proposition is acceptable then ideology would no more play an important role in China's foreign policy decisions.

If the second is taken as correct, then ideology still remains a dominant factor in her policy-making. Perhaps it would be more correct to suggest that there is an element of truth in both these propositions. To say this we have to examine also the factors-historically, ideologically and diplomatically identifiable-which in their totality determine the Chinese view of the Bangladesh struggle.

These factors can be categorised as follows:

(1) Chinese policy on nationalities from the point of view of her own national experience;

(2) Chinese view of the struggle for self-determination in other countries (Biafra and Kashmir as case studies);

(3) Chinese understanding of the internal developments in Pakistan and the class character of the Awami League movement in East Pakistan; and

(4) China's immediate diplomatic stakes in the sub-continent.

China's stand on nationalities differed radically from that of Soviet Russia. On the other hand the thinking on struggles for self-determination underlined China's commitment to certain ideological objectives. The immediacy of China's diplomatic aims and the ideological line, as we shall attempt to show, seems to have brought about a compromise in her present stance on Bangladesh. Whatever might have been the Soviet practice, there is a long tradition in the history of the Soviet communist movement to theoretically define the right of self-determination of nationalities. The official line as advanced by Stalin defined a nation as a "historically evolved stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up, manifested in a community of culture". Interpreting the nation thus, Stalin proclaimed its right of self-determination. "It has the right to arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It has the right to enter into federal relations with other nations. It has the right to complete secession. Nations are sovereign, and all nations are equal". (Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question pp. 8 & 19) Lenin had later realised the differences in the theoretical approach to the question of nationalities and its practice in the Soviet Union. In his last days he was very much worried about Great Russian chauvinism which he warned should be suppressed so that the "weaker' nationalities need not exchange class exploitation for exploitation by the Great Russians. Lenin had declared war to the death on Great Russian chauvinism in a letter to the politbureau on October 6, 1922 (Louis Fischer, Life of Lenin N. Y. 1964, p. 610).

In the Soviet Constitution also, the principle of self- determination was consecrated in the provision that the various republics retained the right to secede from the Soviet Republic. Although Soviet practice has universally contradicted this principle, the fact must nevertheless be noted that in the total Soviet ideological position, national self-determination has been accorded a very important place.

In contrast, the Chinese People's Republic does not concede the right of secession even in theory. Mao considers the national minority problem as a class problem and class struggle is the main theme of the Chinese communist policy on national minorities. By 1962, the Chinese leadership was asserting the fact that there are no contradictions between nationalities but only between classes. (Mosley, China Quarterly, No. 24, October-December 1965, p. 16). Elucidating the point further, Liu Chiun, Member, Nationalities Committee, Third National People's Congress, argued in 1964 that "the unreformed national and religious upper strata elements of the national minorities would try to incite national contradictions in order to protect or rehabilitate their class interests. A bourgeoisie still exists in some of the national minorities, and the bourgeoisie and the ideological influence of the bourgeoisie are the root source that gives rise to nationalism. It it quite clear that the nationality question in our country at present is still essentially a class question and its root cause is still class, class contradictions, class struggle and the struggle between the two roads". ("The current nationality question and class struggle in our country". Hung Ch'i, No. 12, June 30, 1964; translation in Selections from China Mainland Magazines, No. 428 August 4, 1964, p. 14).

The most immediate and practical instance of the Chinese position is the Tibetan uprising in 1959 which was conceded by the Chinese to have been based on class struggle-a counter-revolutionary movement engineered by a handful of upper strata feudal reactionaries against the Tibetan people. The class view of the Tibetan revolt was merged with the Chinese fear that China's territorial integrity was being interfered with by outside powers, including India. It would be seen that since 1949 China's main aim has been to bring border areas under centralised control as a step to defend aid strengthen her territorial integrity. This process, however, has to be justified in terms of class struggle just as the Soviets in practice also suppressed the nationalities in Central Ada during the Stalin period. Thus as far as China's internal experience with the nationalities is concerned, political consolidation and territorial security have been the primary motives with ideology coming as a weak cover.

The Chinese attitude to self-determination could be best illustrated from the stand China has taken on Kashmir and Biafra. Notwithstanding her close diplomatic relations with the military regime in Islamabad, China has not changed her basic understanding on Kashmir i.e. she supports the just struggle of the Kashmiri people for self-determination. Although this stand has been interpreted as a product of China's anti-Indian stance, it should be noted that it does not support Pakistan's official policy either. The Chinese view of self-determination of the Kashmiri people provides them with option of either (1) keeping their independence or autonomy from both India and Pakistan or (2) choosing India or Pakistan. As to what means should be followed to obtain the views of the Kashmiri people on either of these choices, China has said that the pledge given to the Kashmiris should be honoured by India and Pakistan.

