The Soviet‐Indian friendship accord signed in New Delhi yesterday strengthens Soviet influence in the second most populous nation in Asia—and the world—at the expense of the United States. It could increase the danger of a local war leading to a big‐power confrontation on the Indian subcontinent.

The decision of Moscow and New Delhi to cement their long‐time cooperation with a twenty‐year treaty undoubtedly was influenced by apprehension in both capitals about the growing rapproachement between the United States and China. But the moving factor for the Indians is certainly their desperate sense of isolation as the Pakistani civil conflict threatens to spill over their borders—a conflict in which both Chinese and American policies appear to favor the Pakistani Government. The incredible United States decision to keep supplying arms and other aid to Pakistan in spite of the ruthless Pakistani crackdown on autonomy‐seeking Bengalis, and especially on Bengali Hindus, has handed Moscow a major foreign policy coup.

The Soviet‐Indian accord is clearly intended to discourage any attack on India by Pakistan with Peking support; yet it does not necessarily serve the cause peace. Although the Pakistani army might conceivably make a desperate lunge at India in an attempt to divert attention from its growing embarrassment in East Pakistan, such a confrontation with superior Indian forces would be highly irrational. If war does come to the sub continent, it is more likely to arise inadvertently out guerrilla activities along the porous Indian‐East Pakistani border.

The danger is that Moscow's backing may encourage the Indians to become bolder in their support for the Bengali Liberation Army and thus increase the danger Indo‐Pak clashes that could get out of hand. If peace is to be served, the Russians will have to use their new influence in the Indian capital to counsel restraint and promote accommodation.

But by signing a treaty with the Indians, the Kremlin has compromised any credit it still may have had in Islamabad, thus reducing the possibility of becoming a mediator, a role it played so successfully at Tashkent after the 1965 Indo‐Pak conflict. The United States Government is in no better position to serve as conciliator, having cast its lot so firmly with the Yahya regime. The wise course for Washington now is to use what influence it may have in Islamabad — and that does not appear to be much—to persuade President Yahya put aside the secret military trial of Sheik Mujibur Rahman, the Bengali political leader. If Mujib should be sentenced to death, as Yahya has threatened, the possibility of a political settlement in Pakistan would be virtually destroyed. War between India and Pakistan would be difficult to avoid, regardless of Washington's wishes—or Moscow's.