1971-09-29
By Ralph Joseph
Page: 0
Is President Yahya Khan planning another big military sweep through East Pakistan to clear the countryside of guerrillas before getting on with his plans for by-elections in the province? This seems the likeliest moment, with the monsoons now over and the pressure building up even in the west wing for the transfer of power to the civilians. President Yahya’s sudden one-day trip to Teheran recently is still wrapped in mystery, but if he came here to ask the Shah for support, moral or otherwise, for a second large-scale military operation in the eastern province, there are no indications that he got it. The Persian monarch, who tried his hand earlier in the summer at mediation between India and Pakistan, is believed to be in favour of a political settlement with the Bangla Desh rebels in East Pakistan. The joint communique issued at the end of Yahya’s visit, of course, gave no such impression. If anything, its mention of “continued mutual support” seemed to throw the scent in quite the opposite direction.
World-wide speculation about a Soviet-inspired mediation attempt only helped to deepen the mystery. Mrs. Indira Gandhi is not known to be planning a trip to Teheran for the 25th centenary of the founding of the Persian monarchy. The guest list shows it is the Indian President V.V. Giri who is scheduled to be here. Besides, the earlier mediation bid this summer is reported to have broken down, after former Iranian Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi visited Islamabad and Indian Industries Minister Moinul Haq later visited Teheran. There wras then some talk of the possible arrival here of Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, but he never turned up. Instead former Pakistan Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto did, but there was no hint, official or otherwise, that his trip had anything to do with the Iranian mediation effort, though as a personal friend of the Shah he was treated as a special guest at Saadabad Palace.
In fact, it may not have been purely coincidental that as long as Dr. Henry Kissinger was “in” Pakistan, Mr. Bhutto extended his stay in Teheran. In both cases, curiously, sudden stomach upsets were given as the reasons. How much Yahya had to do with keeping anti-American Bhutto out of the country while he was arranging Dr. Kissinger’s trip to Peking may come to light later. In any event, Mr. Bhutto’s sojourn accomplished no obvious purpose. Mr. Bhutto’s visit was followed in August by that of the head of the Pakistan Foreign Office, Sultan Mohammad Khan (no minister, incidentally: ( Yahya has no Cabinet). Sultan was here to attend what was described as a routine meeting of Pakistani ambassadors in the Middle East. About the same time the ambassador to Baghdad defected. He was not at the meeting. Asked to comment on the defection, Sultan Khan, in obvious embarrassment, told a reporter he would “rather not”. There was also to be “no comment” on reports that Iran was mediating between Pakistan’s military government and the Bangla Desh rebels. Reporters were asked politely simply not to talk about it, as even an official denial might seem to give substance to the report. Sultan Khan shortly after made a trip to Moscow, and the announcement of Yahya’s planned visit to Teheran, coming on the heels of Sultan Khan’s return to Islamabad from Moscow touched off speculation of another impending Tashkent. The comings and goings certainly did have the look of another Soviet-inspired accord coming up. But how far would Yahya risk infuriating Mr. Bhutto, who still has the mobs behind him? The Tashkent accord of January 1966 between Ayub Khan and Shastri was the start of the split between Mr. Bhutto and Ayub. Bhutto is also unlikely to have forgotten that General Yahya Khan was the officer involved in implementing the deal with his Indian counterpart, whom he met in New Delhi to arrange for the pullback of Indian and Pakistani troops from each other’s territories.
Mr. Bhutto has already started to take on a defiant attitude to Yahya, though his latest outbursts may have been touched off by advance information of Yahya’s plans to set back the date for the handing over of power to the civilians. However, Yahya’s current dilemma about the transfer of power is that many of the Awami Leaguers whose names were cleared of any involvement in the secessionist bid are just not around to take their seats in the National Assembly. The desperate and repeated calls he and others have made for the refugees to return may be as much directed at the “qualified” Awami Leaguers as at the millions of others who have fled. Even the promises of “amnesty” seem to have done no good. There just is not enough trust in an all-powerful military government. Theoretically, therefore, as long as the “qualified”' Awami Leaguers do not return, the National Assembly will not have the “quorum” Yahya desires and cannot be convened. As long as it is not convened, Yahya cannot present his constitution to it for approval before transferring power to the assembly, and a civilian Prime Minister. One can see good reason for Mr. Bhutto’s impatience. He, after all, seems next in line for the premiership.