On Biafra which represented the secessionist movement of the Ibo minorities of Nigeria, the Chinese stand was a more committed one in terms of material support in the form of small arms through other African countries. But whereas some African States (Tanzania, Zambia, Ivory Coast and Gabon) and France recognised Biafra, China did not extend diplomatic recognition to it. This might indicate that the Chinese were watching the developments in the Nigerian civil war. At the same time China's pro-Biafra attitude was motivated by the fact that the super-powers were trying to divide the African continent into their respective spheres. The Chinese stand therefore resembled that of France which was also aiming at curbing the growing influence of the big powers. It, however, differed from France because of ideological inhibitions as to whether the movement in Biafra was engineered by bourgeois class interests.

Paradoxically, the Chinese stand on Kashmir reflects adherence to the Soviet ideology of self-determination without a Chinese commitment to support the Kashmiris materially. On the Biafra issue, on the other hand, the Chinese stand hid no such ideological basis giving it at the same time the leverage to the extent of materially supporting the Biafrans.

What is the Chinese understanding of the situation in East Bengal? First of all, the question arises as to how the Chinese identify the character of the Bangla Desh movement ? What direction is the movement taking ? On these questions, it is as yet too early to define the Chinese responses. It is clear that China would not be deterred by the pervasive apprehension of escalation of the struggle as India would be. Instability in East Bengal and a protracted struggle would hurt the interests of the power-elite in India rather than that of China. The reasons are not far to seek. For, if the struggle escalates, it may have serious repercussions on West Bengal which at the moment is the most troubled area of the Indian Union. Since there is already an extreme left move-ment in West Bengal, the spread of instability across the -A. borders might further help these elements. In such a situation, the Chinese might interpret the developments in ideological terms.

It could be asked why China does not help escalate the situation in Bangla Desh from the point of view of supporting it. This can be only answered on the basis of what has been already discussed about the Chinese understanding of the nationality question. China cannot express sympathy with the Awami League movement because it is a bourgeois- dominated movement. Secondly, since the Awami League leaders have close contact with India, the Chinese would naturally not be sympathetic at the moment. For, any success of the Bangla Desh struggle under Awami League leadership may only mean a gain for India. There could be a third consideration as well. It is because India stresses the democratic aspect of the movement in Bangla Desh that China might also consider that such a movement goes against her revolutionary concepts. Unlike the Soviet Union, China has not considered parliamentary democracy as a step in the direction of socialist development. A successful democratic struggle in Bangla Desh may then in China's view become an obstacle to a revolutionary class struggle. Hence, China's non-support to the present struggle led by the Awami League may as well mean support to a left oriented movement at an opportune time.

The diplomatic stakes can be measured in terms of (1) Chinese, suspicion of Soviet expansionist schemes in South Asia where India is a complementary factor; (2) Chinese support to the Pakistan regime originates from their assessment of the sixties about India playing a hostile role against their interests. In other words support to Pakistan has been governed by the well-known principle, "the enemy of your enemy is your best friend". (3) Whatever may be the character of the military regime in Pakistan, the Chinese think that a revolutionary movement is most likely to succeed in Pakistan because parliamentary democracy has not yet become the main instrument of the bourgeoisie to consolidate its position in Pakistan.

In the immediate future therefore China would like to keep the posture of verbal support to Pakistan and threat to India of possible measures she would take in case India intervened in East Bengal. This is also a legalistic stand in so far as international standards on secessionist movement^ are concerned. The world order did not come in support of Biafra because it considered that the movement would lead to the disintegration of a sovereign independent State, the single important constituent that makes the World society. This minimum posture helps her second objective, that of keeping Pakistan as a viable unit to oppose the joint schemes that the Soviet Union and India might impose on South Asia. In other words, the status quo in South Asia helps China's revolutionary stance, whereas the posture of the Soviet Union and possibly India if she is to succeed would have to consider a radical change in the status quo. That is to say, the present non-committal attitude of China (which includes traditional^ moral and some material support to Pakistan) leaves room for escalation of the Bangla Desh movement into a class struggle involving India and Pakistan. In order to prevent this situation, India has to see the immediate success of the Bangladesh struggle under Awami League leadership.

It is possible that because Pakistan played an intermediary role in the current trend towards a Sino-American detente^ China would not like to see any widespread disruption leading to a collapse of the regime in Rawalpindi. On Bangla Desh, China has shown that a minimum posture can bring maximum benefit in terms of the present. As to the future, the doors are wide open. It is up to Peking to interpret the developing situation in Bangla Desh either in terms of ideology or real politik.