Hindustan Times (New Delhi)

Although today newspaper reports on the Mukti Bahini’s operations and its successes against the Pakistan army are not as wildly exaggerated as they used to be during the early days of the Bangla Desh war, they are still unrealistically sanguine and reflect a degree of unfamiliarity of the nature of the military operations that are being conducted in that country. For instance, there are frequent reports about “liberated” areas under the occupation of the Bahini. A delegate to the recent International Conference on Bangla Desh claimed that the guerrillas are taking a toll of 5,000 Pakistan army casualties every month and that the Pakistan Government is forced to spend up to 150 crores per month on the counter-insurgency operations, these overtly optimistic reports help nobody, least of all the Mukti Bahini. Ultimately, such reports will lead to impression that the defeat of the Pakistan army is just around the corner and that the Bahini is well able to achieve its aims by itself. One of the reasons for this unrealistic reportage is that though we now know something of the strength, organisation and tactics of the Mukti Bahini, not much is known about the method of operation of the Pakistan army. The result is that in the absence of any definite information from the “other side of the hill” the success stories of the guerrillas leave one with impression of a Pakistan army with its back to the wall, fighting a losing battle in an atmosphere of terror and defeatism. This is not the case.

On March 12, the day when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declared that he was taking over the administration of Bangla Desh, these elements of the Pakistan army were located in East Bengal: the 14th Infantry Division made up of four infantry brigades containing a total of 14 infantry battalions, a regiment of light (Chaffee) tanks and three artillery regiments ; in other words, an infantry division with an increased allotment of infantry but somewhat under-strength in the normal artillery complement of a Pakistan Division. However, of the 14 battalions, five belonged to the East Bengal Regiment, composed entirely of Bengalis; these ceased to be an asset almost immediately, though it would be incorrect to assume that they went over to be Liberation Army as battalions. After the systematic murder of senior officers, disarming of certain elements and large-scale arrests, only a part of this Bengali Regiment was able to “take the field”, in small, company size groups.

Besides the 14th Division, there were 3,000 Razakars (all Bengalis) and 3 000 East Punjab Rangers (mixed Bengalis and Pakistanis) —the equivalent of our Border Security Force. Most of the Bengali elements of these irregular forces were able to slip away and, where they could be organised, they joined up with the Liberation Army of Bangla Desh. Yahya Khan, while ostensibly holding political discussions with the Sheikh, had already ordered reinforcements to be flown into East Bengal. By the end of April he had built up his strength in Bangla Desh to 39 infantry battalions and six artillery regiments—the equivalent of four divisions but under strength in armour and artillery. It was this force that the Mukti Fouj vainly tried to take on in open combat — and suffered so greatly in the process.

In the first phase of its operation, the Pakistan high command aimed to consolidate its position in the cantonments where they had been located—Dacca, Chittagong, Jessore, and Rangpur in the north—and to ensure that critical border towns through which the liberation forces could establish contact with West Bengal were kept under control. Certain, towns did fall to the liberation forces; for instance, Comilla. and Mymensingh- But eventually these two were re-captured. Sylhet and Mymensingh posed a certain amount of difficulty, because the crucial bridge at Brahmanbaria had been blown, and it took more than a month for the Pakistanis to establish themselves there. Besides the regular army, about 3,000 Pakistani Rangers have been included into Bangla Desh. But the inference that these are specially trained troops for counter-insurgency operations is wrong. The Rangers are intended for border security duties and, even here they have not proved entirely reliable with the result that they have to be stiffened with a sprinkling of regular army personnel in border outposts: all “counter-insurgency” operations are carried out by the regular Pakistan Army operating along regular lines. The tactics of the Pakistan Army today is to maintain firm control in all major towns and cantonments all over Bangla Desh and to establish check-posts along all the critical border areas. From these firm bases, detachments of troops are sent fanning out to border areas tor other Mukti Bahini stronghold whenever intelligence is received about their movements. This is not counter-insurgency tactics: this is basically a defensive posture. However, if the Pakistan Government's; aim is to maintain a military presence throughout the country, then it is achieving its aim. This: is a strong military position because the guerrilla tactics of the Mukti Bahini can strike only at its periphery. To dislodge any part of it—and only then can there be a claim to a “liberated area”-—will entail set-piece battles in open combat. This the Bahini forces are unable to carry out, as they learned at great cost in April-May.

Nor is it realistic to assume that the Pakistan military operations are unduly logistically hampered or economically ruinous. It is true the rail and road communications have been effectively disrupted, particularly in the Dacca-Comilla-Chittagong sector. But they are not entirely inoperable. In any case, Pakistan has been able to utilise a fleet of helicopters and patrol boats which were received from the United States during the relief operations following the East Bengal hurricane, to augment their air maintenance capacity.0Since the army is conducting an essentially low-intensively campaign, the maintenance requirements of the forces are only marginally above normal. There has certainly been a tightening of belts, but no indication that logistical maintenance is breaking down. It is not the purpose here to belittle the heroic efforts of the Mukti Bahini but to introduce a degree of realism into the unduly optimistic picture that is so often painted about the purely military operations that are being conducted. The Mukti Bahini is a resistance regular armed force; it is not feasible to expect it to achieve a military victory. On the other hand, whenever the guerrillas and saboteurs are active—in the border belts, in various pockets in the Dacca or Mymensingh regions, and in the southern delta regions—their sabotage operations against shipping at Chalna, Chittagong and Narayanganj have been remarkably successful—they have forced the enemy on to the defensive. They have prevented the occupation government from exercising effective administrative control over most parts of the country. And they have succeeded in demoralising Pakistan armed forces personnel to an extent where the government now has to offer inducements in the form of extra pay and promotion to personnel to keep alive their spirit against the onslaught of Mukti Bahini—but we must not be led to believe that they are likely to lead to a military victory.