Islamabad: When Yahya Khan and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman sat down for talks in Dacca on Tuesday there were only two options left to Pakistan's president: to agree to East Pakistan's demands for full autonomy within a very loose federation with West Pakistan, or try to physically force the continued existence of close constitutional links between the east and the west wings of the country.

The third prospect--an independent East Pakistan--is anathema to the West Pakistani leaders but is favoured by a large and influential segment of the population in East Pakistan.

Sheikh Mujib is not among those who would lightheartedly sever relations with West Pakistan: the fact that he went alone to see Yahya Khan at the presidential residence in Dacca indicates that he wanted to be free-- from pressure from his more militant east wing advisers and colleagues to tackle the delicate negotiations in his own way.

It must be assumed that he tried to convince the president that the only way to save the country would be to agree to his six-point programme for autonomy and to accede to the preconditions set out on March 7 for him to participate in the meetings of the constituent assembly scheduled to begin next Thursday. These demands included the immediate lifting of martial law, the confinement of all troops in East Pakistan to their barracks, the handing over of power to the people's elected representatives and an inquiry into the behaviour of the army in the recent clashes with civilians in East Pakistan during which an estimated 300 people were killed by troops' rifle shots. Sheikh Mujib was armed with a very strong case; but his chances of success depended on his ability to convince President Yahya Khan--and through him other West Pakistani leaders-- that he had virtually no mandate to make concessions on these points. The West Pakistanis simply had to accept his demands; and if they tried to pressure him too much, they would be doing so only at the great risk of the East Pakistanis burning all bridges and issuing their own unilateral declaration of independence.

While the West Pakistani military leaders stationed in East Pakistan, under their newly appointed and reputedly very tough commander Lieutenant General Tikka Khan, are believed to think that once given the order they can suppress any civilian uprising in East Pakistan, most outside observers feel such an assessment is utterly unrealistic.

There are now believed to be between 35-40,000 troops in East Pakistan. Another 18,000 were thought to have been ordered to cross to the east wing soon after Yahya Khan announced the postponement of the originally planned constituent assembly session to be held at the beginning of this month.

The estimated 8,000 East Pakistani Rifles as well as the police force are, however, clearly siding with the Sheikh. In a situation where the army operates under almost impossible logistic conditions (all aircraft from West Pakistan to Dacca now have to be routed south of India because of New Delhi's over-fly ban following the recent hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane to West Pakistan), the 70 million East Pakistanis deny them any kind of co-operation. They will not even provide local supplies. It is inconceivable that the army could do anything but bring about meaningless bloodshed if it decides to act.

This is a point that, hopefully, should now be clear to West Pakistan's military leaders. President Yahya the "man in the middle" -- who despite his recent arrival on the political scene has shown himself 10 feet taller than most of Pakistan's selfish and opportunistic political leaders - was clearly aware of the very real dangers of the situation when he arrived in Dacca this week. However his troubles do not lie entirely in the east wing. He also is having to contend with militant politicians in the west wing -- among them the leader of the PPP (Pakistan People's Party), Zulfikar Ali Bhutto - some of them with close contacts in the military hierarchy in the west wing.

President Yahya's ill-advised decision to postpone the scheduled first meeting of the constituent assembly on March 3 was quite clearly made on the advice of Bhutto, who long had asked for such a postponement and had threatened to boycott the assembly if he did not get it.

The president was clearly committed to the idea of at least maintaining the present degree of power for the centre in Pakistan, and in no uncertain terms he had said that the army would be used to preserve the unity and the integrity of the country. To what extent this represented his own view and to what extent he was under pressure from the most uncompromising political and military forces in the west wing was difficult to assess. It was, however, quite clear that if these pressures prevented him from giving in to the Sheikh's demands, the country would soon hit the rocks.

President Yahya's intention in Dacca may therefore have been to gain time with the Sheikh until he had convinced his colleagues in the west wing of the need to go along almost all the way with Mujib. If he fails and the tenuous link between the east and the west wings that the president now is breaks, there is no alternative but a parting of the ways. His last duty then would be to use all his power and influence to prevent it from happening in a sea of blood.